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in preparing himself for future usefulness, Ten useless Years
have [closed] the Account: And he now finds himself near
his Fortieth year, banished under pain of death, to a dis-
tant Country, where he has not the most remote family
connection, nor scarcely an Acquaintance, who is not in the
same Circumstances — cut off from his profession — from
every hope of importance in Life, and in a great Degree from
Social enjoyments. And where, unknowing and unknown,
he finds, that after having expended the little, he hopes to
receive, as above related, that he shall be unable, while he
may be said only to wait for death, to procure common
Comforts and Conveniences, in a Station much inferior to
that of a Menial Servant, without the assistance of Govern-
ment.
— THOMAS DANFORTH, memorial to loyalist claims com-
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The American Revolution, seen from the perspective of
two hundred years, is an accomplished fact. As everyone
knows, independence was won and the republic successfully
established. It is difficult, therefore, to recapture the uncer-
tainty of the revolutionary years and to comprehend the
process by which well-meaning Americans came to disagree
over the question of whether or not to seek independence.
Yet that is what must be done before the loyalists or their
reasons for seeking shelter in England can be fully under-
stood.
It is customary to begin a discussion of the conflict between
loyalists and revolutionaries in 1765, for the Stamp Act crisis
serves as a convenient and well-documented line dividing the
internally tranquil empire of the early eighteenth century
from the imperial turmoil of the 1770's.
1 But such a schema
vastly oversimplifies the complex political circumstances of
the prerevolutionary period. To the colonists of 1765, inde-
pendence was not at issue, nor, for that matter, were there
many Americans who did not favor some sort of imperial
reform. The Stamp Act aroused nearly universal opposition
in the colonies — as Jonathan Mayhew said, "Almost every
British American . . . considered it as an infraction of their
rights, or their dearly purchased privileges"
2 — and they
quarreled with each other not so much over whether toThe British-Americans
protest the act as over how to protest it. The chief questions
in contention were the grounds upon which to base their
opposition, the methods they should use to express their dis-
pleasure with British policy, and the extent to which they
should rely upon extralegal means to make their point. Few
colonists ever positively favored the act, though some did
argue that it had to be obeyed in spite of its unpopularity.
The consensus supporting reform was practically unanimous.
When they were later faced with other revenue acts, most
of the colonists continued to function intellectually within
the same restricted context. They argued over means, not
ends, and they did so within a purely imperial framework.
3
They demanded greater autonomy within the empire while
simultaneously recognizing the benefits, even the necessity, of
retaining a connection with Great Britain. But by the latter
part of the 1760's a major shift in attitudes was occurring
among more radical Americans. As recently outlined by
Pauline Maier, this change encompassed both the radicals'
nascent perception of a ministerial plot aimed at destroying
American liberties and their increasing disillusionment with
the king himself. Always before they had been willing to
concede that the ministers and Parliament had been acting in
good faith, though mistakenly; always before they had ab-
solved the king from any participation in his servants' errors.
But between 1768 and 1772 — having before them what they
thought were numerous examples of ministerial and royal
perfidy — the radical colonists discarded their assumptions as
to the government's benevolent intentions, replacing them
with the contrary assumption that the British authorities
were deliberately attempting to enslave the colonies.
4
Because the radicals' premises had changed, the disruption
of Anglo-American relations after the Boston Tea Party in
December 1773 proved to be decisive. Instead of continuingPrologue 5
the dispute within traditional lines, the radical party, which
now included many of the most influential American politi-
cal leaders, turned to new methods of opposition and protest.
And as the novelty of the radicals' approach became progres-
sively more apparent to conservatives and moderates, they
began to dissociate themselves from their former allies.
The new direction of the protest movement was publicly
revealed for the first time at the First Continental Congress.
Although some colonists opposed the very calling of the Con-
gress, most Americans supported the idea in hopes that such
an assembly would be the means through which an accept-
able settlement with the ministry could be reached. But the
Congress, instead of following the moderate course that had
been anticipated, took two actions that some colonists be-
lieved would widen, rather than conciliate, the differences
with Great Britain. The first was its approval of the Suffolk
Resolves, an inflammatory statement of American rights
drafted by one of Samuel Adams' associates. The second was
its acceptance of the Continental Association, a comprehen-
sive nonimportation, nonexportation, and nonconsumption
agreement that was to be enforced by local committees estab-
lished for the purpose. To some Americans, it seemed that
congressional actions tended towards "a total independency,"
because the committees would constitute local governments
bearing no relationship to regular imperial structures. If the
colonists wanted to protest British policy, these men con-
tended, they should accomplish that end through the mecha-
nism of their properly elected state assemblies. The critics of
Congress were therefore not so much opposed to reform per
se as they were to the means by which reform was being
pursued. And their chief objection to the method of protest
adopted by the Congress was their belief that it would even-
tually lead the colonies down the path to independence.
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It is important to note that not every future loyalist per-
ceived the issue in this way at this point in time. Indeed,
some Americans who would remain faithful to the crown
continued to participate in the coalition protesting parlia-
mentary measures even after the armed clashes at Lexington
and Concord. As long as American leaders publicly sought no
more than reform within the empire, which had been the
goal since 1765, colonists who would oppose independence
had no difficulty in maintaining their membership in the so-
called ''revolutionary" movement. On the other hand, once it
appeared that the radicals had decided that the connection
with Great Britain should be abandoned, the loyalists broke
with their fellow countrymen. Many colonists who had vigor-
ously supported the attempts to win imperial reform, who
had actively defended the Americans' claim to the rights of
Englishmen, were horrified by the idea of independence.
Consequently, when they recognized the implications of the
course upon which the radicals had embarked, they pulled
back, recoiling from the step that seemed so logical to many
of their compatriots. The moment of realization did not
come simultaneously to all loyalists: some made their deci-
sion in 1774, a larger number in 1775, a few not until mid-
1776.
The complexities of this dynamic process have often been
overlooked by historians of the Revolution. There is no one
point — at least not prior to July 4, 1776 — at which the two
sides can be completely and irrevocably identified. Before
1774 the political and ideological lines were not at all clearly
drawn, as is suggested by the fact that Daniel Dulany, the
most widely read pro-American pamphleteer of 1765, was at
best a neutral during the war itself; that John Dickinson, the
famed author of Letters from a Pennsylvania Farmer in
1767-1768, refused to sign the Declaration of Independence;Prologue 7
and that William Smith, a political ally of the radicals in
New York in the 1760's, finally chose to side with Britain in
1778 after years of indecision. In short, post-1774 affiliations
and opinions cannot be projected backwards upon the pre-"
revolutionary period. There could be no loyalists until there
were rebels, and there were no rebels until after 1773. There
could be, and was, conservative criticism directed at the activ-
ities of the dominant protest coalition, but that was not
loyalism. Not until independence was perceived as the chief
point of contention could anything resembling a "loyalist
party" emerge.
Moreover, throughout the prerevolutionary years, the
radicals retained the initiative. They organized and acted,
other Americans merely reacted. It is relatively easy, there-
fore, to delineate the membership of the revolutionary move-
ment. It is far harder to determine the identity of its
opponents. The colonists who can today be identified as
loyalists are to a large extent self-selected: they fled to Great
Britain or Canada, joined a loyalist regiment, or were singled
out by committees or provincial legislatures as enemies to the
American cause. As a result any study of "the loyalists" — or,
in this case, "the refugees" — is unavoidably limited in its
scope to the most extreme representatives of loyalism. There
must have been thousands of other Americans who retained
their fidelity to the crown but who were neither willing nor
able to abandon their homes, speak out against their rebel
neighbors, or take up arms to defend their point of view.
This observation suggests another point. Americans did
not "become" loyal to the empire: they remained loyal to the
empire. In 1765, every colonist — including Patrick Henry,
Samuel Adams, and Thomas Jefferson — proclaimed his loy-
alty to Great Britain. Many Americans became revolution-
aries in the years that followed, and that was the significant8 The British-Americans
change. It is entirely conceivable that some loyalists adhered
to their original allegiance through what might be termed
political inertia. The burden of making a break with the past
rested with the revolutionaries, not the loyalists — despite
radical rhetoric to the contrary.
Because of this pattern of decision-making, there is no
reason for historians today to regard some Americans' reten-
tion of fidelity to the empire as in any way abnormal. Loyalty
was the norm: rebellion was not. But the success of the
Revolution has caused historians to reverse the priorities.
Instead of asking, What motivated the rebels? we ask, What
motivated the loyalists? And that question is exceptionally
difficult to answer, because loyalism can be defined only in a
negative sense, only through its relationship to the movement
it opposed. Furthermore, a number of the 'loyalists" seem to
have assumed that guise for reasons unrelated to ideology or
independence. They opportunistically chose what they
thought would be the winning side, simply continued to
oppose old enemies who had become rebels, or acted almost
solely out of economic or political self-interest.
6 This is why
loyalists were such a diverse group, and why it is practically
impossible to delineate any characteristics common to them
all, except their adherence to Great Britain.
By focusing upon the refugees who fled to England during
the Revolutionary War, this study attempts to illuminate
both the loyalist experience and the Revolution as a whole.
Many of the Americans who chose to go to the British Isles
had been leaders in the prewar colonies: the exiles included
most of the government officials, professional men, wealthy
merchants, and large landowners who remained faithful to
the crown. And a large number of ordinary loyalists —
farmers, artisans, urban laborers, and the like — traveled to
Great Britain as well. Consequently, the approximately 7,000Prologue 9
American exiles in England serve as a convenient (if by no
means statistically reliable) sample of the total group of
perhaps 60,000 to 80,000 loyalists who left the colonies dur-
ing and after the war. The refugees' frustrating encounters
with British bureaucracy, their attempts to re-create America
in exile, their opinions on the war constitute a valuable
counterpoint to the traditional "patriot" view of the Revolu-
tion. An examination of their fate can therefore add signifi-
cantly to our understanding of the events of the revolu-
tionary era.A Certain Place of Safety
As the Rebellion is general thro' the provinces, the
friends of Governmt have no certain place to fly
to for safety but to Eng.
— HENRY CANER,I775
1
T
HE year 1774 dawned sixteen days after the Boston Tea
Party, and by the time its twelve months ended, the
royal provincial governments were in disarray, the First Con-
tinental Congress had convened and adjourned, and the
battles at Lexington and Concord were just three and a half
months in the future. That one year brought the effective
collapse of British authority in America, and it consequently
posed a question that many colonists had previously managed
to avoid or obscure: If it came to a choice, did their primary
allegiance lie with Great Britain, or did it lie instead with the
provinces in which they lived?
This crucial issue did not arise simultaneously throughout
the continent. New Englanders faced it first, because of their
adamant opposition to the laws they called "intolerable," but
it was not until after the outbreak of actual fighting that
other Americans were forced to make an essentially irrevers-
ible decision. Whenever the time came, though, the colonists
who chose to side with the crown almost always found them-
selves in a distinct minority. Outnumbered and unorganized,A Certain Place of Safety 11
the men who remained loyal to the empire were never able to
combat effectively the mobs, revolutionary committees, and
legislative pronouncements used to silence them. Their only
recourse, it seemed, was flight.
On June 1, 1774, Governor Thomas Hutchinson of Massa-
chusetts left his native province for what was to be the last
time. Hutchinson, an intelligent and perceptive man, had
over the course of his career constructed a network of patron-
age and influence unrivaled in any other province. He himself
served Massachusetts as chief justice, lieutenant governor,
and governor, and each time he moved on to a higher post he
was replaced by a member of the Oliver family, to which he
was related by marriage. No American had been more suc-
cessful than he in acquiring and retaining political power.
Yet Hutchinson had been unable to cope with the problems
that arose during his tenure as governor. With the arrival of
his successor, General Thomas Gage, he was finally free to
sail for the British Isles in the hope of achieving in London
what he had failed to accomplish in Massachusetts. Above all,
Hutchinson wanted to ensure the preservation of British rule
in America. As he left his homeland, accompanied by his
daughter and two of his three sons, he was both pleased to
escape what he described as "five years constant scene of
anxiety" and looking forward to a fruitful visit to the mother
country.
2
The sequence of events that caused Hutchinson's volun-
tary departure had started, innocently enough, with an act of
Parliament giving the East India Company a preferential
position in the American tea trade. The law was aimed more
at bolstering the company's ailing finances than at affecting
colonial commerce, but some Americans interpreted the mea-12 The British-Americans
sure as a British plot to renew a pattern of oppression that
had begun with the Stamp Act in 1765. On December 16,
1773, a group of "Indians" publicly protested the new law by
dumping more than three hundred chests of the company's
tea into Boston harbor.
Britain's response to the vandalism was immediate and
enraged. Determined to impose its will on the unruly resi-
dents of Massachusetts, Parliament approved the four laws
that became known in America as the Intolerable Acts, and
neither the legislators nor British officials stationed in
America anticipated much resistance to the new program. As
Gage later observed, "Nobody here or at home could have
conceived, that the Acts made for the Massachusetts Bay,
could have created such a Ferment through the Continent,
and united the whole in one common Cause."
3
The four laws that so unexpectedly proved to be the
catalyst that ignited the fires of rebellion in the colonies were
intended to demonstrate to New Englanders that they could
no longer thwart the will of Parliament. The acts took a frag-
mentary and disjointed approach to the perplexities of gov-
erning Massachusetts, one that ranged from the imposition of
short-term punishment on Boston to the adoption of some
fundamental alterations in the provincial charter. Taken
together, the laws succeeded only in creating new difficulties.
By punishing loyal and rebellious subjects alike, by denying
Gage sufficient discretionary authority, Parliament managed
to antagonize a large segment of the population while at the
same time it tied the hands of the royal governor. Predictably,
the result was chaotic.
4
The Boston Port Act, which closed the port of Boston until
the company had been reimbursed for its tea, was both the
first of the four laws to be passed and the first to be pro-
claimed in America. Its contents presented the citizens ofA Certain Place of Safety 13
Boston with a clear-cut choice: either they could loyally
acquiesce in a punishment many of them believed was unwar-
ranted, or they could openly resist Parliament's attempt to
subdue them. For its part, the town meeting defiantly refused
to accede to the conditions Parliament had laid down for the
reopening of the port. On the other hand, 124 prominent
Bostonians chose a more moderate course. Formally address-
ing the departing Governor Hutchinson, they assured him
that they were willing to pay their share of the cost of the tea,
even though they thought the law too harsh. One of their
number, the wealthy merchant and distiller Richard Lech-
mere, explained that despite being "no inconsiderable
sufferer" under the act, he would "willingly" submit to it in
the expectation that "by suffering" the people would be
"brought to their senses."
5
But Lechmere's hopes, and presumably those of the other
Addressors as well, were futile. Rather than convincing their
fellow countrymen that the Port Act should be obeyed, the
signers of the Address merely set themselves up as targets for
radical opprobrium. Ever since 1765 supporters of unpopular
British measures had been regarded as "detestable Villains,"
as "apostate sons of venality . . . wretched hirelings and
execrable parricides," and the Addressors were no exception.
Vehemently attacked in the newspapers, threatened with
political and economic retaliation unless they withdrew their
signatures from the petition, many of them were frightened
into "Timidity and Backwardness," to use Governor Gage's
words.
6
The colonists' resentment increased when another of the
laws, the Massachusetts Government Act, went into effect in
August. Its major provisions — a limitation on town meetings
and the substitution of an appointed council for the elected
one — had long been touted in England as a panacea for the14 The British-Americans
province's reputed governmental ills. But in America the act
was taken as a confirmation of Britain's intention to enslave
the colonies, because the elected council had for years played
a major role in Massachusetts' resistance to Parliament. It now
seemed clear to many that the ministry had determined to
disregard, even to destroy, those rights of Englishmen that
were the colonists' only defense against tyranny.
7
In the emotional atmosphere engendered by the act, those
who dared to suggest that it should be obeyed were con-
demned as unregenerate villains. And in the forefront of this
hapless group were the men who had been unfortunate
enough to be appointed to the new mandamus council. In
the radicals' eyes, it was bad enough that Parliament was
transgressing colonial rights, but it was far worse that the in-
struments of this heinous deed were to be American collabo-
rators who had been suborned by British gold. Given the
circumstances, the newly designated councilors wisely viewed
their appointments with more caution than enthusiasm. Sev-
eral of their number, well aware of the possible consequences
of accepting the proffered positions, declined from the outset
to serve on the council. Mobs quickly persuaded the few
waverers to refuse the posts, and some of the men who
initially agreed to take seats on the council were also fright-
ened into recanting.
8
One typical incident involved Councilor Thomas Oliver,
who was lieutenant governor of the colony. On September 2,
Oliver's home in Cambridge was surrounded by an angry
mob. Although the crowd swore "they would have my
blood," Oliver later recounted, he at first "absolutely re-
fused" to resign. But then he considered the "distresses" of
his wife and family, and "Nature, ingenious in forming new
reasons, suggested to my mind the calamities which wouldA Certain Place of Safety 15
ensue if I did not comply." Hurriedly he signed the resigna-
tion the mob's leaders thrust at him.
9
The details varied, but the pattern was everywhere the
same. Throughout the province, men whose names had been
proposed for the mandamus council became the objects of
mob violence. The merest hint that a man was considering
serving on the council was sufficient to attract mobs to his
house or place of business, or to cause crowds to attack him
on the open road. Consequently, many of the councilors
thought it best to flee to Boston, where they could be protected
by royal troops.
1
0 Before long they were joined in the city by
other fugitives from the countryside, as the campaign of
intimidation was widened to include any man who advocated
obedience to the Intolerable Acts. Just ten days after the
attack on Oliver, Gage informed Lord Dartmouth, the
American secretary, that ''People are daily resorting to this
Town for Protection, for there is no Security to any Person
deemed a Friend to Government in any Part of the Coun-
try."
1
1
The frightened Massachusetts citizens who sought shelter in
Boston in August and September 1774 may properly be
termed the first loyalist refugees of the Revolution. The resi-
dents of their province had been the first to confront the
crucial question of where their primary allegiance lay, and
they were the first to suffer the consequences of having sup-
plied the ''wrong" answer in the context of the times. Their
response to the Intolerable Acts had been one of grudging
compliance rather than complete acquiescence, but they had
been branded as enemies to America because they had ad-
mitted the supremacy of Parliament. Most of them would
never see their homes again.
Like the royal government they supported, they had been
completely unprepared for the sudden explosion of violence16 The British-Americans
that greeted the Intolerable Acts. As individuals, they could
not have hoped to oppose the ubiquitous mobs, and as a
group they proved to be too few and too scattered to offer any
significant resistance. Isolated and helpless, they watched,
frustrated, as their world crumbled around them. From the
time they left their homes, they were the prisoners, not the
movers, of events. Their fate was to rest not in their own
hands, but was rather to be subject to the joint control of the
radical colonists they detested and the faraway British minis-
ters who would not listen to them.
Outside of Massachusetts, the colonists had not yet been
forced to choose between their allegiance to the empire and
their ties to their particular provinces. The Intolerable Acts,
with one exception, applied only to Massachusetts, and in the
absence of an immediate threat to their well-being, most
Americans remained relatively calm. Thus the other colonies
exhibited little of the internecine strife that filled the New
England autumn. Instead, in the middle and southern prov-
inces it was still possible to debate openly the issues that had
already been decided in the North.
1
2
One result of this less highly charged atmosphere was an
emboldened public opposition to the radicals. With the no-
table exception of Daniel Leonard, the young and gifted
attorney who wrote his "Massachusettensis" letters in the
security of Boston after he had abandoned his Taunton
home, the major conservative authors of the period lived out-
side of New England. In general they were either govern-
ment officials (like William Allen, chief justice of Pennsyl-
vania) or Anglican clergymen (like Myles Cooper of New
York) . Both groups readily perceived the threat to the status
quo posed by the actions of the First Continental Congress,A Certain Place of Safety 17
and they exerted themselves to defend the state and the estab-
lished church from the radicals' attacks.
In New York, the leading conservative writers were the
Reverends Samuel Seabury and Thomas Bradbury Chandler,
who, along with their fellow Anglican cleric Charles Inglis,
deliberately combined to supply "the speediest answers" to
such radical publications "as appeared to have a bad ten-
dency."
1
3 Both Seabury and Chandler were native Ameri-
cans, graduates of Yale, and missionaries of the Society for the
Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts. Chandler, ever
the optimist, was an indefatigable worker who bore with
fortitude the burden of a painful facial cancer that eventually
caused his death in 1790. Seabury, who was to become the
first bishop of Connecticut, was both a less penetrating
thinker and a more conscious propagandist. He, like Chan-
dler, wrote three pamphlets during the crucial 1774-1775
period.
A less prolific but no less important contributor to con-
servative literature in the same years was Joseph Galloway, a
Pennsylvanian and former political associate of Benjamin
Franklin. Galloway, a delegate to the First Continental Con-
gress, presented to that body a conciliation plan that was at
first only narrowly defeated but was later expunged from the
record. Disheartened by the rejection of his scheme, Gal-
loway published both it and a supportive rationale in 1775,
and for years thereafter he submitted and resubmitted modi-
fications of the same plan to the ministry in London. But
Galloway was too rigidly legalistic, too concerned with ideo-
logical consistency, ever to propose a workable solution to the
imperial problems that obsessed him.
The pamphleteers' goal was simply stated: they wanted "to
awaken the thoughtless to a sense of their danger" and "to try
to reclaim them from their folly, and save them from destruc-COURTESY OF SEABURY SOCIETY FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE GLEBE HOUSE,
WOODBURY, CONNECTICUT
The Reverend Samuel Seabury, from a painting by Thomas DucheCOURTESY OF LIBRARY OF CONGRESS PRINTS DIVISION
'-
The Reverend Thomas Bradbury Chandler20 The British-Americans
tion, before it be too late." Each represented himself as
having "no interest to serve but what is common to my
countrymen," and each was convinced that "all reasonable
Americans'' would "see the necessity of giving up the present
system of American politics, as essentially wrong and destruc-
tive; and of entering unanimously upon moderate and con-
ciliating measures" once they had been "brought to make use
of their own understanding and examine into, and judge for
themselves upon, the real grounds of their fears."
1
4
Accordingly, the conservative authors set out to persuade
their fellow countrymen of three points: that they had no
irremediable grievances against Great Britain; that the
tyranny of Congress was far worse than that of Parliament;
and that nothing could be gained by seeking independence.
Chandler in particular emphasized the first argument.
Most of the current difficulty, he declared, had resulted from
"misinformation and false alarms." If the tea tax was a griev-
ance, then it was no more than "the weight of an atom on the
shoulders of a giant." Boston had deserved its punishment,
for its citizens had committed "an act of the highest insolence
towards government." Moreover, the residents of the other
colonies were "under no obligations to abet the destructive
violence of the people in Boston; or to endeavour to skreen it
from public justice." Far from it: instead of sharing New
England's guilt the other provinces "should endeavour to
reclaim them, by affectionate admonitions, and especially by
a good example." Seabury, by contrast, put his stress on the
disadvantages of congressional rule. He attacked the Conti-
nental Association at length, arguing that it would not
achieve the desired ends and that its sole purpose was to line
the merchants' pockets. Even worse, he declared, was the
"oppressive tyranny" Americans were enduring, "a tyranny,
not only over the actions, but over the words, thoughts, andA Certain Place of Safety 21
wills'' of all of them. It was a "really deplorable" situation
that could be corrected only if his fellow colonists would be
willing to stand up to the committeemen and tell them "you
are Englishmen, and will maintain your rights and privileges
. . . without asking leave of any illegal, tyrannical Congress
or Committee on earth."
1
5
The pamphleteers became most impassioned when they
considered the possible consequences of rebellion. Regardless
of whether a revolt was successful or unsuccessful, Chandler
predicted, it would ''necessarily terminate in ruin and de-
struction" for the colonies. Could anyone, asked Leonard, be
"so deluded" as to think that Great Britain, "who so lately
carried her arms with success to every part of the globe,"
would fail to conquer the weak and disunited American
provinces? On the contrary, it was apparent that, "with the
British navy in the front, Canadians and savages in the rear, a
regular army in the midst," the American landscape would
be devastated, "our houses be burnt to ashes, our fair posses-
sions laid waste."
1
6
Other writers, taking up the same pessimistic theme,
warned that even if independence was unexpectedly won,
"we shall inevitably fall under the dominion of some foreign
tyrant, or the more intolerable despotism of a few American
demagogues." The colonies would become "a theatre of in-
conceivable misery and horrour," filled with "anarchy and
confusion." Galloway painted an especially vivid picture of
the dreadful consequences: "Companies of armed, but undis-
ciplined men, headed by men unprincipled, travelling over
your estates, entering your houses — your castles — and sacred
repositories of safety for all you hold dear and valuable —
seizing your property, and carrying havock and devastation
wherever they head — ravishing your wives and daughters,
and afterwards plunging the dagger into their tender bosoms,22 The British-Americans
while you are obliged to stand the speechless, the helpless
spectators."
1
7
But despite this perception of an impending cataclysm, the
pamphleteers failed to transmit a sense of urgency to many of
their fellow Americans. In late 1774 and early 1775, the
strategy of the 1760's still seemed viable to many residents of
the middle and southern colonies. Believing, as Chandler
said, that they had "reason to complain of some late acts, as
violations of their constitutional liberty," the Americans
thought it likely that the North ministry would surrender in
the face of concerted opposition, just as previous administra-
tions had yielded when the colonies had actively resisted in
1765 and 1767. American leaders wanted to avoid an irrevo-
cable confrontation with the ministry, and to that end they
publicly advocated reconciliation, expressing dismay at the
very idea of independence.
1
8 Consequently, the vital ques-
tion that was later to divide loyalist from rebel was not even
raised, and in the absence of such a sharply defined issue it
was impossible for most Americans to determine with any
certainty just what constituted the difference between a loyal
opposition to specific parliamentary policies and a treason-
able resistance to British authority. The political context was
so ambiguous that a conservative colonist who hoped that
England and America could peacefully negotiate a mutually
acceptable settlement of their dispute did not appear unalter-
ably opposed to his more radical compatriots. Even Galloway
admitted as late as August 1775, "However I may differ with
many respecting the mode of redress, and the means of
accommodating the unhappy Differences between them . . .
yet I shall be happy to find in the unforeseen events of
things that I have been mistaken and others in the Right."
1
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The lack of clear ideological divisions in the time of flux
between the adjournment of the First Congress and theA Certain Place of Safety 23
battles at Lexington and Concord is suggested by three obser-
vations that may be made about the functioning of the
committees established to enforce the Continental Association.
First, they concerned themselves only with overt violators of
the Association, with active opponents of Congress, not with
men who expressed a more conservative philosophy than
theirs. Their role was strictly limited, and their aim was to
control certain specified actions, not thought. Their restraint
contributed to a second circumstance, the invariable failure
of the scattered attempts to form "counterassociations" to
oppose them. Only men like the pamphleteers, who were
especially sensitive to the committees' challenge to the politi-
cal and religious establishment, rallied to support the efforts
at organized resistance. A third and still more important
indication of the underlying consensus was the fact that a
number of men who eventually proved to be steadfast
loyalists participated actively in the work of the committees
and provincial congresses. These colonists saw no contradic-
tion between their fidelity to Great Britain and their desire to
readjust the imperial relationship. As long as the issue was
not independence but rather reform within the empire, men
who were to consider themselves loyalists in the years to come
could readily embrace the American cause. There was no
inconsistency involved: their ideology remained constant. It
was the radicals who changed.
2
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The accuracy of this observation may be illustrated by a
closer examination of the ideas of one of the men in question,
the Reverend Jacob Duche of Philadelphia. Duche, an Angli-
can with intellectual pretensions, served as chaplain to both
the First and Second Continental Congresses. In July 1775 he
preached a sermon entitled "The Duty of Standing Fast in
our Spiritual and Temporal Liberties," which was such a
strong statement of the American position that another24 The British-Americans
future loyalist, Jonathan Boucher, who was more skeptical of
the colonies' claims, felt compelled to respond to it with a
learned sermon of his own. But in his presentation Duche
carefully declared his "inviolable loyalty" to the king, and,
he asked emphatically, "As to any pretensions to, or even
desire of independency, have we not openly disavowed them
in all our petitions, representations and remonstrances?"
More than two years later, in a letter addressed to George
Washington, he explained that he had "looked upon inde-
pendency rather as an Expedient, and a hazardous one in-
deed, thrown out in terrorem, in order to procure some
favourable terms, than [as] a measure, that was seriously to
be persisted in at all events."
2
1 Duche had not altered his
opinion one whit in the intervening years. It was Washing-
ton and the members of Congress who had abandoned one
course of action for another. And the primary event that
helped to set them on their new path was the outbreak of war
on April 19, 1775.
[3]
The clashes at Lexington and Concord brought to an end
much of the uncertainty of the previous months. Although
American leaders still denied that they sought independence,
ever greater numbers of colonists began to see that indepen-
dence was indeed the ultimate issue. Furthermore, many
participants in the earlier coalition did not believe that
Americans should oppose Great Britain with force, regardless
of the limited nature of their goals. In the wake of the fight-
ing, such critics of the radical strategy appeared to be poten-
tial dangers to the cause of freedom, possible spies and
traitors, rather than simply dissenters whose waywardness
could be tolerated. The radicals argued that men who op-A Certain Place of Safety 25
posed the will of the people in this important matter could
not expect to participate normally in society. To use the
words of the Georgia provincial assembly, they were "inimi-
cal to the Liberties of America," and therefore ''precluded
from the protection of this Congress."
2
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Accordingly, the local committees and provincial con-
gresses set out to expose and neutralize their opponents.
2
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Again New England took the lead, and the committees of the
area turned their attention to men who had managed to
escape the notice of the mobs during the preceding autumn.
A typical target was the Reverend John Wiswall, an Anglican
missionary stationed at Falmouth, who at first had "deter-
mined to espouse neither side, considering himself as a Min-
ister of that kingdom which is not of this w
Torld." But
Wiswall discovered to his dismay that "even silence is now
censured by the people as evidence of what they call tory
principles." Like many others, Wiswall was harassed by his
local committee soon after the battles at Lexington and
Concord. In May he seized the first available opportunity to
escape to Boston.
2
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It is important to note that as yet it was only in the North
that such silent supporters of British authority came under
attack from the committees. In the middle and southern
colonies, where the war had not had a direct impact, it was
not until September 1775 that the committees' campaign
against dissenters shifted into high gear. But from that time
on Americans who disagreed with the prevailing revolution-
ary ideology were confronted with a steadily narrowing range
of political choices.
The progression began with a number of provincial laws
prescribing penalties for anyone who aided British troops or
criticized the Continental Congress. By either formal or in-
formal mechanisms the local committees became responsible26 The British-Americans
for enforcing these laws, and so they started to conduct offi-
cial investigations of men charged with publicly or privately
opposing the war effort.
2
5 Some especially dedicated commit-
tees actively searched out potential troublemakers by circu-
lating defense associations, which were formal agreements to
take up arms against Great Britain. Persons who would not
sign the associations were immediately exposed as unsympa-
thetic to the American cause. Another tactic that served the
same end was an official mustering of the local militia.
2
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The aim of these devices was to identify the disaffected and
consequently to make them subject to the committees' con-
trol. Once singled out, suspected persons could be 'Very
narrowly watched" (as one was), fined, required to give
bond for their good behavior, imprisoned, or forcibly removed
from their homes to remote sections of the province or even
to other colonies.
2
7 Moreover, once a man had been declared
an "Enemy to the Freedoms and Rights of America," he
could be subjected to all sorts of ingenious pressures designed
to make him abandon either his beliefs or his property. A
Virginia Anglican cleric, for example, had to contend with
"officers and armed parties" that "frequently entered his
Churches with Drums Guns and Bayonets and with wanton
outcrys and profanity disturbed the Sacred Service of Re-
ligion," and even "nailed up the Windows and Doors of his
Churches and at length placed armed Men to guard them on
Sundays." In another telling incident, an unfortunate resi-
dent of New Hampshire, afraid to anger the local militiamen
by refusing any of their requests, found that the soldiers "in
three Nights drank me in the article of Porter, thirty dozen
Bottles." It is hardly surprising that both men soon fled to
the protection of the nearest British outpost.
2
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Although the committees occasionally utilized more fore-COURTESY OF LIBRARY OF CONGRESS PRINTS DIVISION
Virginians being forced to sign the Continental Association in 1775, as
seen by a British cartoonist. Note the tar and feathers hanging from the
scaffold in the background.28 The British-Americans
ible coercion, it was likely that the mere threat of direct
action would suffice to serve their purposes. Their use of tar-
ring and feathering, for example, has been greatly exagger-
ated. A few men were tarred and feathered, but more
common was the experience of loyalists like George Johnston
and Thomas Macknight, of South and North Carolina re-
spectively, who, although mobbed and threatened, were able
to leave their homes without being physically molested.
2
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And in any case drastic tactics were adopted only as a last
resort. A suspected person would usually first be warned to
mend his ways. If he persisted in his obstinate refusal to
support the rebellion, he would be subjected to harassment
short of physical harm, just as a Marylander was "hanged and
Burnt in Effigy in different parts of the Province and many
threats thrown out daily against both his Person and prop-
erty." The next step was to present him (as was done with
the same man) with the "Alternative of either taking up
Arms or Subjecting himself to such Punishment as the Pro-
vincial Convention shall think proper to inflict." That, for
most loyalists, was no choice at all, and they often selected a
third, implicit alternative — flight.
30
The committees therefore had many ways of achieving the
desired end of silencing their critics. The best method of all,
perhaps, was to get rid of them altogether. Prominent loyal-
ists who had left their homes could not exercise any influence
over their neighbors, whereas if they remained they could
sow dissension among their fellow countrymen. Furthermore,
once inside the British lines they could do little to harm the
American cause. And so, it seems, the committees deliber-
ately created an atmosphere that abetted emigration. As one
Virginian accurately observed, the "few friends [of] Govern-
ment" were "either obliged to go off or subjected to insult
and danger."
3
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[4]
In 1775, the only haven in America for supporters of royal
authority was the town of Boston. British naval vessels
anchored in the harbors of New York City, Charleston, and
Norfolk could offer temporary shelter to fleeing loyalists, but
nowhere else in the thirteen colonies was there a city so
securely under royal control. Accordingly, to that sole beacon
of safety flocked the New Englanders forced from their homes
by committee persecution. By early summer the city was
crowded with refugees.
Life in the besieged port was far from pleasant. Most of the
civilians, without money or sufficient food supplies, were
forced to depend upon military stores for their very exist-
ence. The diet was monotonous — one sufferer described it
as "salt beef and salt pork one day, and the next . . . salt
pork and salt beef" — and the fear that the rebels would
eventually break through the British lines to cause "bar-
barous slaughter and desolation" was all-pervasive. As a re-
sult, many of the loyalists soon left for the happier climes of
Halifax or London. Jonathan Sewall, judge of the Halifax
vice-admiralty court and a leading Boston lawyer, graphically
enumerated his reasons for abandoning the city as "Mus-
ketry, Bombs, Great Guns, Redoubts, Lines, Batterys, Enfi-
lades, Battles, Sieges, Murder, plague, pestilence, Famine,
Rebellion, and the Devil." Many others must have agreed
with him and with John Wiswall, who wrote, "The Suffer-
ings and Persecutions I have undergone, together with the
Rebellious Spirit of the People has weaned my Affections
from my native Country — the further I go from it the
better." By mid-July, according to one observer, only one-
third of the city's population remained.
3
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But those who stayed clung tenaciously to their little30 The British-Americans
outpost of the empire. Chief Justice Peter Oliver, a close
friend and relative of Hutchinson, retained his confidence in
an ultimate British triumph because, he observed characteris-
tically, ''the God of Order may punish a community for a
time with their own disorders: but it is incompatible with
the rectitude of the Divine Nature, to suffer anarchy to
prevail." And so Oliver remained in Boston, despite the
hardships of the life he described cleverly in November 1775:
"We have little else to do now but to take snuff; we snuff in
the air for want of food: we take snuff at the rebels for their
barbarities: and we enjoy the snuff of candles, when we can
get them to burn." Like the other loyalists still resident in
the port, Oliver was caught unawares by the "sudden and
precipitate" retreat ordered in March 1776. General George
Washington's troops had managed to plant cannon on Dor-
chester Heights, which commanded the entire city, and Sir
William Howe consequently directed that the port be evacu-
ated. As Oliver's ship left the coastal waters of Massachusetts,
his comments reflected the bitterness he so deeply felt: "Here
I took my Leave of that once happy Country, where Peace
and Plenty reigned uncontrouled, till that infernal Hydra,
Rebellion, with its hundred Heads, had devoured its Happi-
ness, spread Devastation over its fertile Fields and ravaged
the peacefull Mansions of its Inhabitants. . . . Here I drop
the filial Tear into the Urn, of my Country."
3
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With the exception of a single ship that carried dispatches
and a few fortunate refugees directly to England, the vessels
loaded with civilians and soldiers set sail for Halifax. The
ships were crowded, and although the voyage was short, many
of the Bostonians arrived in Nova Scotia with "Health and
Strength almost exhausted." The circumstances they encoun-
tered when once again on dry land did little to improve their
condition. As Lieutenant Governor Oliver later reported, theA Certain Place of Safety 31
profit-hungry local inhabitants charged the refugees "six fold
the usual Rent" for "miserable Lodgings" and double the
regular prices of food and clothing. Observing the scene with
unusual detachment, Peter Oliver remarked wryly, "Thus
Mankind prey upon each other."
3
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The Bostonians quickly discovered that the exorbitant cost
of living was not the only drawback to a prolonged residence
in Halifax. Many became ill in the "foggy chilling air," and
they lamented the lack of the "comforts" of a New England
summer. Furthermore, Halifax was simply not a congenial
place to live. The town lacked many of the civilized amen-
ities to which the Bostonians had become accustomed, and
consequently a number of the evacuees soon made plans to
leave. Despite their certainty that the w
Tar would be won
within a few months, they saw no reason to endure the
discomforts of Nova Scotia any longer than was absolutely
necessary. As Lieutenant Governor Oliver explained just
before his departure from Halifax in May, "To continue in
this crouded starved Place without any possibility of being
useful to my Sovereign, is a Sacrafice which I am sure his
Majesty never will desire his servants to make."
3
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Oliver's intended destination was the British Isles, and
London in particular. The city was an irresistible magnet
drawing the refugees across the Atlantic: Mandamus coun-
cilors, customs officials, merchants, landowners, and civil ser-
vants — most of those who could afford to pay their passage —
unhesitatingly abandoned Nova Scotia in the summer of
1776 and sailed for England. By the end of the year, more
than seventy families, numbering among them many of the
political, social, and economic leaders of prewar Massachu-
setts, had arrived in the British Isles.
3
6 And these were but
the first of a long line of loyalists who would choose to spend
at least part of their exile in London. The metropolis at-32 The British-Americans
tracted American refugees for various reasons, not the least of
which were the numerous amusements available to curious
visitors with time on their hands. London was, after all, the
seat of the empire, the center from which the war was being
directed, and it seemed the perfect temporary residence for
prominent loyalists who wanted to offer their suggestions on
the war to the ministry, or who hoped to better themselves by
obtaining royal appointments. By the end of the war, nearly
every important American refugee had lived in London for
at least a brief period.
But there were some New Englanders who remained in
Halifax in the expectation that (as one said) they would be
* 'doing business in Boston before Winter." And when Sir
William Howe captured New York City just a few months
later, it seemed as if they had correctly anticipated the course
of events. But Boston was never to be retaken, and Man-
hattan of necessity replaced it as the chief haven for refugee
loyalists in America. Throughout the rest of the war New
York City was the major British stronghold in the colonies.
To it regularly came fleeing sufferers, singly or in small
groups, and large numbers of refugees arrived en masse
following the evacuation of Philadelphia in 1778 and the
abandonment of Savannah and Charleston in 1782-1783.
The extent of the loyalist migration was reflected in the
rising population of the city. It has been estimated that when
Howe took possession of New York only 5,000 of its regular
inhabitants remained. By February 1777 the civilian popula-
tion had climbed to 11,000; by 1781 it had become 25,000;
and by the time of the final evacuation in 1783 it was at least
33,000, in addition to the 10,000 British soldiers stationed in
the port.
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The presence of that many civilians caused serious logisti-
cal problems for the British military authorities that gov-A Certain Place of Safety 33
erned the city throughout the war. Normal difficulties were
compounded by the fact that fully one-quarter of the city's
dwellings had been accidentally destroyed by fire soon after
the British occupation began. As a result, lodgings were both
scarce and expensive, and the loyalists had to be satisfied with
what remained after the officers and men of the regular regi-
ments had been housed. By December 1778 one refugee was
describing conditions in the city as "truly deplorable and
almost hopeless." Another recorded his lengthy search for
suitable lodgings and complained vividly of the "stinks and
ill smells" permeating the port because of poor sanitation
and overcrowding. He commented bitterly that the residents
of New York exhibited only the most "vicious and unfeeling
part of human nature." It was a reflection with which others
concurred. In September 1778 Galloway observed, "Every-
one here think of nobody but themselves; and friendship is
not to be found."
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The lot of the loyalists in Manhattan was somewhat im-
proved after Sir Henry Clinton replaced Howe as com-
mander in chief. Clinton appointed two refugees to advise
him on the needs of their fellow sufferers, and he directed
that military supplies be issued to those in the greatest dis-
tress. A number of the Americans were employed by the
army in civilian capacities, and others were recruited into
loyalist regiments, largely because of Clinton's belief that it
was "more satisfactory to themselves and excites less jealousy
in others, that they be supposed in real employment, and not
receiving a bare elymosynary Subsidy."
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9 Clinton's successor,
Sir Guy Carleton, continued a solicitous policy toward the
refugees, even to the extent of delaying the final evacuation
of the city until he was certain that all the loyalists had had
the opportunity to leave. As a result, Manhattan was con-34 The British-Americans
sistently a sympathetic, if not an overly attractive, refuge for
loyal Americans fleeing from rebel-held territory.
But not every colonist who remained faithful to the crown
found it possible to reach Manhattan. For southern loyalists
in particular there were few avenues of escape until Savan-
nah fell to royal forces in late 1778. Before that time the loyal
residents of the South were completely at the mercy of the
rebel provincial governments. Their one organized attempt
to resist — the battle at Moore's Creek Bridge in North Caro-
lina in February 1776 —ended in the rout of the loyal
militia, and consequently in uncontested rebel control of the
area.
4
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During much of 1775 southern loyalists could still book
passage on regular commercial ships crossing the Atlantic,
and many took advantage of the opportunity to remove
themselves from the scrutiny of the committees. Yet large
numbers of British sympathizers remained in America, and
they were helpless to resist, or even to escape, as the southern
rebels systematically began to isolate and expose them. The
revolutionaries' campaign relied mainly upon the use of the
loyalty oath statutes that were enacted in most of the states by
the end of 1777. These laws required voters, officeholders,
and suspected persons to swear allegiance to the state, at the
same time abjuring their former loyalty to the king.
4
1 Espe-
cially in the Carolinas the acts were consciously utilized as a
means of ferreting out enemies of the rebellion. By the spring
of 1778, both states were requiring all free adult males to
take oaths of allegiance, under the threat of immediate ban-
ishment.
4
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Many southerners were therefore faced squarely with a
choice between an expedient submission to the rebel author-
ities and a public avowal of their principles. In spite of the
heavy penalty involved, some steadfast loyalists refused toA Certain Place of Safety 35
subscribe to the oaths and were banished to England or the
West Indies. Others adopted various subterfuges in order to
evade the requirement or, to the same end, attempted to
avoid having any contact with the local authorities adminis-
tering the oaths. But the acts meant, as one South Carolinian
later observed, that "Every body who contin[ue]d in the
Country was obliged to temporize."
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When the British army invaded Georgia in 1778, the time
for vacillation ended. For the first time southerners were
presented with a viable alternative to the revolutionary state
governments, and many of them were emboldened to reassert
their fidelity to the crown. The mere presence of royal troops
served to crystallize loyalist sentiment, and Americans who
had previously acquiesced in rebel rule sought the protection
of the redcoats and even enlisted in loyalist regiments. It is
difficult to determine how many of these late-declaring south-
ern loyalists were sincere in their reversal of allegiance and
how many were simply opportunists seeking the winning
side. But there can be no doubt that the chief factor influenc-
ing their decision to disavow the Revolution was the comfort-
ing accessibility of the British army. Without the assurance
offered by the presence of British troops, all but the most
fanatically loyal southerners had previously seen little reason
to oppose the Revolution openly.
The pattern that developed in the South after 1778 was the
familiar one. Loyalists from the region fled to British-occupied
Savannah and Charleston, just as their northern counterparts
had sought refuge in Boston, Philadelphia, and New York
City. And, since conditions in the southern ports were little
better than they had been in Halifax or Manhattan, some of
the refugees chose after a few months to retreat to England.
But at the same time many of those who had managed to es-
cape the South in previous years returned to resume what they36 The British-Americans
thought would be their normal lives in their former homes,
once again under British rule. The news of Cornwallis'
defeat at Yorktown in October 1781 came as an unwelcome
shock to these men, and when in the aftermath of that catas-
trophe the ministry ordered the evacuation of Savannah and
Charleston, one of them remarked that ''nothing could ex-
ceed the distress to which the Loyalists were then reduced."
The refugees had little choice: they could either leave
America, abandoning their property forever, or remain be-
hind to risk "the harshest treatment from an enraged
enemy."
4
4 And so, like their predecessors from Boston and
Philadelphia, most of them sorrowfully sailed with the
troops.
But this time there was a difference. Unlike their fore-
runners, the evacuees from the South — and later those from
Manhattan — knew that they would probably never return to
the United States. Consequently, instead of sailing for En-
gland and what was only a temporary residence, most of them
chose to go to the West Indies or to Canada, where they could
begin their lives anew within the remaining British Ameri-
can colonies.
4
5 The vast influx into the mother country had
ended, and many of the loyalists who had originally sought
refuge there joined the migration to other parts of the
empire. By 1785, the movement of loyalists resulting from
the Revolution had largely been completed.
The following table charts the arrival dates in Great
Britain for 1,440 heads of loyalist families. This figure repre-
sents a minimum calculation of the migration to England, for
there is evidence indicating that many loyalist exiles may
have disappeared into English life without leaving any trace
of their presence. Assuming that each person noted on the
chart had three dependents (wives, parents, children, or
other relatives), and taking into account the loyalists whoARRIVAL TIMES OF HEADS OF 1,440 FAMILIES
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a When a loyalist crossed the Atlantic more than once, he has been counted
the first time only. Although loyalists continued to arrive in England after
1784, most of them were permanently settled elsewhere and came only for the
purpose of submitting claims. Thus they have been excluded from this table,
though they are included in the analysis of claims in chapter 7. It should be
noted that the figures in the table do not exactly indicate the total number of
loyalists in England at any particular time, because there was a good deal of
transatlantic travel, especially by southerners who returned to their homes in
left no records, it seems reasonable to estimate that between
seven and eight thousand Americans fled to the British Isles.
In addition to suggesting the total size of the migration to
England, the table illustrates statistically several of the obser-
vations that have been made in this chapter. The importance
of the British army as a determinant of loyalist identification
has already been noted in relation to the southern campaign,
and the distribution of figures within the table demonstrates
that the presence of the army had a similar effect elsewhere at
other times during the war. The states that were most seri-38 The British-Americans
ously affected by the fighting produced far greater numbers
of refugees than those left relatively untouched by actual
battle. The contrast between neighboring states like Mary-
land and Pennsylvania, or New Hampshire and Massachu-
setts, is especially striking, even when population differences
are taken into account.
Furthermore, historians have tended to assume that the
number of exiles from a particular area or state indicates the
relative strength of loyalism in that region. For example, it
has been argued that "in most colonies Loyalism was a dis-
tinctly urban and seaboard phenomenon," on the basis of
figures that show that large percentages of the exiles came
from cities like Savannah, Charleston, and Boston, or at least
from nearby coastal areas. But when these observations are
viewed in the light of the pattern of British military activity,
a different deduction emerges. Of the ten cities producing
the highest number of loyalist claimants in relation to total
population, seven were British garrison towns at some time
during the war. Of the states in which major battles occurred,
only Pennsylvania had a relatively low percentage of claim-
ants. And the rural areas that supplied the highest numbers
of loyalists were the scenes of either significant unrest or large-
scale fighting.
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A detailed examination of the preceding table reveals the
close relationship between the events of the war and the size
of the migration from particular states. Most Massachusetts
refugees arrived in England in 1775-1776, during and after
the siege of Boston; most South Carolinians came in 1777-
1778, when the loyalty oaths were introduced, and 1782-
1783, following the evacuation of Charleston; and most New
Yorkers appeared in 1783-1784, after the abandonment of
Manhattan. By contrast, the figures for the states in which
few battles were fought show no such fluctuation. The emi-A Certain Place of Safety 39
grants are rather evenly divided among the war years, indi-
cating an absence of external pressures. The inescapable
conclusion is that the number of exiles from any particular
area varied directly with the specific circumstances of the
war. This does not mean that the size of the migration from a
state bore no relationship at all to the size of the loyalist
community within that state, but it does imply that the
connection is not so close as has previously been imagined.
There is no reason to suppose that the Americans who fled
their homes were necessarily representative of their fellow
loyalists, for though a man rarely became a loyalist by acci-
dent, it was through the accidents of war that he became a
refugee. It is therefore practically impossible to extrapolate
backwards from an analysis of the refugees to obtain an
accurate picture of the loyalist community as a whole.
The fact is that unless the British army was nearby to offer
him protection, an American had little incentive to declare
his loyalty to the crown. Long before the Declaration of
Independence was adopted, committees and provincial con-
gresses had taken over the day-to-day government of the
colonies. Any man who openly opposed these extralegal
bodies could find himself investigated, disarmed, threatened,
even jailed. To loyally-minded citizens it must have seemed
much more prudent to remain silent until the expected
British victory had been achieved, or at least until British
forces had triumphed in their respective regions. That many
did play this waiting game is demonstrated by the substantial
number of Americans who first swore allegiance to the rebel
governments and then reversed themselves — honestly or not
— when the British army appeared in their vicinity.
The figures in the table also reflect the loyalists' reaction to
the progress of the British war effort. Although the loyalists
were forced from their homes by committees, battles, and the40 The British-Americans
like at certain specified times, they were not necessarily
compelled to go to England at those same times. Even at the
evacuations of Philadelphia, Savannah, and Charleston the
refugees always had the option of going to another British
outpost in America instead of traveling to the mother coun-
try. Thus, for example, many of the persons evacuated from
Philadelphia in June 1778 did not travel to England immedi-
ately. Instead they remained in New York City for months,
perhaps years. A number, as shown by the table, left only at
the final abandonment of that port.
Because there was this element of choice involved in the
timing of a trip to England, the composite arrival figures for
each year can indicate the loyalists' assessment of the pros-
pects for a quick British victory. When the refugees believed
that the final triumph could be expected within a few
months, they were reluctant to make the arduous journey to
Great Britain. On the other hand, if the immediate outlook
was poor and a British victory seemed years in the future,
London was certainly a more comfortable place to pass the
intervening time than were the garrison cities of New York,
Charleston, or Savannah. With this perspective, the great
fluctuation in total arrivals from year to year becomes expli-
cable. In 1775, when the committees were active and Boston
was the only refuge for loyalists in the thirteen colonies,
Americans flocked to England in large numbers. During 1776
and 1777, years of some military success, the totals fell, if the
Boston evacuees and the banished Carolinians, who were not
presented with much of an alternative, are excluded. The
year 1778 saw a large influx into England, following the seri-
ous setbacks of the defeat at Saratoga and the loss of Phila-
delphia. By contrast, the period 1779-1781, when optimism
was at its height because of victories in the South, showed a
significant decline in the number of arrivals. Finally, the post-A Certain Place of Safety 41
Yorktown months brought a resurgence of emigration, which
continued until East Florida was evacuated in late 1784
under the terms of the Spanish peace treaty.
Whenever they arrived in Great Britain, or for whatever
reason, the loyalists all faced the same problem of acclima-
tion. They had always called England "home" even if they
had been born in America, but when they arrived in the
British Isles they found a culture and even a system of gov-
ernment alien to their experience. Although they had left
their property and sometimes their families because of their
adherence to the crown, they soon learned that their sacrifices
were not appreciated in the mother country. The adjustment
to the hard realities of exile was long, painful, and not en-
tirely successful. Ironically, the loyalists realized how Ameri-
can they were only after they had abandoned America.Vain Hopes
Those who bring property here may do well
enough, but for those who expect reimbursement
for losses, or a supply for present support, will
find to their cost the hand of charity very cold;
the latter may be kept from starving, and beyond
that their hopes are vain.
— SAMUEL CURWEN, 1776
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HE loyalists who traveled to England during the early
years of the war felt unqualified relief at finally reaching
the safety of the mother country. No prescient glimpse of
their troubled future intruded upon their rapture: Louisa
Wells, the daughter of a loyal South Carolina printer, prob-
ably spoke for them all when she recorded in her journal,
"O! how shall I describe what I felt, when I first set my foot
on British ground? I could have kissed the gravel on the salt
Beach! It was my home: the Country which I had so long and
so earnestly wished to see. The Isle of Liberty and Peace."
2
Before long, though, Louisa and her fellow refugees dis-
covered that England was not in fact their home. They had
expected a warm welcome from the ministry. They had
hoped to influence British policy towards America. They had
looked forward to a brief, pleasant sojourn in London that
would end as soon as the war was won. Instead, they found
their advice ignored, their needs slighted, and their monthsVain Hopes 43
of exile stretching into years. It was an intensely disillusion-
ing experience.
The loyalists who fled to England in 1774 and 1775 went
to the mother country not only to escape from the colonies
but also to achieve a positive goal: effecting a reconciliation
between Britain and America. Regarding the incipient dis-
pute as "unnatural," resulting at least in part from the
Americans' and Britons' mutual ignorance of each other's
true intentions, they wanted to remedy that situation by
supplying each side with copious information concerning the
other's actions and attitudes. Through such means, they be-
lieved, the misconceptions of both the North administration
and the colonists could be dispelled, and once that end had
been accomplished the few remaining differences between
the combatants would readily be resolved. In effect, they at-
tempted to discover in their exile the significance they had
lost in America. If they successfully pointed the way to a
permanent reconciliation, they could at the same time regain
the respect of their fellow countrymen and win favor from
the British government.
Accordingly, the loyalists' letters home were intended to
convince the colonists that they had incorrectly anticipated
the British response to their current tactics. As the exiles well
knew, American radicals had argued that strict enforcement
of the Association would cause severe economic dislocation in
the mother country. The radical leaders had predicted that
British merchants, their business destroyed by the boycott,
would try to bring the administration to alter its obnoxious
policies. Moreover, they had argued that ordinary working-
men unemployed as a result of the boycott would riot or
perhaps openly rebel against North's government, thus exert-44 The British-Americans
ing further pressure on the ministry.
3 The refugees thought
it imperative to correct these erroneous notions, and so they
repeatedly assured their American correspondents that the
Association had not seriously affected British commerce. To
the contrary, they asserted, business in the mother country
had never been better. "In short my Dear Sir," concluded
one New Yorker, "not a single effect which it was thought the
Resolutions, Addresses, etc of the Congress would have pro-
duced here, has happened/'
4
Actually, the loyalists continued, the Americans' violent
words and deeds had only "kindled the resentment of the
Nation" and had wrought "infinite injury" to their cause.
Congressional statements, instead of easing tensions, had suc-
ceeded in arousing "the public resentment." Even the mer-
chants w
rere beginning to turn against their former American
friends, detesting both their tactics and their "lust of Domi-
nation and Empire."
5 With the defection of these traditional
allies, "the Nation w
ras never more United" behind the
ministry. The Americans had "not the least ground to expect
any relief, or any change of measures whatever." The govern-
ment absolutely insisted on the "Sacred Tenet" of colonial
subordination to Parliament, and despite Lord North's will-
ingness to compromise on minor matters, he would never
agree to terms that would "imply a surrender of the whole
legislative authority of G B."
6
Thus, the refugees argued, it would be futile for the
Americans to persist in their opposition to the ministry, espe-
cially because "vigorous measures" would be instituted if
they did not soon change their tactics. To the exiles' minds
there could be just one answer to the crucial question,
"Shou[l]d brave men be lost when what they contend for can be
obtained otherwise?" As a New Yorker advised a friend, "In
this state of Imperfection, better most assuredly is it, to beVain Hopes 45
contented with a moderate Share of Civil Liberty in enjoy-
ment and well secured, than to be aiming at visionary
Schemes of Perfect Freedom."
7
But it was simply too late for such ideas to carry much
weight with many of the refugees' fellow countrymen. Per-
haps the radicals might once have been satisfied with "a
moderate Share of Civil Liberty," but the difficulty was that
they no longer believed they enjoyed that desirable state. It
did little good for the exiles to describe the dire consequences
of opposition to Great Britain when the radicals believed
they were already experiencing the even more dire conse-
quences of ministerial tyranny. Since the loyalists' premises
therefore diverged from those adopted by other Americans,
the arguments they carefully based on those premises were
useless, incapable of persuading anyone who disagreed with
the initial assumptions.
The exiles encountered nearly identical difficulties when
they tried to present their ideas on America to the North
administration. In the first place, loyalists were but rarely
consulted on American affairs. Contrary to their expecta-
tions, they were neither systematically utilized as sources of
factual information about the colonies nor encouraged to
propose methods for ending the conflict.
8 And even when
refugees were asked for their opinions, their suggestions re-
ceived short shrift from North and his advisers, who had
already decided upon the course of action they would follow.
Very few exiles achieved the distinction of having private
conversations with members of the administration; indeed,
those who did can almost be counted on the fingers of one
hand. Foremost among them was Thomas Hutchinson. Then
came Thomas Bradbury Chandler and two other Anglican
clerics, John Vardill and Jonathan Boucher, both of whom
had had previous personal contacts with men who were now46 The British-Americans
on the periphery of political power. Finally, there were
George M. Johnston, a South Carolina physician, who in
1775 visited various ministers "frequently," and Thomas
Moffat of Rhode Island, whose letter of introduction from
Gage enabled him to see North "divers times."
9
Of these men Hutchinson alone had consistent entree to
administration circles. Within twenty-four hours of his ar-
rival in London in July 1774, Hutchinson spoke with both
Dartmouth and the king at length, and, although he never
had another private interview with George III, he thought
that his reception "exceeded what I had any reason to ex-
pect." His "whole time," he told friends late in July, was
"taken up in receiving visits and complying with invitations
from persons of the first rank."
1
0 Hutchinson found Dart-
mouth "friendly to the Province and to me personally be-
yond conception," and he recorded with pleasure that the
minister had assured him "more than once" that he had
affected the government's policy on America. Moreover, he
noted in September 1774, "the Ministry are always inquisi-
tive after my Intelligence."
1
1
But Hutchinson quickly learned that frequent contacts
with administration officials did not necessarily indicate that
his words were being heeded. In fact, the inability to make
any impression on the government's established ideas — an
inability that was to haunt Hutchinson for the remaining
years of his exile — began at that very first encounter with the
king. The governor's version of the meeting was that he had
described Boston as thinking the Port Act "extremely alarm-
ing" and that his "chief object" had been "to obtain relief for
the T[own] of Bfoston] on the easiest terms." Yet the
king informed Lord North that Hutchinson had called the
Port Act "the only wise effectual method that could have
been suggested for bringing them to a speedy submission."Vain Hopes 47
George III came away from the meeting convinced that
Boston would "soon submit" to the law; Hutchinson, on the
other hand, thought he had made it clear that some modifica-
tion of the act was necessary.
1
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By the fall of 1774 the governor had discerned the reason
why he was having such difficulty communicating his ideas to
British officials: the ministry simply did not recognize the
differences between political circumstances in England and
those in America. "The Opposition in the Kingdom is not to
the Constitution nor to any particular Law but to the Per-
sons in Administration," he explained. "Opposition in the
Colonies is to the Constitution itself and to the Authority of
the Kingdom over them." The aim of colonial opposition was
not just to advance the interests of a "few particular men";
quite the contrary, "every man is made to believe he is to
reap a great personal benefit or to be freed from the danger
of a great personal evil the loss of his liberty and he considers
himself as contending against his greatest enemies and every
advance he makes he is encouraged to go on further." As a
result, although in the mother country the fire of opposition
might eventually burn itself out, "there is more fewel in pro-
portion in America than there is in England," and the fire
"most certainly will continually increase."
1
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But the administration, ignoring Hutchinson's analysis,
persisted in regarding the American situation as comparable
to the state of affairs in England, and consequently as being
susceptible to punitive legislation and to a mere show of
force. And so Hutchinson found himself caught between the
Americans, who rejected his notion that the supremacy of
Parliament was consistent with the protection of their free-
dom, and the ministry, which refused to believe that extraor-
dinary exertions might be required to preserve that suprem-
acy. Hutchinson, who hoped on the one hand "for every48 The British-Americans
indulgence with respect to taxation, and all other parts of
legislation," even for "any concession short of Indepen-
dency," yet who wanted on the other "to see the Leaders
deterred from their pursuits" through the ministry's acting
with "more vigour," drew harsh criticism from both sides.
1
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"I have been charged in America with false and unfavorable
representations of the people there," he observed in 1777. "I
am here charged with neglecting to give advice of their in-
tentions to revolt, and representing the body of the people as
disposed to live quietly under the authority of Parliament."
Only Hutchinson could resolve such a labyrinthine dilemma.
"I am charged w[i]th arbitrary principles but I am as far
from them as any man in the world and never wished for a
greater restraint of natural liberty than is necessary to answer
the end of Govt," he wrote in 1775, delineating the position
that neither the Americans nor the British ministry ever
seemed to fully comprehend.
1
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Within a few months after his arrival Hutchinson had lost
what little influence he had ever possessed. He continued to
call at the colonial office to talk with Dartmouth or the
undersecretaries, but, when the act to restrict New England
trade was drafted in early 1775, his opinion was not required.
"It was planned very privately and [was] complete as to
form before I saw it or was asked any questions about it," he
revealed to a friend. A few months later, feeling "perfectly
idle and useless," he commented that "there never has been a
question asked me about America for a long time past."
1
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Yet so long as Dartmouth, his "chief Patron," continued as
American secretary, Hutchinson still had some access to the
upper echelons of the ministry. When Lord George Germain
replaced Dartmouth in November 1775 even that tenuous
link was broken. The following February Hutchinson wrote
bitterly, "We americans are plenty here and very cheap.Vain Hopes 49
Some of us at first coming are apt to think ourselves of impor-
tance but other people do not think so, and few if any of us
are much consulted or enquired after."
1
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Deprived of the political influence they had hoped to
wield, the first exiles also found themselves beset with finan-
cial worries. Only a few of them had sufficient funds to
support themselves indefinitely in England, for they thought
(as one Rhode Islander later put it) that "the Provision
made by Government was fully competent to subjugate the
Colonies in a Campaign or two." Anticipating only a brief
stay in the British Isles, they did not bother to make long-
term financial arrangements. "When I left Boston I had not
the least thought of its continuing so long," wrote one
woman in 1778. "I thought I had sufficient to suport me
while I was in Briton."
1
8 But, as the Americans quickly dis-
covered, London was "the most expensive and excessively
dear place to live in that is in the whole World." The most
frugal practices could not alter the fact that they had finite
resources with which to meet infinite demands, and so even
those loyalists who had at first believed they could live ade-
quately upon independent incomes sooner or later learned
that such a feat would be impossible.
1
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A few refugees attempted to solve their monetary problems
by finding employment in London, but that was far from
easy to accomplish for a number of reasons. In the first place,
London had little need for the services of colonial customs
officials, judges, councilors, or landowners. Second, without
capital or contacts, artisans, merchants, and small shop-
keepers were usually unable to reestablish their businesses
successfully in Great Britain. Third, colonial professional
men (lawyers and doctors in particular) often lacked the50 The British-Americans
formal training required to practice in England.
2
0 Finally,
the loyalists' chances for obtaining government jobs were
almost nonexistent because the ministry shared the refugees'
assumption that they were only temporarily resident in
England: There simply seemed little reason to employ them.
In any case, the refugees recognized that they could obtain
official positions only "by Interest or by Purchase," and they
had neither commodity upon which to depend. This applied
even to Thomas Hutchinson, who, despite years of effort,
failed to find a post for his son William. In 1779 he revealed,
"I have never yet met with any person who, when I asked
anything for any of my family or friends, would make use of
their influence in my behalf, which I attribute to a fear lest it
should be considered as a favour which, if granted at their
request, would lessen their claims for themselves, or some of
their connections."
2
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A close look at the fate of some refugee clergymen shows
the types of problems that faced loyalist job hunters. Those
clerics who had served as missionaries for the Society for the
Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts had a slight
advantage over their fellow ministers, for the S.P.G., at the
instigation of Thomas Bradbury Chandler, not only con-
tinued their salaries during the war but also distributed small
amounts of relief (£50 or less) to the clergy in the greatest
distress.
2
2 Yet the S.P.G. made no attempt to find livings in
England for its missionaries, so they, like other clerics, had to
seek such positions on their own initiative, usually with little
success.
2
3 Jonathan Boucher, for example, found the atten-
tion of several bishops "sufficiently flattering," but, he noted,
"I get only Promises." Much later he admitted that he had
"cherish [ed] these hopes for years to no purpose ... all
came to nothing." Eventually Boucher accepted the curacy of
a parish in Paddington and was reduced to the necessity ofVain Hopes 51
waiting like "a Crow near a Piece of Carrion" for the vicar to
die so that he could have sole possession of the living. Ironi-
cally, when the moment he had anticipated finally arrived,
Boucher learned to his dismay that the post had long been
promised to the nephew of a former bishop. His sole triumph
was his election as assistant secretary to the S.P.G., which
brought him a salary of £100 a year.
24
Dissenting clergymen encountered the same difficulties, as
was discovered by a young New Englander, Isaac Smith, who
filled a living at Sidmouth during the war years. Smith's
salary was less than he needed for expenses even in a provin-
cial town, and he was obliged to draw supplementary funds
from his father's London agent. Smith told his parents in
justification, "When I came to this Country, my expectations
were not great. I tho't it however easier than I find it to meet
with a sufficiency, as a Dissenting Minister, to support myself
decently."
2
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The Reverend Henry Caner, who had served as rector of
King's Chapel in Boston, described the clerics' experiences
most vividly. Upon his arrival in England Caner received
"many compassionable expressions" from both the Bishop of
London and the Archbishop of Canterbury, but, whenever
he mentioned the possibility of being appointed to an En-
glish parish, he was told, "We cant think of your residing
here, we want such men as you in America." After a number
of comparable conversations Caner concluded that the En-
glish clergy looked upon the Americans with a "jealous Eye,"
regarding them "in no better light than as coming to take the
Bread out of their mouths." As a result he advised his friends
who could remain in the colonies "with safety" to do so, "for
as to any provision here, no one yet has, nor is likely to
succeed in obtaining anything of that sort."
2
6 After a few
months Caner was offered a curacy in Essex at £50 a year,52 The British-Americans
which he reported that Hutchinson regarded "as an affront,
and begg'd I would not so far sink the Dignity of my former
Station and character as to accept of it." Caner himself was
inclined to take the curacy until he learned that the salary
would not even cover the cost of lodgings in the area. In the
end, he accepted a sinecure from S.P.G.
2
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The loyalists' difficulty in finding jobs in England, com-
bined with their assumption as to the brevity of their stay,
ensured that most of them were never gainfully employed
during at least the early years of their exile. Long afterwards
a Massachusetts lawyer described his reasoning in this man-
ner: He could probably have qualified to practice law in
Britain, he observed, "but I expected every year, to return to
America, and well knew, that . . . [this effort] would not
have added the smallest weight to my Character in America,
and judg'd it to be totally impossible, to make myself known,
and obtain business in England."
2
8
So, instead of exerting themselves in a futile search for
nonexistent jobs, most of the refugees simply looked to the
government to supply their financial needs.
[3]
The first requests for aid were submitted to Lord Dart-
mouth in January and February, 1775, by four New England
loyalists who had been forced from their homes by mobs in
late 1774. The Lords of the Treasury awarded three of the
applicants small sums of money,
2
9 but, as Hutchinson com-
mented, Lord North was "parsimonious beyond example,"
and so the Treasury's largesse ceased almost as soon as it had
begun. Throughout the next year, refugees who asked for
financial assistance received only what Hutchinson aptly
termed "good words." Even the governor himself was con-Vain Hopes 53
vinced that his salary would not have been continued "if my
security had been any thing short of the publick faith."
3
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As the months passed, the number of loyalists in London
steadily increased, and the pressures on the ministry rose
accordingly. In February 1776 Germain revealed that he had
distributed a total of £177 to "Persons who appeared to him
to be particular Objects of the Attention of Government,"
and he persuaded the Treasury to issue him another £200 to
continue the practice of "defraying such Contingent Ex-
pences of the like Nature as may occasionally occur." But the
evacuation of Boston, which took place the following month,
brought so many new refugees to London that this small-scale
compensation scheme soon proved completely inadequate. In
May Germain again went to the Treasury board to request
funds to aid the exiles, whom he described as being in a
"deplorable situation," and this time the Lords issued £5000
to one of their clerks, Milward Rowe, to be divided among
the exiles Germain identified as especially deserving.
3
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Still, though, the ministerial measures fell far short of the
loyalists' needs. In July Germain took the further step of
recommending that colonial officials' salaries be continued
despite their absence from their posts, arguing that "the
Honor of Government is pledged to make good [their sal-
aries] to such of them as have adhered to their Allegiance,
and stood firm in support of the Constitution." The Trea-
sury agreed with his reasoning, and although Germain's
proposal nominally applied only to persons who were paid
under the provisions of the Townshend Acts, an identical
policy was adopted with respect to admiralty judges, customs
officers, and postmasters, whose compensation was drawn
from other sources.
3
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But most of the newly arrived loyalists were not fortunate
enough to be government officials. What was worse, there54 The British-Americans
were such large numbers of them (said Caner) "that Govmt
cannot provide for them all, so think it best to provide for
none." The ordinary refugees who were allotted funds still
received their payments haphazardly through the colonial
office, and by the end of the year Rowe had been issued
another £15,000 to be distributed to "sundry persons." The
exiles found this arrangement highly unsatisfactory, and they
began to press the reluctant ministry to broaden the compen-
sation scheme. In October 1776 twenty-nine Massachusetts
loyalists who had not yet received any money petitioned for
relief, and two months later the mandamus councilors fol-
lowed suit.
3
3 Near the end of the year the New Englanders
heard that their memorial was "like to have an answer soon,"
and in early 1777 the Treasury finally established a formal
pension list, allotting annual allowances to approximately
one hundred loyalists then resident in London. A majority of
the pensioners were New Englanders, since at this point they
constituted the majority of Americans in Great Britain, but a
number of southerners and exiles from the middle colonies
were included on the list as well. The standard stipend was
£100 a year, though the mandamus councilors received £200
and other civil officers were awarded up to £500 (salary
payments already begun to men like Thomas Oliver were
simply transferred to the pension list) . Loyalists without
pretensions to status or office were generally allotted £40 to
£80 annually, and customs officers (whose salaries were being
continued under the auspices of the customs commissioners)
were given small grants to supplement their other income.
3
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The Treasury Lords, who had shown no great desire to set
up the list, added no names to it until midsummer, when in a
series of marathon sessions they considered 150 petitions from
"American sufferers" and awarded seventy-four new allow-
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December 1781 the Treasury board set aside an average of six
days a year, three in summer and three in winter, solely for
the discussion of American pension applications. At each
session they granted further stipends, and the amount of
money allotted for aid to the refugees rose proportionally. In
1777 Rowe was issued more than £58,500, the following year
he received an additional £10,000, and although the total fell
in 1779, by 1781 the sum supplied him to be paid to loyalists
had again climbed to more than £68,ooo.
3
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As the cost of supporting the refugees increased, so did
parliamentary criticism of the pension system. Each year the
ministry's request for an appropriation for the loyalists' al-
lowances evoked an acrimonious debate. In 1781, for ex-
ample, one Member declared that many of the exiles "ought
to be rewarded with halters instead of pensions" and charged
that "the public money was thus thrown away, not only with
profusion and negligence, but to feed a set of vipers, who
were gnawing the very entrails of Great Britain, and spilling
her best blood." In spite of such repeated challenges, the
administration majority held firm on the subject of loyalist
stipends throughout the war years. The necessary appropria-
tion was always granted, even after the fall of the North
ministry in 1782.
3
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The refugees had their own criticisms of the pension
system. If in the minds of certain Members of Parliament the
exiles were "drones" living in idleness and luxury, the
Americans themselves thought they were not being "suitably
rewarded" for their sacrifices on behalf of the crown. In light
of the fact that each of them had "forsaken every Thing that
was near and Dear" to him in America to serve the king, that
each of them had "little expected that my attachment to the
authority of this Kingdom, wou'd have reduced myself and56 The British-Americans
family to the Condition in which they are, at this Time," the
government's provisions seemed little enough.
3
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Nearly every loyalist, regardless of the amount he received,
contended that his pension was insufficient to meet his
needs.
8
8 Yet it appears from scattered evidence that the
standard £100 allowance could with some care support a well-
to-do single man in London. A family, on the other hand,
would probably require more, and the loudest complaints
accordingly emanated from refugees with large numbers of
dependents.
3
9 The Treasury indeed seems to have regarded
an annual £100 as the necessary minimum income for an
American accustomed to a comfortable existence. With that
as their starting point, the Lords then either added to or
subtracted from that sum depending on their estimate of an
applicant's merit and former status. In most cases their
awards permitted the recipients to live (as was said of one
Marylander) "in a genteel — but strictly oeconomical stile."
4
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The chief difficulty with this system was that the loyalists
refused to accept it for what it was: a simple, if somewhat
cumbersome, charitable operation, intended only to supply
them with a minimal temporary support until they could
return to their homes. Instead, the refugees insisted on re-
garding the Treasury pensions as compensation for their
sufferings and losses on behalf of Great Britain. Joseph
Galloway, who admitted privately that his pension would
support him amply (which was all it was meant to do),
complained publicly in 1779 that it was "a very small pit-
tance, compared with what I have sacrificed for Govern-
ment." He elaborated on the thought in a letter addressed to
a member of the ministry, probably Germain. "Poverty, my
Lord, to persons used to affluence is distressing enough,"
Galloway asserted, "but if, to that calamity, you add neglect
of merit, which in fact amounts to utter contempt, theCOURTESY OF LIBRARY OF CONGRESS PRINTS DIVISION
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burthen becomes really insufferable, because it then exceeds
the utmost bounds of human patience."
4
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Galloway and others particularly criticized the "inequal-
ity" they perceived in the relative size of allowances. A
Massachusetts exile observed that "some thro' importunity
alone, some by friends and some by a happy manner of tell-
ing their own story, and setting forth their own worth and
consequence, have been brot into particular notice and hand-
somely provided for; whilst many of real merit, merely from
modesty and reserve, have been wholly neglected."
4
2 There
was some truth to his charge, for the Lords of the Treasury
made little attempt to award comparable allotments in com-
parable cases. Moreover, they were always susceptible to
adroitly used influence.
4
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The allowances awarded to friends of Benjamin Thomp-
son, one of the few refugees to achieve success in England,
provide a case in point. Thompson, a protege of Governor
John Wentworth of New Hampshire, had fled to Boston in
1774, after his neighbors had correctly suspected him of sup-
plying General Gage with information concerning radical
activities in the area.
4
4 At the evacuation of the city he sailed
directly to England, carrying with him his "Miscellaneous
Observations upon the State of the Rebel Army." Thomp-
son, with a characteristic flair, insisted on handing the report
to Germain in person. Impressed by its contents, the Ameri-
can secretary hired the youthful Thompson as his personal
assistant, and during the war Thompson helped to supervise
the sending of supplies, equipment, and reinforcements to
the colonies. In 1780 he was named undersecretary of state
for the northern department.
4
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The loyalists were well aware of Thompson's influence
with Germain and regularly sought to make use of it. In 1781
he was described as "uniformly the Patron of our loyalVain Hopes 59
american Brothers/' which was something of an exaggera-
tion, but he did at times exert considerable pressure on the
ministry on behalf of American acquaintances. Thompson as-
sisted at least six of his friends in their quest for pensions; of
one it was said in 1782, "he had originally only ioo£ a year
but being well acquainted with Mr. Thompson he got him
5o£ more." One of the persons he helped, Hannah Winslow,
had previously been unable to acquire a pension despite the
fact that she had Hutchinson's support for her application.
4
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As Mrs. Winslow's experience implies, it was not always
easy to obtain an allowance. Because of the Treasury's policy
of considering the loyalists' petitions only once every six
months, delays of a year or more were not uncommon if there
were initial deficiencies in a memorial. Understandably, the
exiles grew bitter as they waited — endlessly, it seemed — to
learn whether their applications had been successful. "How
thankful ought I to be to that beneficent Congress, which
first taught me to live upon air," wrote the Reverend Daniel
Batwell of Pennsylvania. "The good Lords of the Treasury
seem to think it an wholesome diet, and very much suited to
my Constitution." All the applicants would have agreed fully
with the disillusioned woman who said of her memorial in
1777: "I had not the smalest thought that it would be
attend[e]d with so much trouble, I was told that there was a
sume of money voted by Govt for the American Sufferers
. . . and I realy thougt . . . that it was a thing of course
and that I had as good a right to part as others."
4
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Even when refugees were awarded annual stipends, their
troubles were not necessarily ended. As Thomas Hutchinson,
Jr., noted, the government transacted business with "the
greatest exactness," and the procedures for collecting allow-
ances were exceptionally complex. Loyalists had to call at the
Treasury in person each quarter to receive their payments,60 The British-Americans
or, if that was impossible because they lived outside of Lon-
don, they had to send agents to the Treasury with signed
receipts to pick up the money for them. Treasury clerks
deducted a fee from each sum paid, and the loyalists were
likewise expected to tip the office doorkeeper, so they never
received the full amount of their stipends. Furthermore, only
Milward Rowe was authorized to make the payments. When
he was out of town or simply did not feel like conducting
business, no one could collect an allowance. After calling at
the Treasury on one such day, a New Englander commented
in disgust, "Every expedient is used that craft can devise and
power execute to squeeze dependents."
4
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In short, it is not surprising that the Americans found
much to criticize in the system that supplied them with their
chief means of subsistence. "Inability to provide for one's
own support is a mortifying consideration that embitters
almost every circumstance of life," wrote one refugee in
1779, and he was echoed two years later by Joseph Galloway's
daughter, who declared, "What a humiliating situation are
the refugees reduced to from a state of independant affluence,
to rejoice at the bounty of the public."
4
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And the loyalists had to bear a further burden: that of
being treated with what they believed was "Contempt" by
the very government for which they had abandoned their
homes. As Dr. Peter Oliver, son of the chief justice, put it in
1784: "We are obliged to put up with every insult from this
ungrateful people the English, without any redress. . . .
What are all the promises of protection and retribution? but
to mortify, insult, and disappoint. I have the best authority to
say we are well off if our small pittance is not taken from us.
Blessed are ye who expecteth nothing, for ye then shall not
be disappointed/'
5
0
In just a few short years the exiles' hopes had turned toVain Hopes 61
dust. A man like the Reverend Samuel Peters of Connecticut,
who had gone to England thinking he could "make himself
of much Importance," was reduced within two years to
"boast[ing] . . . [of] having learned the Art of not dying
upon so small a Pittence" and begging for an increased
government pension.
5
1 Expecting to be lionized in London,
the refugees had instead been ignored — an unkind cut indeed
for men accustomed to wielding influence in the colonies.
Excluded from the kinds of political and social circles in
which they had moved in America, the exiles were drawn
closer together both by necessity and by choice. They turned
to each other for companionship, for if they were not ac-
cepted in England they could at least preserve as much as
possible of the colonial life they had left behind.3
America Transplanted to London
I see many faces I have been used to. America
seems to be transplanted to London.
— SAMUEL QUINCY, 1777
1
T
HE loyalists who began to gather in London in late
1775 and early 1776 exhibited characteristics common
to any group involuntarily forced into exile. Although no
language barrier divided them from their English hosts, they
largely held themselves aloof from British society. In part
their isolation resulted from the rebuffs they received when
they attempted to enter fully into English political or eco-
nomic life, but their aloofness can also be attributed to their
own inclinations. They simply preferred the company of
their compatriots — indeed, of the very persons who had been
their closest associates in America. Denied the opportunity to
return to the colonies, the refugees transferred to the British
Isles as much as possible of the familiar pattern of their lives.
Like the Hutchinson family, which continued to live "as
much in the N[ew] Eng[lan]d way as ever we can," the
exiles resisted change in their basic modes of existence. They
tried to obtain American foods, kept themselves informed on
American affairs, and associated almost exclusively with one
another.
2 By such means they preserved for a time the illu-
sion that the war had not permanently altered their lives.America Transplanted to London 63
One day soon they would return to their homes in triumph:
that prospect they held always before them.
The first task of a refugee newly arrived in London was
rinding a place to live, and it was not always easy to locate
adequate accommodations at a reasonable price. Americans
resident in the city tried to help by informing friends of
vacant rooms in their neighborhoods, and the exiles in any
case understandably preferred to live near acquaintances
from the colonies. For these reasons, the loyalists tended to
cluster in certain areas of London. On occasion entire streets
were practically taken over by refugees, as latecomers were
attracted to neighborhoods already replete with their friends.
In 1775, many of the New Englanders arriving from Bos-
ton settled in Westminster, rarely going farther north than
the Haymarket. The first refugees from the southern col-
onies, who came about the same time, tended to take up
residence on the short streets between the Strand and the
Thames. When loyalists began arriving from the middle
colonies in large numbers after 1778, they frequently chose to
live in Soho or perhaps near Red Lion Square. Only in the
neighborhood just north of Oxford Street, sandwiched be-
tween Portland Place and the British Museum, did no single
provincial group predominate. There, along wide, straight
streets, refugees from nearly all the colonies found lodgings
in the 1780's.
3
The pattern of concentration was repeated in suburban
areas, for some of the exiles preferred to live in more "re-
tired" sections of the metropolis, ones that were "clean,
healthy, and free from Noise." A group of Boston merchants
moved to Highgate, near Hampstead Heath; Samuel Peters
and other New Englanders settled in Pimlico; some Newa portion of central London showing three of the loyalists'
favorite neighborhoods: Soho, the Haymarket, and the Strand.
From R. Horwood's map of London, 1799.
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Yorkers decided to live in Chelsea; and about twenty Massa-
chusetts refugee families migrated to Brompton Row,
Knightsbridge, which one of them described as "country
altho only % of a mile from Hyde Park Corner/'
4
In Brompton and the other neighborhoods the groups of
friends constantly exchanged visits. The Boston merchants
lodging at Highgate, Hannah Winslow recorded, were "Glad
and happy to see me and do every thing in their power to
make me Chearful." The New Yorker David Colden chose to
reside in Soho because "many more of my American Friends
are in this Part of the Town." And, within half an hour after
he moved into his rooms on Frith Street, Colden "began to
receive visits from the Americans." He later wrote, I "have
had a view of many more of my old Friends and Acquaint-
ance, then I Could now have in New York." Colden's
experience was not unique. Another New Yorker living in
the same area remarked to a neighbor, "Its so much like
home," and a third complained that "I never had so little
Time to spare. Together with Persons calling upon us, and
we in Turn upon them, the whole Day is consumed, and
much more of the Night than ought to be dispensed with
upon such occasions."
5
The New Englanders of Westminster engaged in com-
parable practices. Samuel Quincy, the solicitor general of
Massachusetts, spent his days seeing friends, often walking to
Brompton to talk with "the whole Circle" there, or else
calling upon other acquaintances who lived closer to his
lodgings in Parliament Street.
6 The Massachusetts refugees
who like Quincy lived near St. James's Park virtually adopted
it as their own private preserve. In the spring of 1776
Thomas Hutchinson recorded that "thirteen New En-
glanders, of which I was one, met by accident to-day in St.
James's Park." A year later Edward Oxnard, a young mer-America Transplanted to London 67
chant from Falmouth, commented after a walk in the Park
that "as usual found it throng'd with Refugees/' and Quincy
told his wife that it "wears an appearance not unlike the
Exchange of Boston."
7 The popularity of the Park as a meet-
ing place continued unabated even after many of the Massa-
chusetts exiles had moved to other parts of the city. In 1778 a
New Englander complained that he had been "traversing St
James Park till have been quite glad to retire to rest," and
the following year Elisha Hutchinson and his father "met a
variety of Americans" while walking there.
8
Although they tended to congregate in certain sections of
London, the loyalists often changed their lodgings. If they
left town for extended journeys (as many did in the sum-
mers) , they gave up their rooms and looked for other accom-
modations when they returned to the city several months
later. Furthermore, they were always watchful for less expen-
sive or more conveniently located quarters. Single men
changed their residences frequently (perhaps once or twice a
year) , and even Thomas Hutchinson moved his large family
four times between 1774 and 1780.
9
As a result of this peripatetic existence, many of the refu-
gees used London coffeehouses as their mailing addresses.
They therefore had a reason to visit the coffeehouses fre-
quently, not only to pick up letters from and send missives to
the colonies, but also to meet friends, read the latest Ameri-
can newspapers, and greet the most recent arrivals from their
homeland. Southerners established their headquarters at the
Carolina coffeehouse, men from the middle colonies assem-
bled at the New York and Pennsylvania coffeehouses, and
northerners frequented the New England coffeehouse. The
same geographical divisions that were preserved by the loyal-
ists' choices of places to live were therefore maintained in
their usual gathering places. The Massachusetts loyalists sel-68 The British-Americans
dom called at the Carolina coffeehouse, and the reverse was
equally true. Although middle colony refugees did indeed
patronize both the Pennsylvania and New York coffeehouses,
they did not go so far afield as to call often at either of the
establishments that catered to their northern or southern
compatriots.
1
0 In short, there was little sustained intercolo-
nial mingling among the refugees, either in residential
neighborhoods or at communal meeting places.
The separation of the provincial groups was heightened by
chronological divisions as well. As was pointed out in the first
chapter, each section of the thirteen colonies had its own
distinct pattern of loyalist emigration, based upon the events
of the war, and each exile community in England varied
according to a rhythm peculiar to it alone. New Englanders
began to gather in London in 1775, and some resided in the
city throughout the war, but by 1778, for reasons that will be
discussed in chapter 4, many of them had started to disperse
through the countryside. At the very time they were aban-
doning London, refugees from the southern and middle
colonies were arriving in large numbers, because of the
evacuation of Philadelphia and the strict application of
loyalty oath laws in the Carolinas. The size of the Pennsyl-
vania and New York contingents in London swelled steadily
for the next six years, but the southerners, on the other hand,
returned to their homes in 1779 and 1780, thereby decimat-
ing their incipient refugee society. Not until after the evacu-
ation of New York in late 1783 were many loyalists from all
areas of the continent resident in the city at exactly the same
time. Appropriately, it was only then that the exiles were
able to organize themselves into a long-standing, relatively
coherent group.
A few exceptions to the general rule of provincial isolation
did exist, and they should be noted here. First, some inter-COURTESY OF NATIONAL GALLERY OF ART, WASHINGTON, D.C. ANDREW MELLON FUND
The Copley Family, by John Singleton Copley. Copley himself
stands at rear, his father-in-law Richard Clarke is seated in the
foreground. The child with his arm around Mrs. Copley's neck
was to become Lord Lyndhurst, Lord Chancellor of England.70 The British-Americans
colonial contacts came about because of a shared occupation
or a common interest. For example, exiled clergymen from
the various colonies saw each other occasionally, though their
meetings did not usually occur on a regular basis. Similarly,
the professional connection between the artists John Single-
ton Copley of Massachusetts and Benjamin West of Pennsyl-
vania helped to bring their respective friends into contact
with one another. But in neither case did any lasting rela-
tionships form. A Pennsylvanian introduced to the Copley
family at West's thought that Copley's father-in-law's name
was "Hart" (it was Clarke) , and even more revealing was the
fact that Thomas B. Chandler, testifying in 1784, stated that
although he had known Jacob Duche well in America before
the war, he "never saw him personally since." At that time,
the two men had been simultaneously resident in London for
six years.
1
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A second exception was those few loyalists who had devel-
oped extensive relationships with men from other colonies
before they arrived in England. One such man was Samuel
Shoemaker, a Quaker and former mayor of Philadelphia, who
had served as a civilian administrator of the city during the
British occupation. When Philadelphia was evacuated, Shoe-
maker removed with the troops to New York, and he re-
mained there until the end of the war. During his stay in
Manhattan, Shoemaker was active in loyalist affairs, and he
came to know many refugees from other provinces who were
then living in the city. When he finally made his way to
London in December 1783, Shoemaker continued to associ-
ate with his friends from New York, among them men like
Robert Alexander, a Marylander who had served in the
Second Continental Congress; Daniel Coxe, a New Jersey
councilor; and William Smith, the chief justice of New York.
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quaintance from his Manhattan days, Governor Josiah
Martin of North Carolina, only after both had been in
England for eighteen months.
1
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Another exception was entirely unique: Thomas Hutchin-
son and his associations. Hutchinson's preeminent position
among the loyalists ensured that he would be brought into
contact with refugees from throughout the continent, if only
because exiles from a number of colonies called at his house
seeking advice and assistance. The governor invited those
visitors whom he especially liked to return for dinner and
conversation, and his non-New England guest list frequently
included Thomas Bradbury Chandler and Joseph Galloway.
Elisha Hutchinson and his wife Polly grew particularly close
to Galloway and his daughter Elizabeth, and the four spent
many hours together. But even a man so well known as
Hutchinson was on one occasion referred to by a New York
refugee as "our friend Govr H n of Philad[elphi]a."
1
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A fourth and final exception resulted from the occasional
physical juxtaposition of the loyalists' lodgings. Although it
was not common for exiles from different colonies to live in
the same neighborhoods, sometimes they did, and in conse-
quence a few friendly relationships developed across provin-
cial lines. Samuel Quincy became a close associate of the
North Carolinian John Burgwin because both lived in the
same building. And Arthur Savage of the Boston customs
office frequently saw John Savage of Charleston, one of his
neighbors at Brompton, especially after they decided they
were probably distant cousins. But such contacts were un-
usual: it appears from copious evidence pertinent to Bromp-
ton that the relationship of the Savages had no comparable
counterparts.
1
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The various exile circles, then, existed independently of
each other. There were a few points of congruence, places72 The British-Americans
where the circles touched or interlocked, but on the whole
these connections were both peripheral and accidental.
Centered on neighborhoods like Soho or Brompton, rein-
forced by the insularity of coffeehouse associations and by
differentials of time, the little refugee societies were almost
totally self-contained. Each revolved around one outstanding
figure, usually the man among them who had held the
highest political office in their colony before the war. Gallo-
way was the acknowledged leader of the Pennsylvanians;
Attorney General John Randolph, of the Virginians; and
Lieutenant Governor William Bull, of the South Carolin-
ians. Like Hutchinson (the chief of them all), these men
advised other refugees from their home provinces on dealings
with the British government, served as hosts at innumerable
American dinner parties, and sometimes themselves assisted
destitute loyalists. In the strict hierarchy of refugee society,
they were usually the called-upon, rarely the callers.
1
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The Massachusetts community in London is the one most
open to analysis both because many of its members arrived in
England early in the war and because it is the best docu-
mented of the various provincial groups. Thirteen New Eng-
landers kept at least fragmentary journals detailing their
daily activities and associations, and the diaries can be sup-
plemented by vast quantities of personal correspondence.
1
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A close examination of this evidence can suggest the types of
patterns that must have characterized the other refugee so-
cieties as well, though they were of course more transitory
than that of Massachusetts.
Until his death in 1780 Thomas Hutchinson was the
unchallenged leader of the New Englanders in London. His
shoes were afterwards filled by the youthful Sir WilliamAmerica Transplanted to London 73
Pepperrell, the only native-born American baronet, who had
inherited the title and a fortune from his grandfather, the
hero of the colonial assault upon Louisbourg in 1745.
Neither Hutchinson nor Pepperrell mixed socially with ordi-
nary Massachusetts refugees, instead relating to them as a
superior to his inferiors. For instance, recent arrivals from
America would pay Hutchinson a courtesy call, and he would
graciously return the compliment by inviting them to dinner
at his house, but unless the newcomers were of high social
status that first invitation was usually also their last.
1
7 Un-
surprisingly, Hutchinson's closest associates (aside from his
children and their Oliver in-laws) were the former political
and economic leaders of Massachusetts. The most frequent
guests at the governor's house were Richard Clarke, Copley's
father-in-law and a wealthy Boston merchant; Thomas
Flucker, the secretary of the province; Jonathan Sewall;
Thomas Oliver; and Charles Paxton, one of the commis-
sioners of American customs. Hutchinson rarely saw either
younger or less prosperous refugees, even when the persons
in question were friends of his son Elisha.
1
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The New Englanders excluded from an intimate relation-
ship with Hutchinson had their own circles of friends, de-
rived, like his, from their earlier connections in America.
Sometimes the social patterns followed town lines, as was the
case with a number of former residents of Salem who stayed
in touch with each other throughout the war. Other common
groupings were based upon age, occupation, or education. So
Mrs. John Amory, the wife of a Boston merchant, recorded in
her journal her husband's almost constant association with
his former business partner Joseph Taylor and with a num-
ber of their friends from the Boston commercial community.
And the diary of Edward Oxnard reveals that his closestBrompton Row, Knightsbridge. From R. Horwood's Map of London, 1799.o
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friends in London were, like himself, graduates of Harvard
College who were under forty years of age.
1
9
The casual relationships among the Massachusetts refugees
were formalized to a certain extent by the founding of the
New England Club in the late summer of 1775. The orga-
nizers of the club were men who had left Boston before the
evacuation, a majority of them merchants, lawyers, and civil
servants. Although any New Englander could be elected to
membership, the exiles who were later added to the organiza-
tion were almost without exception of similar social status.
The club's somewhat elaborate rules provided for weekly
dinner meetings to which members could invite guests;
among its founders were Taylor, Quincy, Oxnard, Clarke
and his son Isaac, Copley, Flucker, and Sewall.
2
0 After the
initial session at the Pauls Head Tavern on August 31,
dinners were held at the Queen's Arms, the Crown & Anchor,
and the Adelphi. At the latter site in February 1776 Samuel
Curwen, a Salem merchant and justice of the peace, attended
his first meeting of the club, and he recorded the presence of
twenty-one New Englanders, seven of whom had recently
joined the group. During the early months of 1776 both
Curwen and Oxnard attended club meetings regularly. The
highest recorded attendance was twenty-eight, on March 14;
the lowest, twelve, on May 17. Sometimes (as on February
15) the club entertained distinguished visitors like Francis
Bernard, Hutchinson's predecessor as governor of Massachu-
setts.
2
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The club, which dissolved during the summer of 1776
while many of its members were vacationing outside of
London, reappeared in different form the following Septem-
ber. In his diary Oxnard listed the thirteen members of the
"club at Brompton Row." Added to such earlier participants
as Curwen, Sewall, the young attorney Sampson Blowers, andAmerica Transplanted to London 77
Harrison Gray, Jr., were some recent arrivals from Halifax:
the senior Gray; Daniel Leonard; Ward Chipman, a protege
of Judge Sewall's; and Colonel John Chandler, who had been
one of the leading citizens of Worcester before the war. All
resided at Brompton, and they met to play cards at each
other's lodgings approximately every third evening. The
sessions continued until the end of March, 1777, when the
club once again disbanded for the summer.
2
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This time the hiatus lasted longer than before (because of
the dispersal of the Massachusetts refugees), and it was not
until July 1782 that Curwen again mentioned attending "an
American Thursday dinner club at the New England Coffee-
house."
2*
3 But the collapse of their formal organization did
not end the general gatherings of the northerners who re-
mained in London. Not only did they organize their own
dinner parties at taverns and coffeehouses, but they were also
brought together by the social activities of the mercantile
firm of Lane Son and Fraser. This company, first organized in
1756 as Lane and Booth, had long been engaged in the New
England trade. Many of the Massachusetts exiles had dealt
with the firm before 1775, and they continued to rely on its
services after they arrived in England. Like other London
companies, Lane Son and Fraser shipped goods to America
for the exiles, managed their funds, extended credit to them,
and sometimes provided them with a mailing address.
2
4 But,
unlike other merchants, the partners — Thomas Lane, his son
John, and Thomas Fraser — frequently entertained Massa-
chusetts loyalists at their homes in the city and on their
country estates. At one such affair, Oxnard recorded, "drank
Madeira, till we were jolly."
2
5 The cordial relationship of
the Lanes, Fraser, and the refugees was founded less on busi-
ness than on the firm's open sympathy for the loyalists and
their cause. The political bias and customary hospitality of78 The British-Americans
the Lanes was in fact so well known that when one New
Englander was not invited to John Lane's until after he had
been in London for six months, he regarded it as a direct
snub and refused the offer.
2
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In all, the Massachusetts exiles may be divided into three
separate segments: Hutchinson and his intimates; the many
lesser merchants, government employees, and young attor-
neys who formed the core of the New England Club; and,
finally, the poorer refugees who had little or no connection
with either of the other groups. Tradesmen, skilled laborers,
clerks, and artisans from Massachusetts lived in London
throughout the war, but their names never appear in the
pages of the diaries of the more well-to-do loyalists.
2
7 And so,
therefore, even the relatively coherent Massachusetts exile
community was split along economic and social lines into
circles with distinct identities. Despite the proximity of the
New Englanders' lodgings, their occasional mutual friends,
and their common experience of exile, the social barriers
erected in America continued to affect their lives and deter-
mine their associations. It is sufficient illustration to quote
Curwen's remark upon a chance encounter with Charles
Paxton, after both had been living in England for more than
five years: "The traces of his countenance have been lost in
my memory, and I should have passed him," Curwen ob-
served.
2
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This sort of fragmentation had a noticeably detrimental
effect upon the exiles' later attempts to create pressure
groups that could advance their interests. Although loyalists
from throughout the American continent resided in London
during most of the war, each man had few contacts outside
his own prewar circle of friends. There was little sense of
community among the refugees, each of whom went his own
way without much regard for anyone else. Not until 1779 didAmerica Transplanted to London 79
the exiles attempt to act in concert, and then they achieved
only limited (and short-lived) success in building a compre-
hensive organization.
The lack of cohesion among the refugees also suggests
something about the revolutionary movement itself. The
loyalists' restricted vision, their provincialism, throws into
sharp perspective the successful unification of the Americans
under the Continental Congress. What an achievement that
unity must have been, if the social patterns exhibited by the
refugees in London were at all typical of prerevolutionary
America. Not even the overwhelming pressures of exile
forced loyalists from different colonies to associate regularly
with one another. Yet at the very same time the revolution-
aries were in the process of forging a coalition that — however
tentative and fragile — successfully defeated the greatest mili-
tary power in the world. The contrast is both striking and
significant.
[3]
Obviously, the loyalists did not spend every waking minute
seeing each other and sitting in coffeehouses. They were,
after all, residents of London, then as now one of the great
cities of the world. Supported mainly by government largesse
and therefore not required to work to earn their keep, they
were able (their limited income notwithstanding) to take
advantage of the wide range of attractions available in the
metropolis. Although they could not participate in what one
of them called "the glitter and refinement" of London so-
ciety, they could — and did — indulge in many less expensive
pleasures.
2
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One of the Americans' "invariable amusements" was walk-
ing around the city. Some of the more energetic exiles
trekked all the way to Richmond or Hampton Court (a two-80 The British-Americans
day journey), but most confined their excursions to the
immediate vicinity of London itself. They wandered about
the city streets, sometimes stopping to visit friends, or they
strolled in the parks on the outskirts of town. In the winter
the Americans watched the skaters on the Serpentine in Hyde
Park; in the spring and summer they admired the flowers in
Kensington and Kew Gardens. One April Sunday in 1777,
Oxnard recorded that Hyde Park was so crowded it seemed
"like a Holiday and a Fair." St. James's Park was "equally
astonising" that day, being filled with Londoners "from the
remotest parts of the City [who had come] to enjoy that pure
Air which they are not acostom'd to in the thick settled parts
of the Town."
3
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The refugees could also view without charge the city's
great public monuments. Westminster Abbey and St. Paul's
Cathedral were edifices to be admired in awe, and the Tower
of London and the British Museum filled their time in a
somewhat less elevated manner. Housed at the Tower were a
number of interesting "Curiosities," in particular a zoo that
fascinated a number of the exiles. The young Boston physi-
cian John Jeffries, who had a taste for adventure and high
living, was a master of the trenchant comment: after a visit to
the zoo he noted pointedly that the monkeys there seemed
"almost human," displaying "more sensibility than a large
part of what is called [the] human race." Jeffries and the
other Americans were also impressed by the exhibits at the
British Museum, which could be seen only by permission of
its governing authorities. A Marblehead clergyman especially
liked "the Ostrich's egg as big as a quart pot" and "the artifi-
cial Crab made out of precious Stones." On the other hand,
Chief Justice William Smith was not so pleased with his visit
to the museum, for his request "to see the Flesh of an Egyp-
tian Mummy out of the Frames in which they were incased"America Transplanted to London 81
was refused by a museum employee. Smith, a self-centered
man who never hesitated to ask for special treatment, com-
plained in his journal that his guide was "not a Man of
Manners, and if a Philosopher readier I believe to acquire
than impart Knowledge."
3
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When they had exhausted the public sites, the refugees
could visit many privately owned amusements by paying
small fees. As Smith and his fellows soon discovered, "your
Pocket may be emptied in this great Town by the innumer-
able Exhibition of Spectacles of one Kind and another in
several Streets and Quarters of the City." The exiles viewed
scale models of European cities, exhibitions of fine china and
stained glass, floral displays, and flower gardens.
3
2 A Bos-
tonian paid to watch a man eat stones, and Smith spent a
shilling to see the "Learned Pigg" tell time, count the num-
ber of persons in the room, and answer other questions. In
addition, the refugees often attended art exhibits, particu-
larly when works by Copley and West were on display.
Copley's The Death of Pitt was one of the Americans' favor-
ites, and he presented several of them with "perpetual
Ticket[s]" to its showing at a public gallery.
3
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Some of the ways in which the refugees passed the time
during the long days in London seem repulsive to modern
eyes. Several went to Sunday services at Newgate Prison, in
company with debtors, felons in chains, and a number of
convicts under sentence of death. On Christmas Day, 1785,
the young New Englander Thomas Aston Coffin was there,
and in the congregation were fourteen condemned criminals,
two under fifteen years of age. "These have a Pew appropri-
ated to them, painted Black, with a Table in the Centre,
upon which is Placed a Coffin — all which added to the
Clinking of Irons make a most gloomy Impression," he told
his mother.
3
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lie executions at Tyburn. Oxnard appropriately had his
pocket picked as he watched the hanging of five criminals in
1775, and Jeffries termed the six executions he saw one day in
1783 "an awfull and solemnly tremendous sight." Yet Jeffries
was even more impressed by the death of the French spy
Francis Henry LaMotte, which he had seen two years earlier.
According to the doctor, the condemned man conducted
himself in a "cool and gentlemanlike manner," and Jeffries
was no less cool as he calmly set down in his diary a descrip-
tion of the beheading and the drawing and quartering that
were ceremoniously inflicted on LaMotte's corpse after his
death.
3
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In the evenings, the loyalists often attended acrobatic exhi-
bitions at Sadler's Wells and Astley's Amphitheatre. The
tumbling, juggling, and balancing acts that formed the core
of the shows amazed the Americans, who had never seen
anything quite like it before. "It is almost incredible to
conceive the feats of Bodily agility that are perform'd, unless
one were an eye witness," wrote Oxnard after a visit to
Sadler's in 1775. A year later, though, he had revised his
estimate somewhat, observing, "The Tumbling may be justly
s[ai]d to be extraordinary the rest of the performance mere
Bufoonery." Astley's, which was London's first permanent
circus, added "incredible Feats of Horsemanship, a Horse
Conjurer, Pantomimes, Air-Balloons, and Fire-Works" to the
other acts. Dr. Jeffries especially liked the "imitation of
various Singing Birds" and the "Puppet Scenes of Dancing,
Duck Shooting, vessell sailing with a Storm and Shipwrack"
that he saw there in 1779.
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In addition to the acrobatic performances, the loyalists
occasionally went to magic shows and lectures, and they
sometimes sat in on the discussions at the various working-
men's debating societies, which were open to the public for aAmerica Transplanted to London 83
small charge. But Oxnard and the other colonists sneered at
the "meer mechanicks, who tho't themselves sufficiently able
to dispute on the most abstruse and intricate subjects." After
listening to a discussion of the question, "Which is the most
censurable the Boldness of the Women or the Foppery of the
Men of the present Age?" Smith commented that a "great
many low laughable Things were said, none stuck to the
Point." Of all the loyalists, only Samuel Curwen seemed to
enjoy his evenings at the debating associations.
3
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During the theater season, which ran from September to
May, many exiles attended performances at Drury Lane and
Covent Garden. Both theaters were cavernous by today's
standards, but the demand for entrance was so great that the
loyalists frequently suffered "thumps, squeezes, and almost
suffocation" when they attempted to gain admission. The
usual cost of a seat ranged from four shillings sixpence down
to one shilling, and most of the refugees chose to sit in the
"pit," which was priced between the expensive boxes and the
cheaper galleries. The patrons sat on backless benches, and if
the play or its cast was especially popular, the spectators were
packed together like sardines. A typical evening's perfor-
mance began with music, then came a five-act play, complete
with entr'acte entertainment, followed by some sort of after-
piece, ordinarily a farce or pantomime. The entire affair
lasted five or six hours, so it is apparent that the customers
received their money's worth.
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The refugees were avid theatergoers throughout their years
in London and, like other devotees of the stage, they soon
developed their favorite plays and actors. Those Americans
who arrived in the city in 1775-1776 were fortunate enough
to see David Garrick before his retirement, and they were
overaw
red by his great abilities. After watching Garrick per-
form in Much Ado About Nothing in the fall of 1775,COURTESY OF BRITISH MUSEUM, DIVISION OF PRINTS AND DRAWINGS
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Oxnard wrote, "He is without exception a compleat actor in
all the parts he acts in. He at once enters into the Spirit of it
and appears the Character the Author design'd." Jeffries,
who arrived too late to see Garrick, quickly became an
admirer of Mrs. Siddons. On one occasion he thought a play
"unworthy of her" and on another he recorded effusively,
"Her sweet upbraidings — and most delicate natural yet ex-
treme Passions in the last scene of Lunacy was above descrip-
tion and [as] charming as the most fertile imagination can
conceive."
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But the exiles also frequently found fault with the plays
they saw. Samuel Curwen, who was the most stringent Amer-
ican critic of the theater, declared in 1780 that "actors fall
below my idea of just imitation; to my seeming they overact,
underact, or contradict nature." He described himself as
"totally devoid of all relish" for the farces and pantomimes
that followed the main play, for, he observed, "I consider
them as a proof among many others of the depravity of the
present day. I would fain call it vulgar." Instead of engaging
in the more overt forms of disapproval practiced by dissatis-
fied London audiences, though, Curwen and the other refu-
gees expressed disdain for the spectators' habits of hissing or
throwing apples at performances that did not please them.
The loyalists left no room for doubt that they thought the
influence of the "Commonality" on the London theater an
unqualifiedly detrimental one.
4
0
Implicit in the Americans' many comments on the vul-
garity of the customers' tastes and the boisterousness of their
behavior and, indeed, in their observations on the debating
societies was a contempt for the capacities and opinions of the
lower-class Londoner. The theatergoing loyalists were edu-
cated, relatively well-to-do Americans, and they were not
accustomed to the democracy that obtained in the city'sCOURTESY OF BRITISH MUSEUM, DIVISION OF PRINTS AND DRAWINGS
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public places. After an evening at the Drury Lane, for
example, William Smith concluded that the theater per-
formed a socially useful function because its audiences were
"taken from Mischief" elsewhere. "It consists with the Public
Peace to amuse the Populace perpetually, if they were [not]
drawn together for amusing Instruction they would be worse
imployed," he reasoned magisterially.
4
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The refugees expressed much the same attitude about the
clientele of Vauxhall and Ranelagh Gardens. The pleasure
gardens were open only in the summertime (when the the-
aters were closed) and they, like the playhouses, drew a cross
section of London society. Anyone with the small entrance
fee could enter the gardens and stroll along the walks, listen-
ing to music supplied by the gardens' orchestras. Food was
available for those who wanted and could afford it, but many
of the customers simply spent the evening promenading with
friends, gazing at the crowds.
4
2 Vauxhall, in Lambeth, was
the livelier of the two attractions, with a more heterogeneous
group of patrons. Smith termed Vauxhall "a School of Vice,"
noting that it only cost one shilling to enter. Although the
walks near the orchestra were well lighted, he noted, "there
are darker Walks beyond them, very properly called the
Lovers Walks, and the Women who come without Men are
generally to be suspected." Traditionally, the last night of
the season at Vauxhall was particularly boisterous. Oxnard,
who attended the final evening in 1776, described the scene
vividly. First a pickpocket was arrested, then several ladies
were ejected because of their "preposterous Headresses." A
barber impersonating an officer was "severly handled," and
finally "the Young Bucks behav'd extreamly riotous — broke
the Lamps, Kick'd the waiters — Bully'd every[body] — till
some were committed into the Hands of the Constable."
4
3
Ranelagh, located in Chelsea, was somewhat more fashion-America Transplanted to London gi
able and definitely less rowdy than Vauxhall. Its major at-
traction was not its gardens but rather the rotunda that stood
in the midst of the park. This large building sheltered both
the orchestra and the customers and was sometimes used for
special events. Oxnard, though he did not care for Ranelagh
on his first visit, soon changed his mind. After an evening
there in the spring of 1776, he wrote, "This place may be
s[ai]d to be the resort of the best Company in London —
much pleasd with my Ev[enin]gs Entertainment."
4
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As Smith had indicated, the pleasure gardens (and the city
streets as well) were frequented by the many London prosti-
tutes. Of all the refugee Americans, only John Jeffries left a
record of his relationships with these "charming alluring
Women of the Town." Jeffries fancied himself as something
of a playboy after his wife's death in 1780, and he attended a
number of masquerade balls and "routs" at which he proved
readily receptive to propositions from various ladies of the
night. He eventually persuaded a Mrs. Callen "to put herself
under my sole protection," but he also formed numerous
more casual liaisons. After an appointment with Miss Betsy
Spencer, he wrote in self-justification, "Only a compliance to
the laws of nature, when no person is interested cannot be
criminal — if they be — my Creator forgive me."
4
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Jeffries was unique among the refugees not only because of
the frankness of his diary, but also because he participated in
one of the most renowned events of the day: the first balloon
flight across the English Channel. All the loyalists, in com-
mon with the other residents of Europe in 1783, were utterly
astonished by the invention of the "air balloon," but few of
them saw more than just a passing fad in the ascensions con-
ducted frequently in London after November 1783. William
Smith, to cite a prime example, fumed that "these Experi-
ments cost the Nation much in the Detachmt. of the People92 The British-Americans
from their Labour and Trades. . . . The Crowds that flock
after these silly Sights dishonor the English Nation."
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Jeffries, on the other hand, was intrigued by the opportunity
for scientific study presented by the flights, and his inquiring
mind, coupled with his yen for adventure, led him to make
an "aerial voyage" over London in November 1784 with the
French balloonist Jean Pierre Blanchard. A few months later,
on January 7, 1785, Jeffries and Blanchard ascended from the
heights near Dover Castle with the intention of flying to
France, and, although they had great difficulty remaining
aloft, they eventually landed safely in a forest outside Calais.
The two aeronauts were effusively welcomed to France by
the Calais officials, and their journey to Paris can only be
described as triumphal. In the city itself the greetings were
equally unrestrained. The exultant Jeffries met members of
the French nobility, was introduced to the royal family, and
gloried in the lusty cheers he received from audiences at the
Paris Opera and the Comedie Franchise.
4
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Other loyalists also traveled to France, but they did so by
more conventional means. Both before the Franco-American
alliance of 1778 and after the signing of the preliminary
peace treaty in 1782, the refugees often visited Paris and the
French countryside. Thomas A. Coffin thought France "a fine
country," flawed only by the fact that its government did not
resemble England's closely enough. But he found little to
admire in King Louis XVI, "as stupid a looking Gentleman
as you wou'd wish to see," or in his queen, Marie Antoinette,
whom he described as "bold looking" and "fond of shew and
expence, not caring for her Subjects, nor possessing their
Affection or Esteem." And Paris too drew its share of criti-
cism from the Americans. Polly (Mrs. Elisha) Hutchinson,
though praising the city's public buildings, found the streets
"narrow and dirty," permeated with "disagreable smells."COURTESY OF LIBRARY OF CONGRESS PRINTS DIVISION
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Jeffries and Blanchard cross to the coast of France, January 7,
1785. The print is inaccurate because Jeffries' diary reveals that
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Nevertheless, she had to admit that Notre Dame Cathedral
was "the most grand and beautiful structure I ever saw." Mrs.
John Amory disagreed, terming Notre Dame "much short of
my Expectations," but she was in her turn overawed by Ver-
sailles, especially its Hall of Mirrors, which she deemed
"prehaps [sic] the finest Room in the world."
4
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For the most part, the loyalists who ventured outside of
London confined their sight-seeing to the British Isles. Al-
though they complained of the costs of traveling, the exiles
thought with Peter Oliver that "the full Purse cannot be
lightened in a more agreeable Expence." And so they took as
many trips as was possible on their limited budgets. By
sharing rooms and coaches, the Americans managed to travel
economically through much of Great Britain.
4
9 Their most
frequent destinations were the towns along the southwestern
English coast, for the simple reason that the weather there
was preferable to that of London. Those refugees who could
afford it moved their families to the seashore for the summer
months, and those who could not finance a permanent reloca-
tion still spent as much time as possible away from the "dis-
agreable" climate of London during the "warm season."
5
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The American vacationers frequented the same resorts that
were popular with their English contemporaries: Brighton,
Margate, and Bristol Wells in the summer, and during the
winter months, Bath, which Thomas Hutchinson called
"perhaps the most elegant city in England," and which
Oxnard termed "the most noted place in this Kingdom for
disepation."
5
1 One observer accurately noted that although
the chief attraction of Bath was supposed to be the beneficial
effects of taking its waters, "not one half" those who flocked
to the city came "for their health." Instead, the patrons of the
Pump Room enjoyed an active social season, and Hutchin-
son, whose son Billy actually was in Bath to recover hisAmerica Transplanted to London 95
health, felt compelled to caution the young man "against
losing in the ballroom in the evening what he gains in the
baths in the day/' Other loyalist visitors often made no pre-
tense of being ill. A Virginian found the four balls a week
"delightfull," and he uninhibitedly joined in the fun at the
gaming tables, in addition to attending "routs without num-
ber — fine concerts etc. etc." But he soon discovered that "my
cash departs very fast much more then what it did in Lon-
don," and for that reason he was forced to cut his visit
short.
5
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In spite of this perennial lack of funds, the exiles had a
relatively bearable existence before the winter of 1777. The
war presented no immediate threat to their well-being,
though they were, like Oxnard, occasionally "much dis-
tress'd" by "thot's of America and the situation of my
friends." They remained serenely confident that their sojourn
in England was temporary, that it would come to a close once
the British triumph had been achieved. They seldom, if ever,
seriously considered the possibility that the royal forces in the
colonies might be defeated. But all this ended when news of
the rebel victory at Saratoga reached them in early December
1777. According to Hutchinson, there was "universal dejec-
tion," and, he commented, "Everybody in a gloom: most of
us expect to lay our bones here."
5
3 The refugees' self-
assurance had been shattered, and with it went the illusion-
ary world they had so carefully constructed during the three
preceding years. From that time on, their lives were never
the same again.A Distressing Condition
God knows what is for the best, but I fear our
perpetual banishment from America is written in
the book of fate; nothing but the hopes of once
more revisiting my native soil, enjoying my old
friends within my own little domain, has hitherto
supported my drooping courage; but that prop
taken away leaves me in a condition too distressing
to think of.
— SAMUEL CURWEN, 1777
1
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HE refugees in London, who eagerly devoured any news
about the progress of the war, well knew the importance
of the campaign of 1777. They expected it to "crush the
Rebellion, in all Probability," but at the same time they
recognized the "fatal consequences" that would ensue if for
some reason the British army failed to achieve its objectives.
They were therefore surprised when Sir William Howe chose
to attack Philadelphia, which they thought "rather a clog" to
the overall strategy, and were even more astonished when he
decided to transport his troops by sea in a "monstrously
tedious and expensive Voyage."
2 But the exiles nevertheless
believed that General John Burgoyne's "skill, understanding,
and energy" would carry the day, and so when they learned
of Burgoyne's defeat at Saratoga they were "confounded and
staggared" by the news. Jonathan Boucher admitted that heA Distressing Condition 97
had been "set up a little, only to have the heavier Fall," and,
he confessed, "my Hopes are sunk to the lowest Ebb."
3
What happened at Saratoga completely altered the refu-
gees' expectations. They still thought they would one day
return to America, but they now knew that day would not
come in the foreseeable future. The loyalists had been biding
their time in London, living from day to day, making few
long-term commitments. After Saratoga many of them recog-
nized the necessity of changing their mode of existence. They
began to arrange for more adequate and less costly housing
for themselves and their families, and larger numbers of
them started to look for relatively permanent employment.
Moreover, Saratoga affected the ministry's assumptions about
the war as well, and government policy towards the exiles
changed significantly in 1778 and thereafter.
The refugees' London lodgings had always been expensive
and uncomfortably cramped, but they had willingly endured
these disadvantages as long as they thought their stay in
England would be a brief one. The disaster at Saratoga
convinced them that the British victory they awaited would
come neither easily nor quickly, and as a direct result many
of them left the city for good in the spring of 1778. By May,
as William Browne, a Salem mandamus councilor, accurately
observed, the Americans who had "hitherto resided in Lon-
don in hopes of a happy settlement of the national dispute"
were "generally dispersing themselves over the Kingdom as
inclination or hopes of advantage land them." At the end of
the summer Thomas Hutchinson, Jr., told his brother Elisha
(who had joined the exodus) that "the very few Americans
that are left in and about London wear pretty long faces . . .98 The British-Americans
it is now become a rare thing to meet a Yankee even in the
Park."
4
The loyalists did not choose their new places of residence
without some serious thought. As they were already well
aware, "with out sum American Friends lives near you it is
very difficult to form any society in this Country," and so just
as they had congregated in certain London neighborhoods,
they also gathered in a few favored provincial towns. Several
former Salemites settled in Shrewsbury, encouraging others
of their townsmen to join them. A "great number" of Ameri-
cans, especially Virginians, went to Glasgow. And a large
colony of New Yorkers eventually developed in Chester.
5 As
early as August 1778 Hutchinson described one of his lengthy
trips through the countryside as an "American Visitation,"
and by 1786 the loyalists were so scattered throughout
Britain that Thomas Coffin reported after a journey that
there was "scarce a Town that I passed in which I did not
find some American Acquaintance."
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One of the first refugees to abandon London was Peter
Oliver, who had greatly admired Birmingham when he
visited it in 1776, and who decided to move there with his
niece Jenny Clarke in the spring of 1778. Although he found
Birmingham less interesting than London, Oliver was con-
tent with his new life. In a 1779 letter to his granddaughter
Polly he jocularly compared the two cities. If in London
there were pickpockets, he remarked, in Birmingham there
was "no money to pick out of Pockets"; and if London con-
tained people who could drink with their feet and walk on
their heads, Birmingham was full of many experts in "Drink-
ing at the Mouth and not being able to walk at all." In time,
Polly and her husband Elisha Hutchinson joined Oliver in
Birmingham, as did his son Dr. Peter Oliver, his niece andA Distressing Condition 99
nephew Louisa and Daniel Oliver, his niece Sarah Clarke
Startin and her husband Charles, and Benjamin Pickman.
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Life in Birmingham was at best unexciting. Pickman's
laconic journal recorded his days succinctly: "[May] 10.
[1783]. Spent the Evening with Judge Oliver; Mr and Mrs
Hutchinson there. 11. Spent the Evening with Jos. Green
Esq. Four Russians there. 12. Dind with Mr. Hutchinson and
spent Eve with Mr Pemberton." In such an atmosphere, any
event that broke the monotony was welcome. The high
points of 1782, detailed in Elisha's diary, were the public
whipping of a female lawbreaker and the town's celebration
of Admiral Rodney's victory over the French fleet in the
West Indies.
8 Unsurprisingly, some of the resident Ameri-
cans were not as satisfied with this kind of life as was the chief
justice. His son Peter termed the local theater "poor doings,"
and Francis Coffin (the younger brother of Thomas) , who
was assigned to Birmingham in 1786 as an army recruiter,
was thankful that he had connections with the Olivers, for,
he declared, "without a person has an extensive acquaintance
this is the dullest place in England."
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On the other hand, according to William Browne, life in
Cowbridge, Wales, was even more "sober" than that in Bir-
mingham. But, Browne said, he preferred the "peace and
quietness" of Cowbridge to the "turbulence and tumult" he
had so recently experienced. Describing Wales as a "plenti-
ful, pleasant Country," having "much the appearance of the
best parts of N[ew] E[ngland]," Browne persuaded other
Massachusetts exiles to join him in the area. His half brother
John Sargent and Colonel John Murray also settled at Cow-
bridge, and a few miles away in Cardiff William Apthorp
found the life so delightful that his enthusiastic letters con-
vinced the initially skeptical Henry Caner to move there as
well.
1
0 Kidwelly, forty miles from Cowbridge, drewioo The British-Americans
Hutchinson's nephew Samuel Mather and his wife, Jonathan
Dowse of Salem, and, for a time, Daniel Oliver. Meanwhile
Thomas Flucker and Colonel Richard Saltonstall of Haver-
hill joined Browne in enjoyment of Cowbridge's "altogether
domestick" pleasures, and in November 1780 Browne reluc-
tantly informed another friend, James Putnam, that there
were no more empty houses available in the town. Henry
Caner liked his life in Wales, though he missed not serving a
parish, and Browne probably spoke for his neighbors when
he assured a friend, "We should sooner meditate a journey to
Heaven than to London."
1
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But even Browne, who so craved quietude, became bored
with existence in the little Welsh community. In March 1780
he described his life as "without employment, without enter-
tainment, without Books and without conversation, — ban-
ished from every thing that has life and motion," and so he
did not hesitate to accept the governorship of Bermuda when
it was offered to him a year later. After his departure the
original Cardiff-Cowbridge group disintegrated, though at
the same time other refugees discovered the advantages of
living in the area. The John Ervings of Boston settled at
Haverford West, observing "the most severe oeconomy," and
a number of southern loyalists likewise chose to live in Wales
"for cheapness."
1
2 They were followed by a large group of
interrelated New Yorkers that included the John Plender-
leaths (the daughter and son-in-law of William Smith) and
Mr. and Mrs. Robert Leake. Leake, like his predecessors,
enjoyed living in Cardiff all the more because of the fact that
so many of his friends and relatives settled nearby. In early
1788 he described his family as living "in the same Stile" as
their plain food, "never dreaming of exceeding at our
Tables, except indulging now and then with a Fowl."
1
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In Bristol, across the Severn River from Cardiff, the loyal-A Distressing Condition 101
ists gathered in greater numbers than anywhere else outside
of London. After a visit to Bristol in 1777 Thomas Hutchin-
son wrote, "I think, take in all circumstances, and I should
prefer living there to any place in England." The other
Massachusetts refugees must have agreed with him, for they
began to settle in Bristol in 1776, and by October 1777
Curwen could count eighteen New England exiles (some of
them visitors) in the town.
1
4 Initially, Henry Barnes, a
Marlborough merchant, complained that the loyalists met
with a "Cold reception" from the pro-rebel inhabitants of
Bristol, and he later advised a relative not to move to the
town because the residents were "so selfish and so united
among themselves as to their Interests that a Stranger stands
no chance among them." Yet despite this discouraging report
the general exodus from London in the spring of 1778
brought many more refugees to the port city in search of "a
pleasant place" where the cost of living was reputed to be "a
third cheaper" than in the metropolis. A year later Isaac
Royall, a mandamus councilor from Medford, complained in
London that so many of his friends had gone to Bristol that
"1 shall be left alone from all my American acquaintances
except Mr. Fluc[k]er."
1
5
As Royall's comment implied, most of the New Englanders
who settled in Bristol were either related to or close associates
of each other, and so the Barnes family, for example, found
itself "at no loss for agreeable Company." But the little
American society could also be too exclusive, as George
Inman, a Massachusetts refugee who moved to Bristol in
1780, soon discovered. Although at first he was received
warmly by his fellow countrymen, Inman later recalled, he
managed to offend a few members of the group, and after-
wards his relations with all of them were characterized by
"coolness" and more by "form, than friendship."
1
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Life in the Massachusetts community in Bristol was identi-
cal in its broad outlines to that led by the loyalists in
Birmingham or Wales or London. The refugees called fre-
quently at the American coffeehouse, hoping for news from
the colonies; they walked or rode in the countryside, espe-
cially to the nearby resort town of Bristol Wells; and they
constantly entertained each other and visitors from London
at tea or dinner. As late as 1786 Mrs. Barnes reported, "Wee
have seventeen American familys in Bristol, very Genteel
well bred People, all of one heart, and one mind."
1
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The Massachusetts loyalists were not the only American
exiles attracted to Bristol. If Thomas Hutchinson compared
the city to Boston, Pennsylvanians thought it "like our dear
Philadelphia," and they too settled there in relatively large
numbers. Also drawn to Bristol were Carolinians like
William Bull and Elias Ball, who recorded in 1785 that the
town had been "strongly Recommended" to him as a place of
residence.
1
8 But just as there had been little contact between
loyalists from different provinces in London, so too in Bristol
the refugee circles remained largely separate. Mrs. Barnes
enjoyed the company of the Charles Startins of Philadelphia,
but Mrs. Startin was herself a Bostonian, the daughter of
Richard Clarke. And when Samuel R. Fisher and Samuel
Shoemaker, both exiled Philadelphians, visited Bristol in
1783 and 1784, respectively, they spent their time seeing
other refugee Pennsylvanians, never encountering a New
Englander — in the same way that journeying Massachusetts
loyalists visited only their own fellow provincials living in
the city.
1
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In addition to affecting the loyalists' decisions on places to
live, Saratoga altered their approach to seeking employment.A Distressing Condition 103
Faced w
rith the certainty of years of exile (though not, as yet,
with the notion that the banishment would be permanent
and irrevocable), the refugees began to look for more than
just temporary positions. Instead of concentrating their job-
hunting efforts solely in the British Isles, they started to re-
quest posts elsewhere in the empire. In doing this the Ameri-
cans were taking the first steps towards breaking their ties
with the thirteen colonies. Their acceptance of positions in
other British provinces indicated a willingness on their part,
though of course still a very hesitant one, to abandon their
homeland in favor of another, more "British," environment.
And they were aided in their renewed search for jobs by a
shift in governmental policy. Recognizing that the refugees
would not soon be able to return to their former occupations,
the ministry began to look more favorably upon loyalists'
applications to fill secular or religious positions within the
empire.
The new trend first became apparent in 1779, when James
Hume, the deputy attorney general of Georgia, was ap-
pointed chief justice of East Florida and Samuel Quincy
obtained a post in the Antigua customs service.
2
0 The fol-
lowing year William Browne was named governor of Ber-
muda, and in 1781 Daniel Leonard became chief justice of
the same colony. Both men acquired their jobs through the
intercession of Benjamin Thompson, who also arranged to
put Browne's salary on a more secure footing than that of his
predecessor (while increasing it as well), and who persuaded
the Treasury to double Leonard's pension because the posi-
tion of chief justice was unsalaried. Browne and Leonard
remained in their posts for some years after the end of the
war, so Thompson's arrangements must have proved satis-
factory.
2
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Another indication of the different atmosphere was the fact104 The British-Americans
that missionaries of the Society for the Propagation of the
Gospel in Foreign Parts finally began to obtain reassignments
outside the thirteen colonies. The problem was that the
clergymen, who were accustomed to a temperate climate and
a relatively civilized existence, were often not very pleased
with their new posts. In an extreme case, the Reverend James
Barker of Maryland exchanged New Providence in the
Bahamas, where he suffered from the heat, for Trinity Bay,
Newfoundland, where he stayed only two weeks before decid-
ing that he had been better off in the West Indies. Barker was
eventually given a Bermuda living by Browne and there he
settled, though as a result of his wanderings the S.P.G. dis-
missed him from its ranks.
2
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Less peripatetic but no less dissatisfied was Joshua W.
Weeks of Marblehead, who in 1779 was named missionary to
Annapolis Royal, Nova Scotia. On a visit to the settlement he
found a church that he considered "unfit for the performance
of religious worship," a congregation that treated him
"civilly" but seemed to have little inclination to contribute
to his support, and a life so rough that he was afraid for his
family's safety. After beating a hasty retreat to Halifax, he
began trying to persuade the Society that he could not pos-
sibly take up permanent residence at his mission.
2
3 During
the next two years, over the vehement objections of the
S.P.G., which insisted that he live in Annapolis Royal, Weeks
evolved the practice of spending summers at his mission and
winters in Halifax, where he not only assisted in the parish
but also ran a small school. Although the S.P.G. in conse-
quence replaced him with a more dedicated missionary,
Weeks' good standing with the Halifax notables gave him an
unbeatable advantage: with their help he officially retained
the position of chaplain to the troops garrisoned at AnnapolisA Distressing Condition 105
Royal, thereby receiving the pay for that appointment while
his successor did the work.
2
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The change in the official British attitude towards the
loyalists manifested itself not only in a greater willingness to
use them to fill existing vacancies, but also in the develop-
ment of schemes to employ them in relatively large numbers.
During the later years of the war the North administration
deliberately began to try to provide jobs for the refugees,
both by creating a new colony specifically for them and by
restoring them to civil positions in the American territories
conquered by royal troops. The plans gave new hope to office-
seeking exiles, but neither project ever came fully to fruition.
The glimmerings of the idea that was to become a grandi-
ose scheme to found a province called "New Ireland" in what
is now Maine began in 1778 when a Massachusetts refugee,
John Nutting, proposed to Germain that a fort be built on
Penobscot Bay. Stressing the region's strategic importance,
Nutting argued that possession of it could prove invaluable
in the fight to subdue the rebellious colonists. Other resi-
dents of the area later took up the cudgel on behalf of the
idea, noting that Penobscot was a major source of masts,
timber, and pitch for the British navy. These arguments
struck a responsive chord in Lord North, who wanted to
develop ''some method of permanently providing for the
American Sufferers, who will soon be too numerous to be
provided for as they have hitherto been. Cannot not [sic] a
practicable and advantageous plan be devised of settling
them in the provinces, which still remain connected with
England and of granting them Lands with other encourage-
ments to induce them to settle there?"
2
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Within a month after North expressed his thoughts on the
subject, a plan had been formulated that combined the con-
cerns of the Penobscot group with those of the ministry. On106 The British-Americans
September 3, 1778, Germain disclosed to Clinton that the
government was considering settling the loyalists at Penob-
scot, in order to compensate them, assure a supply of timber
to the navy, and protect Nova Scotia all at the same time.
2
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A number of loyalists, including Governor John Went-
worth, fell in with the scheme enthusiastically. Thomas
Hutchinson, on the other hand, thought the idea "prepos-
terous" because "the American Refugees were in general
persons of liberal education, not brought up to labour, and
many of them too far advanced in life to begin the world
[anew]." Consequently, when Hutchinson was offered the
governorship of the new colony in October 1779, he replied
dryly that the outcome of the current campaign should be
known "before we thought any further on measures for re-
storing peace to America."
2
7 Despite Hutchinson's skepti-
cism and delays caused by the fact that Nutting was captured
by the Americans on his return voyage to the colonies,
planning for the settlements proceeded apace. By August
1780 a formal structure of government for New Ireland
drawn up by William Knox had been approved by the king
and his advisers. At first a governor and council were to rule
the colony, and later a legislature, including an upper house
appointed for life, would be added. Land was to be distrib-
uted according to merit, and loyalists with large holdings
were to be permitted to lease part of them to tenants. (Knox
defended this last provision on the grounds that New Ireland
would thereby come to resemble New York, which he
thought the most loyal of all the colonies.) He explicitly
suggested that the system could serve as a model for the
proper government to be used throughout a pacified
America.
2
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Hutchinson having died two months before the plan w
Ton
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Oliver, who accepted with alacrity. Daniel Leonard was
named chief justice, and Benjamin Thompson exerted con-
siderable pressure to see that the other offices were also filled
with his friends.
2
9 But no further appointments were made
before the plan became bogged down in legal technicalities.
Since Penobscot had traditionally been regarded as part of
Massachusetts, English legal officers raised doubts about the
legitimacy of establishing a new colony there. In September
1780 Germain, disgusted by the delay, asked Knox, "Can we
not take possession of it as a Conquerd Country and Establish
a Government in it ... and leave the discussion of the
rights of the Charter, to the final Settlement of the Colonies,
or till we can legally annul it?"
3
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Unaware of the legal difficulties, the loyalists assumed that
the plan would soon be put into operation. Daniel Batwell
wrote from London that it would be "a very good thing for
this Town, as it will rid us of the Swarms of Bostonians —
And it will vex the Saints at Boston, which will be another
good thing." By early 1781 rumors reported that Sir William
Pepperrell would replace Oliver as governor, but Pepperrell
told a friend he would not accept the position "if I cou'd
possibly avoid it." A number of refugees made plans to settle
in the area if the new colony ever materialized, but despite
Germain's hope that the scheme "would be in forwardness by
midsummer" 1781, nothing was done, and after Yorktow
Tn it
was too late.
3
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The proposal to compensate loyalists with land and em-
ployment in a new settlement therefore failed to attain the
desired end. However, at the same time as the plans for
Penobscot were being considered, the ministry had another
scheme in motion: to return refugees to the positions they
had held in provinces that had now been retaken by the
king's forces. In January 1779, after the ministry was in-108 The British-Americans
formed of the success of Clinton's expedition to Georgia,
Anthony Stokes, the colony's chief justice, and John Graham,
its lieutenant governor, were dispatched to the province to
pave the way for the restoration of civil authority there. The
governor of Georgia, Sir James Wright, remained in England
for a few months while attempting to work out the details
prerequisite to his resumption of office. Of the problems he
foresaw, none was more important than to what extent he
should trust repentant rebels. Wright admitted to Germain
that he was afraid such men could not be relied upon even if
they took formal oaths of allegiance to the king, and Germain
found his comment thought-provoking. If Wright was cor-
rect, Germain reasoned, "it argues against the settling the
Colony at the Peace of the King, and it must Continue under
Military Government."
3
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Notwithstanding the doubts raised concerning the viability
of a restored provincial government, Wright and the other
civil officials resumed control of Georgia soon after their
arrival in the colony. According to Stokes, the new regime
was "disagreeable" to some of the British officers stationed in
Georgia, but he himself was an enthusiastic supporter of the
plan. So were many other loyalists, who, along with Stokes,
argued loudly and frequently that only by reestablishing civil
government in all the conquered territories could Great
Britain make clear to the Americans the sharp contrast be-
tween the rule of the king, "founded in law, and justice," and
the tyranny of the rebels. Particularly insistent on this point
was James Simpson, the attorney general of South Carolina,
who declared that if "some considerable Colony" was re-
stored to its normal state, "the superiour Advantages and
Security, they would then enjoy, above those who lived under
a different Dominion, could not fail, to suggest comparisons
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quences, and an earnest wish, to partake of those Benefits,
and Blessings which they saw their Neighbours in the enjoy-
ment of."
3
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Simpson naturally thought that his own province of South
Carolina was best suited for such an important experiment,
but ironically he was at least partly responsible for the failure
to restore civil government there. After the capture of
Charleston in mid-1780, Clinton asked Simpson to set up a
''temporary Civil Police" to help govern the city, "which
must otherwise fall into Anarchy and Confusion." Simpson's
creation was so successful that it prevented the very end he
desired, for when the other Carolina officials arrived in
Charleston from England they found the board of police
functioning as "a supreme Court of Law and Equity, and also
in some Measure a Board of State Policy." Moreover, Clinton
proved to be unremittingly hostile to the idea of reestablish-
ing the civil government.
3
4 Dismayed by the general's atti-
tude, the civil officers appealed to England in hopes of
persuading the ministry to overrule him. William Bull, who
had been named governor of the colony in 1779, informed
Germain that "nothing can more effectually restore and
establish the public Tranquility on a lasting Foundation"
than reinstituting civil government, and Simpson continued
to argue eloquently for the same goal.
3
5 Loyalists from other
provinces entered the fray as well: Joseph Galloway and
William Smith, to name just two, declared that the perpetua-
tion of martial law would "disgust the minds of the People
and make them very restless Subjects," for Americans, like all
Englishmen, "will never be quiet, because unhappy, under
any Form of Governmt, but the good old Constitution de-
livered down to us by our Ancestors."
3
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It must be admitted, though, that the Carolinians' opposi-
tion to the continuation of military rule in their provinceno The British-Americans
was not entirely based on principle. Indeed, one of their
major objections was founded on pure self-interest. As
Thomas Irving, the receiver general, explained in 1782,
when the Treasury ordered the Carolina civil officers to
return to their posts, it cut off their allowances and left them
without any income until they were formally restored ''to the
Emoluments of our respective Employments." As a result,
Irving complained, "at the same time, that We are in some
Measure under the necessity of supporting (at least) the
appearance of the Rank We formerly held in the Country,
We are not only deprived of the Profits of our Employments
but also of our private Fortunes, whilst We find every Neces-
sary of Life raised to a Price barely credible." And even
though many of the officials in question were serving on the
board of police, Bull declared, the salary for that job was
"not sufficient to support any person in this Country in the
Character and appearance of a Gentleman."
3
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The ministerial proposals to provide employment for
groups of loyalists can most accurately be described as almost
total failures. The Penobscot colony never went beyond the
planning stage, and only in Georgia was civil government
ever fully restored. In each case military considerations
played a major role in sabotaging the original idea. Because
some strategists (colonial and English alike) thought a fort
on the Penobscot River could be of military use, that was the
site chosen for a new province, despite its unsuitability for
large-scale, immediate settlement. And as a consequence of
Clinton's assessment of military necessity, civil government
was never reinstituted in South Carolina, nor, for that mat-
ter, in New York City.
The plain fact was that the war influenced every aspect of
the loyalists' search for employment. Their original expecta-
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made them reluctant to apply for positions in the first place.
When that reluctance was overcome in the later years of the
war, they still tended to prefer jobs that could be readily
abandoned once the final victory was achieved. Furthermore,
the ministry, operating under the same assumptions as the
refugees, was inhospitable to their requests for jobs until
their sheer numbers became so large that there was little
alternative. And even then the provisions the government
tried to make for them proved completely inadequate.
[3]
The loyalists may have found it easier to obtain jobs after
1778, but on the other hand they found it much more diffi-
cult to acquire sizable pensions. Like every other aspect of
the refugees' lives, their allowances were affected by Saratoga,
though somewhat belatedly. Not until 1779 did the Lords of
the Treasury show signs of realizing that they were now
going to have to support increasing numbers of Americans
for an indefinite period. But, once they had faced this un-
appetizing prospect, the Lords started to economize wherever
possible.
Beginning in 1779, they came to rely upon two simple
devices for easing the government's financial burden: first,
they doled out smaller allowances than before, and second,
they replaced some pensions with single grants that carried
the proviso, "in full of all claims as an American sufferer." By
these means the Lords drastically cut the number of pensions
over £100 and slowed the rate at which the total number of
allowances had been climbing. They also began frequently to
deny requests altogether, on the grounds that the petitioners
did "not seem to be within the Rules for Relief, as ...
American Sufferer[s]." And the Lords sought ways to com-
pensate memorialists outside of the pension system; a Vir-112 The British-Americans
ginia refugee, for example, was permitted to collect his
father's customs salary in lieu of receiving an allowance.
3
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Another new policy that yielded fruitful results, even to
the extent of lowering the total amount disbursed to refu-
gees, was the Treasury's determination to take advantage of
every opportunity to reduce or stop current allowances. The
death or departure of a recipient became an automatic excuse
for ceasing or lessening the support allotted to his family, and
once a name had been removed from the list it was practically
impossible to persuade the Lords to restore it.
3
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Treasury furthermore stopped the stipends of persons
ordered to return to their homes in America as a result of
British victories in the South. In March 1779, July 1780, and
July 1781 pensioners from Georgia, South Carolina, and Vir-
ginia respectively were struck from the rolls and directed to
take passage for America. They were granted travel allow-
ances and were specifically told that they would not ''receive
any further Relief on staying here." In addition, southern
loyalists whose applications for allotments had not yet been
considered were given varying amounts of assistance and
ordered to return to the colonies.
4
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These tactics lowered the number of pensioners, but by
early 1782 the sum distributed for loyalist allowances still
amounted to more than £38,000. When Lord Rockingham
and his coalition government took control of the administra-
tion from Lord North in the spring of 1782, they were faced
with a sizable annual outlay, an ever-increasing pile of peti-
tions, and, in the wake of Yorktown, with the knowledge that
the Americans' stipends might well have to become perma-
nent. The new Lords of the Treasury therefore decided to
review the entire pension list in the hope of reducing it still
further.
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allowances but refused to ''grant Relief to any fresh Claim-
ants till the Pretensions of the former ones are all con-
sidered." Next the Lords ordered an end to salary payments
to former American officials. This directive, as the outraged
admiralty judge Robert Auchmuty noted, "converted my
rightfull claim on government into a mere favour."
Auchmuty and the rest of the refugees understood the impli-
cations of the new policy, and they protested mightily, but to
no avail.
4
1 By this device the Lords successfully ensured that
all the American allowances would be open to revision, that
none were any longer in the category of fixed, immutable
payments. They had begun to effect a transition from a
system in which at least some pensioners had been entitled by
right to a certain amount of support, to one in which all
pensioners would be equally dependent upon the good will
of the government for their subsistence.
The practical results of the Lords' changed attitude toward
salary claims may be illustrated by the case of William Smith,
who had been appointed chief justice of New York in 1779.
Since the province was ruled by martial law throughout the
war, he had never actually fulfilled the duties of his office.
Nevertheless Smith, under previous practice, would have
been entitled to receive the full salary authorized for the
position. By the time he first applied for the arrears owed
him, though, the new policy was in effect, and Smith made
the additional mistake of requesting payment in the amount
of three times his nominal salary, on the grounds that the cost
of living in New York had trebled during the war. The com-
bination of Smith's exorbitant claim and the Treasury's insis-
tence that all payments to loyalists were now by favor rather
than by right sealed the fate of his application. For more than
two years he fought to have it accepted, bombarding the
ministry with petition after petition, haunting the offices of114 The British-Americans
the Treasury and the secretary of state. Nothing worked.
Finally in July 1786 Smith surrendered. Recognizing at last
that whatever he received ''must be the Effect of Interest
, . . and not on the Justice of the Case," he submitted a
pension memorial. Within a month he was granted an allow-
ance of £400 a year, retroactive to January 1784. In his diary
Smith recorded his disgusted comment: "What a Lesson does
my Example teach to all that have Demands upon Governmt.
or Business with Ministers!"
4
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The same policy that so incensed Smith was put into effect
with respect to the pension list as well. Refugees attempting
to collect their allowances in June 1782 were told that the
rolls were being examined and that payments would be
temporarily suspended. But it was not until August that the
Treasury board asked Lord Shelburne, who had become
prime minister on Rockingham's death, to appoint some
qualified persons "to enquire generally and minutely into
the Cases of all the American Sufferers." Shelburne selected
for the task two Members of Parliament, John Wilmot and
Daniel Parker Coke, both of whom had opposed the Ameri-
can war. In order to avoid "the imputation of a ministerial
job, or undue influence in their parliamentary conduct,"
they decided to serve without pay.
4
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The list turned over to Wilmot and Coke contained 315
names and represented a yearly disbursement of £40,280.
The investigators' major assignment was to examine each
case, in order to ensure that no loyalist was receiving more
(or less) than he deserved. They began their work in Oc-
tober 1782, and they meticulously insisted that pensioners
appear before them in person to present evidence to prove
their loyalty and losses. According to the woman who cleaned
their rooms, the two men "seldom left the office before 12
o'clock at night" while they were pursuing the inquiry.
4
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Wilmot and Coke decided to consider the cases both collec-
tively, "with a view to the general Disposition of them," and
individually, "with a reference to each particular Case and
the Allowance we think should be made to each till they can
be otherwise provided for." From the first standpoint, they
divided the pensioners into three general classes: (1) land-
owners, merchants, and tradesmen, who should be encour-
aged to settle in the remaining British provinces in America
through the allotting of assistance "proportioned to their
several Ranks, and Situations in Life"; (2) civil officers,
professional men, and customs officials, many of whom could
not so readily relocate and who should receive financial aid
and new positions, if possible; and (3) widows, minors, and
aged and infirm persons, who could neither return to
America nor be profitably employed and who were as a result
"more particularly objects of the Bounty of the Govern-
ment."
4
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After reviewing the cases carefully, Wilmot and Coke
recommended that 134 allowances be continued at the cur-
rent rate; 90 be reduced; 25 be stopped because the recipi-
ents either did not need the money or were not properly
"American sufferers"; 10 be increased because of "extraordi-
nary Merit or Losses"; and 56 be suspended because the
recipients had not appeared to testify on their cases. The
total amount disbursed for pensions was reduced by approxi-
mately one-fourth, from the £34,695 received by the 259
persons whose claims had been checked to £26,4oo.
4
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The investigators' final report to the Lords of the Treasury
revealed the general bases for their decisions. Their chief
tenet was that the allotments "were not intended as Compen-
sation or Satisfaction for the Losses of those Persons to whom
they have been paid, but as temporary Provisions for their
Support till the Close of the War, and till the final Issue ofn6 The British-Americans
the Contest with the American Colonies could be known." As
a result the amounts Wilmot and Coke awarded were not
strictly tied to the size of a man's losses, but instead bore a
vague relationship to three separate and independently de-
termined considerations: loyalty and service to the crown,
loss of property or income in very general terms, and present
need and circumstances.
4
7 An examination of the investi-
gators' comments in individual cases shows how they weighed
each of these elements before reaching their final decisions.
First it must be emphasized that, since the primary purpose
of the inquiry was to reduce the pension list, Wilmot and
Coke continually sought ways to do just that. Whenever a
loyalist could claim only a small property loss, they thought it
an ''advantageous bargin" to exchange his allowance for a
single sum. Or, if they were confronted by w
7hat they believed
to be false testimony, they did not hesitate to stop a stipend
altogether. And, if a recipient did not need government assis-
tance, his allotment was usually halted.
4
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Above all, the pensioners had to prove their loyalty to the
crown. When their allegiance was "at least Problematical"
(as Wilmot and Coke commented in one case) or when
applicants had not particularly exerted themselves in the
British cause, their allowances were more often than not
reduced. If, on the other hand, a pensioner had served the
king well, the investigators were inclined to overlook the fact
that he had little property or even that he was reputed to be
of bad character in order to award him an allowance some-
what out of proportion to his actual losses. As Coke explained
to the House of Commons some months later, "Whenever
they found, on enquiry, that a Loyalist had borne arms, and
been in active service in the cause of Great Britain, they had
always considered that as a great merit, and acted accord-
ingly."
4
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Loyalty alone was not sufficient to win a claimant a sub-
stantial allowance: wealth and status were also of importance.
Men who had had little property often had their stipends
reduced, as did the refugees unable to supply adequate proof
of their former holdings. These deductions derived specifi-
cally from Wilmot and Coke's belief that the status of the
pension recipients had not been ''sufficiently attended to"
previously. By this they did not mean that certain wealthy
loyalists should have received more; rather, they were con-
cerned lest an exile of low social origin be rewarded with an
allotment so high as to put him "in a much better Situation
than he was ever in [in] America." In accordance with this
policy, the investigators frequently lowered pensions that
seemed to them out of proportion to a loyalist's "Rank in
Life, Originally."
5
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The third element considered by Wilmot and Coke in
determining awards was that of need. Since the Lords of the
Treasury had not particularly concerned themselves with the
actual needs of applicants, the addition of this consideration
to the list of relevant criteria for assistance constituted a
major innovation. Time and again in recommending allow-
ances Wilmot and Coke show
Ted that they believed need to be
perhaps the most significant factor in their decisions. If a
claimant was in poor health, was elderly, or had a large
family to support, the investigators would disregard both
deficiencies in evidence and a low social status in order to
allot pensions that "we should think . . . otherwise rather
too much."
5
1 The decisions in such cases were umvelcome
portents of the future for the loyalists, because they indicated
that the pension system was steadily becoming nothing more
than a charitable operation. As greater emphasis was placed
on need, claims of merit received increasingly less attention
from the government.n8 The British-Americans
Two further considerations influenced the investigators.
Unlike the Lords of the Treasury, they took into account the
relative size of allowances, and on several occasions they
ordered stipends reduced because they were "too much
compared with those made to others in similar circum-
stances." But, on the other hand, Wilmot and Coke made no
substantial changes in the basic structure of the system itself.
Feeling themselves bound by the former decisions of the
Treasury, they merely reviewed the cases and refused to make
new determinations on the merits of claimants. Their re-
marks concerning a Pennsylvania farmer illuminate their
attitude. "If it had been a New Case perhaps we should not
have thought ourselves justified in recommending any thing
to be given to him," they wrote. However, since "a Case
ought to be very strong and the impropriety very great"
before a stipend should be stopped, they merely suggested a
reduction in the size of his pension.
5
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The most complex problem Wilmot and Coke encoun-
tered in their efforts to revise the pension list involved the
salaries of customs officials. In December 1776 the Lords of
the Treasury, at the recommendation of the American board
of customs commissioners, had authorized Charles Steuart,
the cashier of American customs, to use receipts from Ameri-
can ports to pay salaries to refugee officers. By June 1779 the
fund from which the salaries were drawn had nearly been
exhausted, and the commissioners asked the Lords to con-
tinue customs payments from general revenues.
1
3 Instead of
complying with the request, the Treasury directed Andrew
Elliot, superintendent of exports and imports at New York,
to collect duties on prize vessels brought into the harbor
there and to remit the proceeds to Steuart, to enable him to
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collect the duties, but then in August 1781 an English legal
officer ruled that the prize ships could not legally be taxed.
5
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By that time some customs officials had not been paid for
almost two years, and the Lords of the Treasury at last agreed
to supply the lesser officers with some "present relief" and to
pay the commissioners' salary arrears. But further than that
they would not go.
5
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At this point the matter was referred to Wilmot and Coke.
They recommended that other customs officers be paid in full
to the same date (October 1782) as the commissioners had
been and that all salaries be stopped from that time. As a
substitute, they proposed to increase the pensions of the cus-
toms officers by approximately one-half, and they suggested
that henceforth the revenue officials should be treated like
other refugee loyalists. Although the Lords of the Treasury
nominally accepted Wilmot and Coke's recommendation, in
response to petitions from various customs officers they modi-
fied the decision several times, ordering additional payments
to those officers not receiving government stipends and even-
tually awarding the commissioners special allowances in the
amount of one-half their former salaries.
5
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Wilmot and Coke submitted their final report to the
Treasury on January 29, 1783, expressing the hope that Par-
liament would be convinced "that some Pains have been
taken to see their Bounty is not distributed to unworthy
Objects, and that the American Sufferers on their part will be
satisfied, there is a desire at least in Government to do them
all the Justice in their Power." Wilmot and Coke's first wish
was indeed fulfilled, but, as one might imagine, the second
was not. The numerous reductions in allowances sparked
countless appeals from loyalists for reconsideration of their
cases. All the appeals, however, were rejected by the Lords on120 The British-Americans
the grounds that they had accepted the commissioners' report
in its entirety and would not depart from it. At least they
were consistent: if Thomas Swan, a Boston storekeeper, was
not successful in his appeal, neither was John Randolph.
5
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The most frequent complaint offered against the new
allowances was that they constituted deliberate insults.
Andrew Allen, the former attorney general of Pennsylvania,
insisted that Wilmot and Coke must have had some "Mis-
apprehension" of his case when they decided to lower his
annual allowance from £400 to £300. "What affects me
beyond all other Considerations," he wrote, "is the Insinimu-
ation [sic] which this new Regulation must necessarily con-
vey of some Demerit in point of Pretensions or Conduct,
which I am by no means conscious of." Peter Oliver, whose
£400 pension was also reduced to £300, exhibited an identi-
cal reaction. "If to be uniformly confirmed in Loyalty to the
most amiable of Sovereigns and to the british Constitution is
to be deemed criminal," Oliver declared in a letter protesting
the cuts, "I do acknowledge myself to be immerged in the
deepest Criminality."
5
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The loyalists' anguished comments reveal the source of the
difficulty. Not understanding that Wilmot and Coke had
based the new awards partly on their assessment of appli-
cants' need and relative merits, the refugees assumed that any
reduction meant that their devotion to Great Britain was
being questioned. Nor, given their interpretation of the
pension system, was any other conclusion possible. Since they
believed that the size of their allotment was directly related
to the ministry's judgment of their loyalty and services, a
lessening of that amount was more than just a financial dis-
aster for the exiles — it was an emotional catastrophe as well,
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which they were regarded by the government they had faith-
fully supported.
There was still another unpleasant implication inherent in
the new system. The Treasury's adherence to Wilmot and
Coke's formula irretrievably altered the basis on which pen-
sion decisions were made. Before the Rockingham coalition
took over the ministry in early 1782, a loyalist could success-
fully petition the Treasury for compensation as a matter of
right. After Wilmot and Coke's report substituted the clearly
defined criteria of need, loyalty, and loss for the somewhat
vague determination of status and sufferings that had previ-
ously been the Treasury's grounds for awarding allowances, a
claim of right became both meaningless and worthless. As
William Smith had discovered, it got one nowhere. Yet the
refugees, led by Joseph Galloway, resisted to the end the
inevitable conclusion that they were thereby to become
totally dependent on government charity. The loyalists, said
Galloway, "will not yet so far degrade themselves as to con-
sider their claims on goverment [sic] wholly founded on
compassion." On the contrary, he continued, they had a "just
right of claim on goverment [sic] for past services . . .
[and for] the meritorious and matchless sacrifices they have
made in support of it."
5
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Galloway's arguments won the plaudits of other exiles, but
they had little impact on the ministry. For both financial and
political reasons the government simply could not afford to
admit the validity of Galloway's position, and as the years
passed the trend towards turning the allowances into nothing
more than benevolent handouts continued unabated. After
1783 pensions were awarded only as "temporary support" in
conjunction with the investigation of claims for property loss
during the war. These procedures and the final disposition of
the allowance system will be discussed in a later chapter.122 The British-Americans
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The related and practically simultaneous developments
resulting from the defeat at Saratoga combined with the
effects of that loss itself to produce readily identifiable
changes in the loyalists' mental attitude. Knowing that they
would not be able to return to America for some time, many
of the refugees surrendered themselves to despondency. The
boredom of life in provincial towns did nothing to offset
their gloom, and the new pension policies adopted by the
government only contributed to it. Even before 1778 their
lives in London had been characterized by an everlasting
sameness, an unremitting tedium. Walks in the parks, after-
noons at coffeehouses, and occasional visits to the theater had
filled their time pleasantly for weeks, perhaps for months,
but certainly not for years. As Samuel Curwen said in 1776,
once the "harmless amusements" had "lost their novelty,"
they could "delight no more."
6
0 This discontent doubled
and redoubled after Saratoga, because now the refugees could
see no end to their misery, no conclusion to their rootless,
meaningless existence. And so they increasingly described
their lives as "dull, heavy and insipid," or characterized
themselves as being in "that torpid inanimate state which
deprives a man of the hopes of anything better and rids him
of the fear of any thing worse to come."
6
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The exiles' pessimistic mood contributed to their already
endemic homesickness. The routine emptiness of their daily
lives, their belief that Britain did not fully appreciate their
sacrifices, and what would today be called "cultural shock"
brought home to them the sharp contrast between their
former lives in the colonies and their current existence in
England. They grew ever more critical of Britain and, con-
comitantly, they became ever more inclined to look uponCOVRTESY OF BRITISH MUSEUM, DIVISION OF PRINTS AND DRAWINGS
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America with a "filial fondness."
6
2 In exile, after all, they no
longer had to face the opprobrium of the rebels. They were
safe from the ravages of the war, their lives were not in
danger. They read or talked about the distresses of America,
but they did not themselves undergo wartime hardships. As
the weeks and months passed, their memories of persecution
faded, and, instead of dwelling upon the difficulties of the
immediate past, they began to recall their happiness in the
years before the rebellion. So Thomas Hutchinson wrote,
with perhaps greater perception than he realized, "I find my
attachment to my native Country increased by my distance
from it."
6
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Yet nostalgia alone would not have been sufficient to pro-
duce the pattern of thought that led Sir William Pepperrell
to exclaim in 1778, "I earnestly wish to spend the remainder
of my Days in America, I love the Country, I love the
People." Contributing a major share to such expressions of
patriotism was something quite different: the loyalists' theory
of the causes of the war. Their analysis will be discussed at
length in the next chapter; at this point it is enough to say
that the exiles believed that the Revolution had been
brought on by a small group of malcontents who had deluded
the naive, well-meaning colonials into thinking that they
were being oppressed. Or, to use Jonathan Sewall's words,
"the Artifices of a few Demagogues have insensibly led a once
happy innocent People to the Summit of Madness and Re-
bellion, and involved them in Distress, Poverty and ruin."
6
4
This theory absolved the majority of the American colo-
nists of guilt for the sufferings caused by "the ambition and
Envy of the jew," and as a result Sewall could retain his
"predilection" for his native land at the same time as he
continued to "curse and swear, most devoutly, without ceas-
ing, at the folly and views of my Countrymen." Moreover,A Distressing Condition 125
the refugees' analysis of the war had a further advantage: it
enabled them to believe that one day the correctness of their
position would be recognized by their erring fellow Ameri-
cans. "The people of the Town of Milton will not persist in
what they know to be wrong," said Thomas Hutchinson in
1779* If the present generation is not convinced of its error
the next will be and truth will finally prevail and our lost
reputations be restored."
6
5
In the interim, though, while waiting for the revolution-
aries to recant, the loyalists found their lot "damnable Hard."
Pepperrell spoke for all of them when he observed in 1778,
"How hard it is to be exiled from one's Country, for trying to
save it from ruin." Joshua Weeks revealed the following year
that "every object around me fills me with melancholy. Even
the beams of the Sun do not shine with their wonted cheer-
fullness, places of amusement seem to wear a dismal gloom,
and even the house of God does not afford me that pleasure it
used to." In short, remarked Sewall, "the situation of Ameri-
can loyalists, I confess, is enough to have provoked Job's wife,
if not Job himself."
6
6
The exiles' experience in England was so unsatisfactory
that some of them, most notably Samuel Curwen, even began
to have second thoughts about having left America. Curwen
decided in 1777 that he might have been better off had he
remained in the colonies to endure "the comparative trifling
conditions of insults, reproaches, and perhaps a dress of tar
and feathers," which he thought preferable to "the distresses
of mind I am daily suffering." Two years later Hannah
Winslow wrote regretfully, "Sincerely wish I had never left
Boston, but," she added, "its now t[oo late] and my unhappy
fate is fix'd."
6
7 Most of the loyalists would have agreed with
her that there w
ras little to be gained from recriminations.
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not view their departure from America as an error, despite
their love for the colonies), the refugees rather had to de-
velop some means of rationalizing their current difficulties
and of dealing with the afflictions thrust upon them by the
rebellion.
Some found their answer in a pessimistic interpretation of
man and his past. "The History of Mankind, from Adam,
through all the succeeding Generations ... is little else
than an History of War, Tumult and Bloodshed," asserted
Benjamin Pickman in 1781. Browne concurred. "The bal-
ance of happiness is and ever has been against all the sons of
Adam," he observed; "that the evils of this life should pre-
ponderate the enjoyments appears to me to be the established
constitution of Nature."
6
8 Yet there was much that could be
gained from adversity. Pickman saw the possibility that he
might discover "Virtues which lie concealed in the Sunshine
of Prosperity," and John Randolph outlined those virtues in
some detail. Difficulty, he commented, "offers a season for
Reflection, calls forth the Powers of the Understanding]^,]
fixes its Principles, and inspires a Fortitude, which shews the
true Dignity of Man."
6
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Other exiles, especially clergymen, turned to religion for
solace in their time of trial. "As your troubles increase, so let
your faith also increase," Henry Caner advised his elderly
friend Silvester Gardiner, "and rest assured that your confi-
dence in the hand that guides the Universe, will not finally
be frustrated." Caner's words evidently had the desired effect,
for some months later Gardiner told a friend, "What com-
forts me in my distress is that God governs the world, Sees
and Suffers these things, no doubt for Some good and wise
ends." With a similar acquiescence in his fate, the Reverend
Harry Munro of New York wrote, "God's will be done. — All
is for the best; — whatever is, is right; — and we are assuredA Distressing Condition 127
from the best authority . . . that all things shall work to-
gether for Good to Them that love God."
7
0 The clerics too
thought that much could be learned from undergoing hard-
ships. Isaac Smith prayed that his afflictions might increase
his "reliance on, and submission to the all-disposing hand of
the wise and righteous Governor of the universe," and Mrs.
Jacob Duche declared, "I have found the distresses I have
suffered Heaven's best gifts to me," precisely because they
had led her "immediately to God."
7
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The ultimate consolation of religion was that expressed by
the Reverend Samuel Peters of Connecticut in 1783. Reli-
gion, he asserted, "conquers Death Kings and congress." So-
called "Liberty" might "cast down the greatest Patriots" or
"change Rebellions into Revolutions," but, he warned, "time
with all her fickle vanities can never change Eternity." And
so, he concluded, "We have Jacobs Ladder to climb to
Heaven on — at its Top we shall meet and find Tranquility
durable as Eternity. . . . Viewing this happy Prospect I am
content in Hope, and in my Fortune."
7
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The refugees had still another source from which they
could draw the strength necessary to endure adversity, and
this was the absolute certainty that they had acted correctly.
To a man they relied upon this knowledge in an attempt to
compensate for the many trials they had undergone. Harri-
son Gray made his thinking explicit in a 1789 letter to John
Hancock: "The cool reflections on the conscientious part I
early acted in the late unhappy dispute between Great
Britain and her Colonies affords me the most exalted
pleasure and is a source of consolation to me under the loss of
my property of which I have been unjustly deprived, A
pleasure which I could not part with for all the honors which
your State could bestow."
7
3
Although few of the exiles expressed themselves so openly,128 The British-Americans
they all found solace for the destruction of their former lives
in an unswerving confidence that they had done their duty
and that they had been motivated by (in Pickman's words)
''the purest Principles of Loyalty." "My Conduct, in
America, was not influenced by Events; but by Duty to his
Majesty — an attachment to my native Country — and a Sense
of mine own Honor," wrote Anthony Stokes; "nothing there-
fore can annihilate my Attachment to my King and Coun-
try." "I repent not of what I have done," declared the New
Yorker Peter Van Schaack; "my Heart condemns me not for
any Part of my political Conduct."
7
4 "[I] have been the
true Patriot," wrote Pepperrell; "My Heart tells me — that I
have done my Duty," Duche asserted; "I enjoy the intire
Approbation of my own Mind, and I am therewith perfectly
content," concurred Isaac Low, who had been a member of
the First Continental Congress.
7
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Emerging from these statements was an attitude cogently
outlined by Robert Auchmuty in 1779: "Though I am
deemed an enemy to that country, I know the contrary. In
fact I am not, nor ever was." His only crime, Auchmuty ob-
served, was that he "differed in opinion with many touching
political matters." And that disagreement made him no less a
patriot, for his judgment was just as "honestly," as "ration-
ally" framed as were the ideas of the rebels. Other loyalists
agreed that they too had been influenced only by "the most
sincere affection" for America, by a "warm attachment" to the
colonists' welfare.
7
6 Van Schaack put it best: "My attach-
ment to her [Great Britain] (great indeed as it was) was
founded in the relation she stood in to America, and the
happiness I conceived America derived from it."
7
7
This set of priorities was, of course, the reason why the
refugees found their experience in exile so frustrating and
perplexing. They knew that they had had the best interests ofA Distressing Condition 129
their country at heart. They knew that they had acted out of
love for America, out of a sincere concern for her future. But
their fellow Americans not only did not recognize that fact,
they also impugned the loyalists' motives, accusing them of
betraying the colonies. The exiles saw no treason in their
actions: they considered themselves British-Americans, and
while in the colonies, they had not been able to separate the
two facets of that identity. After living in England for a time,
they realized that those halves of their existence were in fact
separable, and that it was their identity as Americans, their
allegiance to the colonies, that was primary. This recognition
did not make them change their minds about independence
— the vast majority still opposed it — but it did mean that
they were never completely at ease in the British Isles. They
conceived of themselves as persons "upon an excursion from
home,"
7
8 not as emigrants seeking a permanent place to
resettle. And, as the years passed, they thought ever more
longingly about the land they had left behind.5
The Seeds of Sedition
I saw the small seed of sedition, when it was im-
planted; it was, as a grain of mustard. I have
watched the plant until it has become a great tree;
the vilest reptiles that crawl upon the earth, are
concealed at the root; the foulest birds of the air
rest upon its branches.
— DANIEL LEONARD, 1775
1
P
ERHAPS the most important facet of the refugees' psy-
chological state after Saratoga was their suddenly acquired
compulsion to discuss and explain the origins of the Revolu-
tion. In the pamphlet wars of 1774, a few writers like
Leonard and Seabury had ventured tentatively into the field
of historical analysis, but always within the context of the
immediate political dispute. In 1779 and 1780, quite a differ-
ent phenomenon emerged: for the first time, the loyalists
began to produce formal, comprehensive histories of the
colonies and of the rebellion itself. The destruction of their
initial assumptions about the war forced them at last to find a
way of coming to terms with the reality of the revolt. This
they did in books that superficially differed from one another
but that concurred on essential points. Although these loyal-
ist authors had disagreed among themselves during the 1760's
and early 1770's, their retrospective analyses of colonial his-
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(and of post-Saratoga depression) served to erase the very-
real ideological lines that had once divided them.
The loyalist historians who took up their pens after Sara-
toga were a variegated lot. There was Joseph Galloway, the
perennial proposer of conciliation plans; Peter Oliver, the
acerbic chief justice; Alexander Hewatt, a Scottish Presby-
terian clergyman who had settled in Charleston in 1763;
George Chalmers, another Scot who came to America in 1763
and who thereafter had practiced law in Annapolis and Balti-
more; Samuel Peters, an arrogant, opinionated Anglican
cleric from Connecticut; and Anthony Stokes, the able law-
yer who had served as chief justice of Georgia from 1769 to
1775. These men and the other refugees who commented less
formally on the history of the revolt discerned one overriding
pattern in the materials they studied. Within that pattern
their emphases varied: Anglican historians, for example,
tended to stress the religious side of the conflict, while colo-
nial officials put their emphasis on legal, political, and consti-
tutional issues. But the general outline was in most cases the
same.
The historians began with the assumption that prerevolu-
tionary America was idyllic, a "Golden Age" when the colo-
nists were prosperous, happy, and living in "harmony,
concord, mutual love, and reciprocal affection." This vision
of the past was an important component of the undisguised
nostalgia with which, from the vantage point of exile, they
viewed their homeland. For them, it was axiomatic that the
Americans had been "seated in the bosom of peace and never-
failing plenty, — enjoying the benefit of mild and equitable
Laws, — secured . . . against every Suspicion of danger from
Foreign Invaders, and contributing far less than their Propor-132 The British-Americans
tion towards defraying the general expences of Government."
Before the war, they declared, "the bounty of the mother
country was extensive as her dominions, and, like the sun,
cherished and invigorated every object on which it shone."
2
The flourishing state of the colonial economy was "owing al-
most solely to the protection and patronage of the Parent
State": the colonies had been "nourished in their infancy, and
supported in their more adult age, with all the attention of a
most affectionate parent." Britain had been ever solicitous of
the Americans' interests, and the result was that the colonists
in the 1760's had been "in full possession and enjoyment of
all the peace and all the security which the best government
in the world can give." In short, concluded Silvester Gar-
diner, "I don't believe there ever was a people in any age or
part of the World that enjoyed so much liberty as the people
of America did under the mild indulgent Government (God
bless it) of England."
3
Such an idealized assessment of life in the prewar colonies,
although providing the exiles with a convenient vision of the
Utopia they sought to regain, contained a major theoretical
drawback: it made the rebellion inexplicable by traditional
standards. The refugees admitted that most recorded revolu-
tions had been motivated by "extreme injustice and oppres-
sion by the rulers." But their halcyon description of prerevo-
lutionary America obviously prevented them from applying
this interpretation to the colonies, and so they argued that
there was "no such concurrence of adequate causes" for the
Americans' revolt.
4 The denial of parallels between the
present and the past solved one of the loyalists' problems,
allowing them to maintain their roseate view of prewar
colonial life. But at the same time it created another, even
more pressing dilemma. In the words of Myles Cooper, presi-
dent of King's College in New York, "How then (it willChief Justice Peter Oliver,
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naturally be asked) could a people, thus happily situated, be
persuaded to sacrifice these advantages, and to hazard their
Fortunes, their Lives, and their Souls, in such a Rebellion?"
5
Some refugee authors did not even attempt to supply an
answer to this crucial question. Instead of engaging in a
systematic analysis of the causes of the Revolution, loyalist
historians often contented themselves with narrative sum-
maries of facts, broken infrequently by comments that the
colonists had been "infected with pride and ambition"
(Hew
ratt) or that they had acted "from an excess of liberty
and affluence" (Stokes) . The extent of the exiles' difficulties
in reconciling the reality of the rebellion with their insis-
tence that all had been well in America prior to the war is
amply illustrated by Peter Oliver's lame conclusion (to
which he was inexorably driven by premises he dared not
deny) that the colonists had in the end "run Mad with too
much Happiness."
6
But in spite of the obvious analytical problems involved in
assuming an absence of "adequate cause" for the Revolution,
the loyalists refused to concede that it might have been justi-
fied. "The Colonists were not in a state of Oppression,"
asserted Cooper; their so-called "grievances" w^ere either
"evidently no grievances at all" or else were "much more
than counterbalanced by peculiar Advantages." "Had the
rebellion originated from real grievances," argued Charles
Inglis in 1779, "a redress of those grievances, repeatedly
offered on the part of government, had long since composed
our troubles." Moreover, declared Daniel Leonard, once the
Americans' complaints and assumptions were carefully exam-
ined, "the terrible fabric of grievances vanishes, like castles
raised by enchantment, and leaves the wondering spectator
amazed and confounded at the deception."
7
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the Americans' grievances was shouldered by Joseph Gallo-
way in 1780. The Americans claimed that Grenville's 1765
plan to tax the colonies had been oppressive, Galloway noted,
but that assertion w
Tas utterly false. It was only reasonable for
Grenville, as prime minister, to expect the colonies to con-
tribute to the costs of imperial defense, and, as for the Stamp
Act itself, ''no law within the compass of human wisdom
could be found more just and adequate to its purpose." The
tea tax instituted at the behest of Charles Townshend two
years later was also justifiable, Galloway argued, and the
repeal of the objectionable Townshend duties on glass,
paper, and dyes proved the ministry's responsiveness to colo-
nial complaints. The East India Act of 1773, examined
dispassionately, actually benefited the colonies by making
cheaper tea available, and the ''Intolerable" Acts had pun-
ished Massachusetts only as that province deserved. This was
no program intended to enslave the colonies, concluded
Galloway; to the contrary, w<ere the British ministers "tamely
to permit the supreme authority of the State to be insolently
trampled on by its ungrateful subjects, without supporting
it?"
8
Reasoning like Gallow
fay's led many loyalists to decide that
their fellow countrymen had rebelled "more from other
causes, than those which were openly avowed." After all, said
Chalmers, "a contest with regard to abstract propositions of
law . . . could never have produced universal disaffection"
without additional contributing factors. And so Galloway,
Chalmers, and a number of other exiles resolved to expose
the truth about the rebellion, and to "endeavour to demon-
strate by what progressive means, and fatal succession of
events, the original spark has been produced, and nourished
up to its present flame."
9
With the exception of eccentrics who attributed the Revo-136 The British-Americans
lution to causes like the "insidious" influence of France or
the lack of adequate educational institutions in America,
1
0
the loyalists generally agreed that the seeds of revolt had been
"co-oeval with the Colonies themselves" and that the rebel-
lion had "necessarily flowed from causes interwoven with
their very existence." The chief flaw they perceived in the
early colonies was that the provincial governments had origi-
nally been "laid out more by accident than by plan." The
American constitutions were "discordant[,] contradictory,
ungovernable — forming on incidental convenience and
temporary expedients a motley system, which wore the Face
of Dominion without its Energy and power." In fact, de-
clared Galloway, the colonial polities were based upon prin-
ciples so "erroneous" and so "totally different" from those of
the British government that by their very existence they
"tended to break in time the uniformity of the State."
1
1
The refugees found particular fault w
Tith the distribution
of power inside the respective governments. Jonathan
Boucher, who asserted that the executives had never had
sufficient "Pith and Energy," was echoed by Stokes, w
7ho
bewailed the governors' lack of an unlimited power of ap-
pointment.
1
2 What made matters worse was the fact that in
America "too much weight was . . . thrown into the popu-
lar scale," and the strength of the assemblies was such that the
governments appeared to be on the "Verge" of republi-
canism. Furthermore, the colonies lacked the independent
aristocracy "necessary to check the illegal attempts of an
arbitrary governor, or the ambitious and licentious designs of
a popular assembly." All in all, Galloway concluded, the
American governments failed to exhibit "those Principles of
Policy that alone ever have or can bind the Members of a free
Society together."
1
3
Aggravating the original problem was the "irresolutionThe Seeds of Sedition 137
and unsteadiness" of British colonial administration.
Britain's "supineness" in not correcting her early errors had
allowed "mismanagements" to become rebellion, Boucher
charged angrily, and Chalmers observed with regret that
British ministers had generally applied "palliatives ... to
disorders w
Thich required effectual remedies," substituting
"temporary expedient for uniformity of system."
1
4 In addi-
tion, the "Timidity" of recent administrations had resulted
in "great, and indeed too much, condescension on the part of
the State towards its subjects," in a "lenity of disposition"
that had perhaps encouraged the Americans in their recalci-
trance.
1
5 The whole theory was very neatly summed up by
George Chalmers in one sentence: "The original defects of
the provincial constitutions, the genuine source of successive
usurpations, were permitted to exhibit standing monuments
of continual complaint, of general neglect, of the imbecility
of man, till they ended, by a natural progress, in the worst
evils that can afflict a people, revolt and civil war."
1
6
Comprehensive as it sounded, there w
7ere two major rea-
sons why this formulation could not supply the final, defini-
tive explanation for which the loyalists were searching. First,
an overemphasis on British mistakes would bring the refu-
gees perilously close to a denial of their initial proposition
that the prewar colonies had been unqualifiedly happy, pros-
perous, and well governed. Second, and more important,
such a long-range interpretation could not account for the
exact timing of the Revolution. It was all very w
rell for
Chalmers to write of a "natural progress" toward rebellion,
but that statement was insufficient to explain why the conflict
had surfaced after 1763 and had broken into open warfare in
1775- So, in order to supply this deficiency, the loyalists were
forced to examine recent events as well as the distant past.138 The British-Americans
The refugees began their investigation into the immediate
causes of the revolt with some general observations on the
inherent characteristics of mankind. Chalmers wrote of the
''active principle" motivating men to attempt ''to throw off
present evil or to grasp at future good," and Boucher thought
it axiomatic that "those who are governed are always ready to
set themselves against those who govern." Coupled with this
tendency to restlessness, to perpetual dissatisfaction, was the
disquieting fact that "the Common People seldom, if ever,
think or judge for themselves in Matters w
7hich concern the
whole." Indeed, declared Oliver, "the Mobility of all Coun-
tries" could best be described as "perfect Machines, wound
up by any Hand who might first take the Winch," and many
hands were more than willing to try to control the
machinery.
1
7 "In every society," Boucher commented,
"there always have been, and too probably there always w
7ill
be, men of restless and ambitious minds; who are never long
satisfied with any system of government, or with any adminis-
tration." Such men, asserted Chalmers, used "riots and
tumults" and played upon men's "malice, revenge, bigotry,
envy, pride, and avarice" in order to cause "anarchy and con-
fusion." They usually met with little difficulty in deceiving
the "low and vulgar," because, James Simpson noted, "it is
more easy to delude the Populace, by specious pretences,
than to Govern them by arguments deduced from sound
reason, and calm reflection." And, even though the wiser
men of the community might try to thwart the plot, they
most often would find themselves powerless to combat it, for,
as Chalmers warned, the people, "freed from all restraints,"
would "with a ravishing degree of pleasure, feel their mad
strength."
1
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To support this assessment of man's natural tendencies, the
loyalists cited the lessons of history. A brief glance at the
recorded past, Leonard asserted, would show that "the same
game, and with the same success, has been played in all ages,
and all countries." The history of England provided espe-
cially relevant examples. Boucher referred to the lengthy
conflict between the houses of York and Lancaster to demon-
strate that political commotions "originated, first, in the ill-
governed passions of some popular leader or leaders; and,
next, in the misled reason of the people." Even more perti-
nent was the English Civil War, because the common folk
had been incited into rebellion by demagogues who, once
they had attained their objective, had themselves turned into
tyrants. The message was undeniable: "The generality of the
people, who are thus made the dupes of artifice, and the mere
stilts of ambition, are sure to be losers in the end."
1
0
Unfortunately for the stability of colonial government, it
seemed to the loyalists that Americans were "peculiarly
fitted" for the role of the deluded multitude in this oft-
performed historical scenario. Their "early Prejudices,"
wrote Boucher, "fostered by Education, and confirmed by
Religion" combined to make them particularly vulnerable to
demagogic appeals. Since in the colonies "literally and truly,
all Power flows from the People," the populace could readily
be persuaded to oppose anyone wielding authority, regardless
of whether or not that authority was actually oppressive. One
small spark, one smoldering coal, could set America aflame.
2
0
And that, said the refugees, was exactly what had hap-
pened. The Americans had been lured into rebellion by "the
lies and misrepresentations, of artful, wicked, and desperate
men." Certain colonists had pursued a "determined design
• . . to promote an Independency" and had "gradually
trained" many "better meaning but less cunning Men than140 The British-Americans
themselves" to view "their governors as despots, and even
laws as mere arbitrary decrees."
2
1 The people had been
"insidiously induced to believe" that Britain was "rapacious,
cruel, and vindictive" when in fact nothing could have been
further from the truth. Accordingly, "the Wheel of Enthusi-
asm was set on going, and its constant Rotation set the
Peoples Brains on Whirling; and by a certain centrifugal
Force, all the Understanding w
rhich the People had was
whirled away."
2
2
It was now very easy to resolve the paradox that had at first
seemed so perplexing: how happy, prosperous, contented
people had come to engage in a needless rebellion against the
very source of their prosperity. Oliver's formulation was
succinct: "Why is the sudden Transition made, from Obedi-
ence to Rebellion, but to gratifye the Pride, Ambition and
Resentment, of a few abandoned Demagogues, who were lost
to all Sense of Shame and of Humanity?"
2
3
There remained but the task of describing the types of
men who had fomented the revolt, and, although the loyal-
ists' emphases differed somewhat, they agreed with respect to
the chief characteristics of the rebel leaders. The plotters
were, in the first place, looking out for their own "private
Interest." "Ambitious and needy Adventurers," seeking
"plunder," they had recognized that in order to advance their
own careers they would have to destroy British authority in
the colonies. The rebellious coalition was therefore led by
men "whose importance and political salvation" depended
upon keeping America "in a continual flame."
24 These "pre-
tended patriots" had been joined in their endeavors by
"smugglers, debtors, and men of desperate fortunes," a set of
"worthless Fellows" who were "mostly bankrupts, and mean
People."
2
5
The resulting combination of crafty leaders and ruthlessThe Seeds of Sedition 141
followers was formidable, but even so it could never have
succeeded in its objective had it not been for "the loose prin-
ciples of the times." The pervasive influence of these prin-
ciples had been the "one great cause" of the Revolution,
asserted Boucher, and he was seconded by Inglis and Gallo-
way, among others. Foremost among the dangerous notions
circulating in America was a "deep rooted republicanism,
democratic, levelling principles, ever unfriendly to mon-
archy." And, because the Anglican clerics believed that
"Church and State mutually support, and are supported by,
each other," they in particular saw
7 republicanism as a threat to
both secular and religious authority. "A republican spirit can
never rest," explained Henry Caner; "the same levelling
principles which induce them to withdraw from the whole-
some establishment of the Ch[urc]h operate with equal
force in throwing off the restraints of civil Govmt."
2
6 Inglis
argued that "one of the principal springs" of the rebels' con-
duct was their desire to destroy the Anglican church in
America. "The independent mode of religion," wrote
Samuel Seabury, "is, from its very nature, incompatible with
monarchical government," and Caner likewise warned that
"they who disapprove of the established religion will ever
be laboring as far as their Influence extends to undermine
and destroy that power by which it is protected."
2
7
With this stress on the Revolution as an attack upon
church and state alike, the loyalists' chief villains had to be
both dissenters and (in their estimation) republicans. And so
when they set out to discover the exact identities of the con-
spirators responsible for inciting the rebellion, they fixed
upon two groups of men who fit both descriptions. Refugees
from the middle colonies sometimes named the New York
''Triumvirate" as the prime movers of the American revolt,
but more commonly the loyalists placed the blame for all the142 The British-Americans
troubles in the colonies on the New England Congrega-
tionalists.
Among the authors who ascribed the major role in the
rebellion to the Triumvirate was Thomas Jones, a former
judge of the New York Supreme Court. William Livingston,
John Morin Scott, and William Smith had been "presby-
terians by profession, and republicans in principle," Jones
charged. They had early determined "to pull down Church
and State, to raise their own Government and religion upon
its ruins, or to throw
r the whole province into anarchy and
confusion." Their main instrument in this endeavor had
been the Whig Club, which they had founded in Manhattan
in 1752, and whose members had been "the promoters, the
advisers and counselors" of the revolutionary effort from its
very beginnings. In their publications, both pamphlets and
newspapers, they had attacked government "with a rancor, a
malevolence, and an acrimony" unparalleled elsewhere in
America, and as a result New
7 York "in a short time, from a
state of happiness, became a scene of confusion, of uproar,
and disorder, thanks to the triumvirate Livingston, Scott, and
Smith, and to them only."
2
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Although a few other loyalists agreed with Jones at least in
part, most focused their attention upon the New Englanders
when they sought scapegoats for the rebellion. Massachu-
setts, wrote Peter Oliver, w
ras "the Volcano from whence
issued all the Smoak, Flame and Lava which hath since
enveloped the whole British american Continent." And the
reason why the province had played such an important role
in bringing on the revolt was deeply embedded in its history.
"Many of the first settlers imported with them an aversion to
the regal part of our Constitution, and were thorough-paced
Republicans," declared Thomas Bradbury Chandler. Such
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their principles in England" and had "transplanted them
into a more genial soil; and thus preserved them from that
humiliating reverse of fortune which was experienced by
their brethren in the Mother Country." The dangerous ideas
that had been eradicated in England were "handed down by
an uninterrupted succession, from father to son, and from
generation to generation, to the present day." Chandler
warned that the New Englanders were therefore prepared,
"whenever the word is given, to declare and exert themselves
to all hazards for an independent government of their own
modelling."
2
9
Because of the loyalists' belief that Massachusetts "ac-
quired habits in her infancy, which though checked in her
youth, were strengthened as she grew up, and became inveter-
ate during her age," they devoted many pages of their accounts
of the war to explicating the early history of the factious prov-
ince. Both Oliver and Galloway began their discussions of the
American Revolution with lengthy accounts of the effects of
the Reformation upon religious belief and practice. They
then proceeded to describe the ideas of Separatists and Puri-
tans in some detail, noting that "their principles of ecclesiasti-
cal polity were as directly repugnant to those of the estab-
lished Church, as their ideas of civil government were to
those of a mixed monarchy." As a result, declared Galloway,
the charter of Massachusetts Bay "was manifestly calculated
to efface all the laws, habits, manners, and opinions which it
ought to support," and more specifically "to level all the
orders, arrangements, checks, and balances, wisely graduated
and tempered, of a mixed monarchy, to the lowest and most
imperfect of all political systems, a tumultuous, seditious, and
inert democracy."
3
0
The consequence of this imperfect form of government
was, as might well be imagined, continuous anarchy. In144 The British-Americans
Massachusetts, Chalmers wrote, "a perpetual fever rushed
through every vein of the body politic." Under such circum-
stances, observed Gallow
ray, it was only reasonable "to expect
that a faction would be formed, ever watchful to seize the
first opportunity of throwing off the small remains of subordi-
nation to the State." So it was without surprise that Chandler
commented in 1775 that "a set of people ... at Boston,
have for many years been aiming at, and preparing the way
for, a government of their own modelling, independent of
Great Britain."
3
1
The "hereditary disaffection" and conspiratorial ten-
dencies of New England still did not explain "what were the
inducements and the causes which led others not so circum-
stanced into rebellion." Boucher, w
7ho raised the point ex-
plicitly, argued that the other colonies were drawn into the
Revolution because of defects in their charters, the ineffec-
tiveness of their governors, the failure of their clergymen to
uphold government properly, and their citizens' desire to
escape the debts they owed British merchants.
3
2 Other loyal-
ists were more inclined to ascribe the general participation in
the rebellion to New England's successful exportation of her
"peculiar principles," and they discerned several methods by
which this had been accomplished. First, there w
Tas the fact
that "republican tenets" were "taught in their colleges, and
disseminated through the provinces by dissenting teachers."
Second, emigrants from New England to other areas of the
colonies had "carried their own tenets and customs with
them, and were zealous in propagating them." Finally, the
northern dissenting churchmen had encouraged their south-
ern counterparts to join together in a synod, and "a danger-
ous combination of men, whose principles of religion and
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and Government," was formed with "the secret and real
motive" of promoting American independence.
3
3
In spite of the New Englanders' machinations, it was
obvious to the loyalists that the attempts to foment trouble in
America "most certainly would have expired in contempt,
had not such been cherished, applauded, and kept alive in
Great Britain, by the minority." As a result the refugees saved
some of their bitterest invective for English opposition
leaders. They despised the rebels' English supporters, men
who should have known better than to encourage the Ameri-
cans in their delusion, men who, Galloway charged, had
"intentionally laid the foundation of future insurrections
and resistance ... to that very authority which they were
bound by oath to preserve."'
6*
The American rebels and the British opposition had the
same goals, Chalmers explained. "They both wanted the
direction of each country — envied their superiors — coveted
their neighbours property, and wished an entire change of
men and measures." Unsurprisingly, they had coalesced into
"a Cabalinarian Combination" directed at the constitution.
After 1765 they had acted in concert, the Americans depend-
ing upon their English patrons for protection from the wrath
of the ministry, the Britons receiving support from the colo-
nists for their efforts to unseat the majority government.
Much of the responsibility for the Revolution therefore
rested with the opposition party, which had convinced the
Americans that the colonies' position was widely supported
in England, that the merchants would actively aid them in
their struggle, and that the ministry was incompetent and
would be unable to quash their resistance movement.
Chalmers concluded, "Had there been no such intercourse,
but instead of it only an unanimous frown of parliament, on146 The British-Americans
the then conduct of the Americans, no rebellion, in that
country, would have taken place."
3
5
This, then, was the loyalist historians' interpretation of the
Revolution. The dispute between England and her colonies
had been deliberately fomented by a small group of design-
ing New England republicans, w
rho were supported by ambi-
tious American politicians, debtors, smugglers, and members
of the British opposition party. Each element of this coalition
had its own reasons for joining the movement: some partici-
pated because they were ideologically dissatisfied with the
British government and the established church, others be-
cause they saw an opportunity for personal advancement in
the hoped-for disruption of regular government. In either
case the desired goal was from the beginning the complete
independence of the American colonies.
[3]
When the refugees set out to analyze the period preceding
the Revolution, they applied this theory to its major events.
Yet in a larger sense they rejected the notion that the specific
occurrences of the years 1763 through 1775 had intrinsic
significance. In rejecting the rebels' contention that the revolt
had been caused by a series of oppressive acts, they denied
that those acts were important per se. Rather, it was the
activities of the rebel conspirators that were of primary
significance. Since the rebellion had resulted from a deliber-
ate plot, the details of this or that act were irrelevant. After
all, the laws and ministerial policies complained of had not
caused the trouble. They had merely provided the conspira-
tors w
rith the excuses they needed in order to incite the
colonists to revolt. Thus, as Thomas Hutchinson wrote in
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onies, other pretences would have been found for exception
to the authority of Parliament/'
3
6
Essential to this interpretation of the 1763-1775 period
was the loyalists' assumption that their fellow countrymen
(or at least some of them) had knowingly sought indepen-
dence long before any of the supposedly oppressive acts had
been passed. They saw the events of the prewar years as the
culmination of the rebels' plots, as the working out of what
Galloway called "their long meditated and so often disap-
pointed" plan for independence. The refugees absolutely
refused to accept as valid the Americans' continual protesta-
tions of loyalty to Great Britain before 1776, and by the same
token they were for the most part blind to the changes in the
Americans' ideology and tactics that took place during these
critical years. For them, looking back, the period was all of
one piece, a uniform sequence revealing throughout the per-
vasive and wicked influence of the conspirators. To cite
Hutchinson again: "There were men in each of the principal
Colonies, who had Independence in view, before any of those
Taxes were laid, or proposed. . . . Those men have con-
ducted the Rebellion in the several stages of it, until they
have removed the constitutional powers of Government in
each Colony, and have assumed to themselves, with others, a
supreme authority over the whole."
3
7
Ironically, the exiles began, it was the complete victory of
Great Britain in the French and Indian War that had pro-
vided the plotters with the opportunity "to execute their dark
and insidious design of revolting from the parent state." After
the French withdrawal from Canada, wrote Oliver, "the Buds
of the present Rebellion began to swell." The Americans were
now able to oppose the mother country, to put their plan
into operation, because they no longer had to worry about the
presence of a "formidable Enemy" on their frontiers. Conse-148 The British-Americans
quently they began to cast about for "real or imaginary"
grievances that could serve their purposes, and they started to
make preparations for embarking upon a titanic struggle
with Great Britain.
3
8
In 1765 came the first major opportunity for the Ameri-
cans to advance their plan. Beset with financial problems,
Parliament passed the Stamp Act to raise revenue from the
colonies. The "distrust, jealousy and ferment" caused by the
act, reported Leonard, "afforded scope for action" by the
conspirators. The subject of taxation was, as Hutchinson
noted, "most alarming to the people, every man perceiving
immediately that he is personally affected by it," and so the
Americans were nearly unanimous in opposing the act. "All
parties, all denominations, and all ranks of people" joined in
protesting the measure, Thomas Jones later recalled, and that
indeed gave the plotters their chance.
3
9 They quickly began to
organize opposition to the law, pretending "that they were
driven to such measures by necessity; but in reality [asserted
Hewatt] they had nothing less in view than their favourite
plan of independence." The New Englanders "vomited out
Curses against Great Britain, and the Press rung its changes
upon Slavery": they "hung out the Flag of Defiance." In all of
this the Americans "adopted the arguments of the minority
in parliament, and took encouragement from them to resist
the authority of the supreme legislature."
4
0 The leaders of
the plot then managed to incite "abandoned men" in each of
the American seaport towns to form mobs to destroy the hated
stamps, and "these flames, kindled in New England, soon
spread through all the capital towns along the coast."
4
1
The ministry's response to the uproar only played into the
conspirators' hands. Instead of exerting force to require obedi-
ence to the law, Parliament repealed it, thereby giving (in
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America, and such superiority over the good and loyal sub-
jects as had a manifest tendency to throw the colonies into a
state of anarchy and confusion." Even worse, Hewatt con-
tinued, the repeal "served to promote a doctrine . . . that
the obedience of subjects was no longer due to the laws of the
supreme legislature, than they in their private judgments
might think them agreeable to their interest, or the particu-
lar notions which they may have framed of a free constitu-
tion."
4- And the Declaratory Act had done little to offset this
false impression because, Oliver noted, a "Law without
Penalties" was "useless," except to induce "Contempt."
Galloway therefore concluded that although the repeal of the
one act and the passage of the other "cannot be said to have
been the original cause of the rebellion, yet ... so much
timidity and weakness in the councils of this country tended
to encourage and nourish the seeds of American sedition,
long before planted, and now growing fast to a dangerous
maturity."
4
3
During the Stamp Act crisis, the plotters gained the
people's confidence and became the spokesmen for what
appeared to be the public good. All they had to do to achieve
their goal was to maintain this position. As a result, said
Leonard, "sensible that there was no oppression that could be
either seen or felt," they decided "to work upon the imagina-
tion, and to inflame the passions." By their "perpetual incan-
tation" they managed to keep the colonists in a state of
"continual alarm," and when their next opportunity — the
Townshend Acts — appeared, "the whole system of American
opposition was again put in motion."
4
4
This time the leaders of the opposition to Britain were
merchants (that is, smugglers) who, Oliver declared, "dis-
guised their Private Views by mouthing it for Liberty." The
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charmed with it" and were thereby thrown "into the harpy
Claws" of the conspirators. It was at this time (1768), Oliver
later asserted, that "Adams and his Junto" made their final
plans for independence. Playing an especially large role in the
plot was what Oliver termed "the black regiment" — the
dissenting clergy of New England, who were "strongly tinc-
tured with Republicanism" and who "distinguished their-
selves in encouraging Seditions and Riots." Indeed, Leonard
wrote, "what effect must it have had upon the audience to
hear the same sentiments and principles, which they had
before read in a newspaper, delivered on Sundays from the
sacred desk, with a religious awe, and the most solemn
appeals to heaven, from lips which they had been taught, from
their cradles, to believe could utter nothing but eternal
truths."
4
5
The conspirators kept up the pressure even after they had
intimidated Parliament into repealing all the duties except
that placed on tea. The climax to their efforts to involve the
people in their schemes came in 1770 with the Boston
Massacre, which they had "previously planned," and which
they used deliberately to collect the sparks of rebellion "into
a Focus" and to cause them to "burst into Flame." After the
Massacre the royal government of Massachusetts was, Oliver
said, "pretty thoroughly dissolved," and there was nothing
loyal subjects of the king could do to oppose "the Torrent,"
for they were without protection once the royal troops had
been removed from Boston. "Some indeed dared to say that
their Souls were their own," Oliver observed, "but no
one could call his Body his own; for that was at the mercy of
the Mob."
4
6
When the New Englanders had at last acquired control of
their home province, they moved with "premeditated design"
to bring their fellow countrymen into the movement forThe Seeds of Sedition 151
independence, choosing the arrival of the East India Com-
pany tea in Boston to see ''how far the other colonies could,
by art, and management, be induced to take part with them."
They executed "their rash purpose," the destruction of the
tea, and waited to see what would happen elsewhere in
America. To their great joy, recorded Seabury, the "more
furious and fiery zealots" in the other colonies supported
them fully, and they themselves became even more "turpu-
lent and unruly."
4
7 But their action had an unexpected
consequence as well: Parliament altered the Massachusetts
charter. Through this one "fatal stroke" to their plans "all
their fancied greatness vanished, like the baseless fabric of a
vision." Therefore the "disappointed, ambitious, and envious
men" had to oppose what was actually a measure calculated
to improve government. They successfully convinced the
people that the changes were oppressive, and, Leonard re-
counted, "a match was put to the train, and the mine, that
had been long forming, sprung, and threw the whole prov-
ince into confusion and anarchy. . . . Every barrier that civil
government had erected for the security of property, liberty
and life, was broken down, and law, constitution and govern-
ment trampled under foot by the rudest invaders."
4
8
The New Englanders' next step, revealed Seabury, was to
call for a continental congress. This move was supported by
many moderates in the colonies as well as by the "wrong-
headed, blustering people," and the Congress itself contained
''many men of the first abilities and independent fortunes,
who knew the sense and wishes of the people." But the New
Englanders continued to conduct themselves "in such a
manner, as should have the greatest tendency to inflame the
minds of the congress," and the result was that the republicans
managed to control the entire proceeding.
4
9 The conspira-
torial group at the Congress was composed of "congregational152 The British-Americans
or presbyterian republicans, or men of bankrupt fortunes,"
and, according to Galloway, who was present as a delegate,
they used "every fiction, falsehood and fraud" to carry the
day. In the months that followed, the conspirators continued
on the same deceitful path, inventing one "monstrous lie"
after another, concealing their "real designs and perfidy,"
until, at last, fighting broke out at Lexington and Concord,
occasioning the "general Uproar" that had been their objec-
tive since 1763.
5
0 The long-sought victory had been won.
[4]
This account of the coming of the war is, of necessity, a
composite, because individual loyalist historians differed in
their assessment of the relative importance of the various
causes they perceived for the Revolution. Some stressed the
rebels' hope for personal gain, others emphasized the Ameri-
cans' ideological disaffection from the British constitution.
Some saw the New Englanders primarily as republicans,
others viewed the northerners' acts mainly in the light of
their dissent from the established church. And the loyalists
on occasion interpreted particular events of the prewar
period in disparate ways. But the differences were no more
than variations on the single theme that the revolt had been
fomented by a small coterie of determined agitators. The
y loyalists did not uniformly agree on the composition or the
motivation of this group, but they all postulated — indeed,
assumed — its existence. Their belief that the rebellion had
been caused by a minority, in fact by an almost infinitesimal
minority, of Americans inescapably affected all their writings
about the war and blinded them to many of the realities they
might otherwise have recognized.
In the first place, if only a small number of Americans
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in terms of traditional theory. Many of the loyalists were
willing to admit that perhaps, under certain conditions, resis-
tance to an established government could be justified. But,
according to John Locke and his successors, a legitimate
revolution (as opposed to a rebellion, which was specifically
defined as illegitimate) had to have the support of most of
the people of the nation. More than a simple majority was
required: the decision to revolt had to be made by an
overwhelming percentage of the populace. Obviously, given
their assumptions, the loyalists could never conclude that the
American rebellion was an acceptable and justifiable one.
Since it had been incited by a small group, it did not have the
support of most Americans, and so it had no claim what-
soever to legitimacy.
5
1 The refugees' absolute insistence on
this point — to the extent that they always referred to the
dispute as the American Rebellion, not Revolution — meant
that they were incapable of perceiving the widespread colo-
nial involvement in the independence movement.
Second, when the loyalists' interpretation of the rebellion
is examined in depth, it is revealed as circular, as leading
nowhere but back upon itself. Once the circle was entered
(at whatever point) there was no logical exit. Acceptance of
any one of the assumptions necessitated acceptance of the
other assumptions as well. Their train of thought can be
outlined in the following manner: Since (as the loyalists
insisted) the Americans had no legitimate, irreconcilable
grievances against Great Britain, the Revolution itself could
not be legitimate. Since the Revolution was not legitimate, it
was not supported by a majority of the people. Therefore only
a minority of the colonists agreed with its aims, which indi-
cated that most Americans felt little dissatisfaction with
British rule and had no real grievances.
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In the absence of well-founded complaints about British
government in the colonies, most Americans remained loyal
to the crown. If most colonists were still loyal, the revolt had
been caused by a minority. If such was the case, it could not
be legitimate and as a result could not involve legitimate
grievances.
The circle was complete, self-contained, and totally mis-
leading.
The importance of the loyalists' circular interpretation of
the Revolution lies in the fact that this was the viewpoint
they repeatedly impressed upon the British administration
during the war. Convinced that most Americans were, like
themselves, faithful to their old allegiance, and that the
Revolution had been incited by a small, conspiratorial
minority, they successfully persuaded the ministry to accept
this same formulation. After Saratoga the British government
decided to act upon the loyalists' theories, and the conse-
quences were exactly the opposite of what the refugees would
have wished.Strange and Unaccountable Conduct
The whole conduct of the war has been hitherto
strange and unaccountable.
— SILVESTER GARDINER, [1779]
1
A
FTER the defeat at Saratoga, both the refugees and the
ministry began searching for a new strategy that would
bring victory in America. The loyalists, who since 1776 had
more or less acquiesced in the administration's military plans,
started to produce detailed tactical proposals of their own.
And the ministry, which in 1774-1775 had given short shrift
to the exiles' suggestions, finally began to pay them some
heed. Lord North and his advisers eventually came to accept
the refugees' interpretation of the Revolution, partly because
it happened to coincide with their own views, and the result
of the combination of these disparate interests was a military
strategy that was to have disastrous consequences.
The Saratoga defeat was not the only shock the refugees
experienced during the waning days of 1777 and the first
months of 1778. In February came the announcement of the
Franco-American alliance (at which the loyalists were
"struck dumb," according to Hutchinson) and the revelation
of North's conciliation plan, which offered far greater con-156 The British-Americans
cessions to the revolutionaries than the exiles believed war-
ranted. "So strange a measure is not to be paralleled in
history," Hutchinson commented in his diary, and Thomas
Bradbury Chandler termed the proposals both "entirely un-
expected and altogether unaccountable."
2 The refugees were
pushed still further into the depths of despair. In the spring
of 1778 Henry Barnes reported himself "very much in the
Dumps," Edward Oxnard recorded that he was "very low in
spirits," and Henry Caner decided that America was "irre-
trivably lost."
3
But just a few months later the exiles' mood began to
change. The crucial event that lifted their spirits was, in-
triguingly enough, the total failure of North's peace mission.
The unsuccessful attempt at reconciliation, wrote one loyal-
ist, would "answer the good purposes of rousing and uniting
the Nation, silencing opposition, and giving vigour to our
Councils and future plans." In addition, the refugees hailed
the appointment of Sir Henry Clinton as commander in
chief, because they thought him "a very different Man from
his unworthy predecessor," Sir William Howe. After a year of
depression they had started the long climb up from the
melancholy into which they had been thrown by the Saratoga
catastrophe. They were convinced that all that was needed to
bring the Americans "to absolute submission in the course of
one Campaign" was a "well regulated plan under able and
spirited Officers," for they had concluded that "it is not
owing to the Prowess of the Rebels that the rebellion has not
been reduced; much less to the want of Spirit or Numbers in
the Kings Army, but to the repeated Errors and Mistakes of
those who have had the conduct of it."
4
The difficulty was that the exiles themselves disagreed over
just what constituted the best possible "well regulated plan."
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as the logical focal point for British military action, arguing
that possession of it and it alone would prove to be the key
for the royal conquest of America. James Simpson asserted
that Charleston's capture was essential for victory; Sir James
Wright called for the reduction of Georgia; several Mary-
landers advocated an expedition to the peninsula between
Delaware and Chesapeake bays; and Silvester Gardiner urged
an attack on New England.
5 Since the proponents of each
plan cited the same arguments on behalf of their schemes, it
is hardly surprising that British authorities at first paid little
attention to the details of any one proposal. When the
ministers were told that closing the port of Boston (Charles-
ton, Baltimore) would stop most American shipping, that
possession of the Delmarva peninsula (Connecticut, the
Hudson Valley) would cut the major rebel lines of com-
munication, or that the local rebels (anywhere at all) were a
particularly vile lot, deserving to be punished more than
those in other regions, the administration quite rightly
termed the loyalists' notions "most Extraordinary."
6
In spite of the variation in their proposals, the refugees
agreed on one point: "Good Policy" dictated that the loyal
American population should be "favoured and encouraged"
by British forces in the colonies. Jonathan Boucher and the
other exiles recognized that "there is infinitely less Difficulty
in gaining a Victory, than in turning it to any good Account,
when gain'd," and so they argued that royal commanders
should be careful to discriminate between loyal and disloyal
Americans, that they should deliberately try to attract men to
the British cause, and that they should both arm and protect
local loyalists. With the assistance of such men, the refugees
declared, the British army would have little difficulty in
securing the colonies for the king.
7
It was to the generals' failure to follow this scheme that the158 The British-Americans
exiles ascribed previous British defeats. Although they dis-
agreed on tactical details, the refugees believed that a success-
ful strategy would have to rely heavily on indigenous
loyalists, and they assured the North ministry repeatedly that
such a strategy would inevitably bring victory. Until Decem-
ber 1778, their ideas were expressed individually and in
somewhat inchoate form. But in that month Joseph Galloway
arrived in London from New York, and under his leadership
the exiles' proposals took on new strength and importance.
Unlike Hutchinson, who timidly confined his criticisms of
British policy to his diary, Galloway did not hesitate to con-
demn publicly "all past measures" for their lack of "system."
Within a short time after his arrival he embarked upon a
vigorous campaign against the Howe brothers, Sir William
and Admiral Richard, asserting that they bore the sole respon-
sibility for the ineffectiveness of prior attempts to subdue the
rebellion. He played a pivotal role in the parliamentary
investigation into the conduct of the war, which was pursued
sporadically during May and June of 1779, and as a result, by
July he and his daughter were "scarce on speaking terms with
any of the Howe party."
s
In his testimony before Parliament Galloway emphasized
two major points: that "more than four-fifths of the Ameri-
cans would prefer a union with Great Britain to indepen-
dence," and that the Howe brothers' egregious mistakes were
the reason why the colonies had not yet been conquered.
9 At
first glance these premises seem quite distinct, but Galloway's
peculiar loyalist logic linked them together through a chain of
reasoning most readily apparent in his pamphlet, Letters to a
Nobleman, on the Conduct of the War in the Middle Colo-
nies. Galloway based his argument upon the assertion thatStrange and Unaccountable Conduct 159
most Americans were still faithful to the crown, and he ex-
plicitly derived this conclusion from a study of the history of
the revolt. Everyone agreed that the colonists were perfectly
loyal during the French and Indian War, Galloway observed.
He then characterized the subsequent difficulties between
the colonies and England as so minor and trivial that most
Americans simply could not have become completely dis-
affected from their former allegiance. It was, he contended,
absolutely impossible for a loyal populace to be weaned so
rapidly from a mother country it had always loved and
respected. Why then did some persons falsely assert that a
majority of the colonists favored independence and that a
victory over the Americans was therefore impracticable?
Obviously, their intention was "to conceal from the public
eye the shameful misconduct of the American war."
1
0
Aware that the colonists were truly loyal, Galloway could
see where the blame for the American fiascoes should be
placed: squarely on the shoulders of Sir William Howe. He
had 'Veteran troops" w
Tith which to oppose "new raised and
undisciplined" militia, yet he allowed his enemies "to escape
without pursuit" after defeating them on Long Island. He
did not move across the Delaware River in late 1776, though
to have done so would have brought victory, for "all the
Middle Colonies were ready to submit." Even worse, Howe
committed "blunder upon blunder" during the 1777 cam-
paign, the greatest of which was his decision to travel to
Philadelphia by sea via Chesapeake Bay. His errors were "so
gross — so contrary to the least degrees of military knowledge,
that their possibility almost exceeds the utmost extent of our
belief."
1
1
When Howe in an answering pamphlet specifically denied
Galloway's assumption that a majority of Americans still
adhered to the crown,
1
2 Galloway's response was immediate160 The British-Americans
and intemperate. With his most important premise under
attack, he escalated the dispute and ascribed Howe's actions
to a "dark and heinous conspiracy of the Faction." Howe had
served as the "arch-agent" of the English opposition party,
"taking every step to procrastinate the war; to plunge the
nation yet farther in debt, and a more general despon-
dency; and to render Administration more odious to the
people." In particular, the general deliberately "depressed
the spirit of loyalty," refused to accept loyalists' offers of aid,
and, "with an unaccountable versatility, adopted one plan
after another, always choosing that which was most expensive
to the nation, and ruinous to the success of his own opera-
tions."
1*
The other refugees applauded Galloway's efforts to expose
Howe's "shameful and scandalous" conduct.
1
4 Like Gal-
loway, all of them had to find a reason other than rebel
strength to account for British military misfortunes. If they
once admitted that the American army could legitimately
defeat royal troops, the exiles placed themselves in an impos-
sible quandary, since such an admission would contradict
their basic assumption that the colonial forces were weak,
divided, and without significant support in the American
countryside. A decisive rebel victory that could not be ex-
plained away could mean only one thing: that the rebels
were not a small, unrepresentative minority, that most
Americans were not in fact loyal to the crown. And that of
course the refugees could not afford to admit, because the
contrary proposition constituted the very foundation of their
philosophy and their self-image. So, since they continued to
insist that the royal army was the most powerful in the world,
they had no choice but to conclude that previous British
defeats had stemmed from inadequate, perhaps even treason-
able, leadership.Strange and Unaccountable Conduct 161
For the loyalists, then, the widespread English revulsion
against the Howes after 1777 proved to be a godsend. The
exiles' explanation of British failure in the war was the same
as everyone else's: the Howes became the universal scapegoats
because they provided superficially logical and accessible
targets. It was far easier to blame them for the army's diffi-
culties than to look for other possible sources of trouble.
Even more significantly, the ministry had especially compel-
ling reasons for acquiescing in the loyalists' interpretation.
North and Germain had no little stake in proclaiming the
Howes' culpability, for by placing the responsibility for the
American disasters on the generals in the field, they removed
it from themselves. The refugees' analysis of the reasons for
Britain's military losses therefore meshed nicely with the
ministry's own self-interest, and so North relied heavily on
the loyalists — especially Galloway — for evidence to impugn
the Howes' actions. When Benjamin Thompson at one point
told Galloway that "we should scarcely know what to do
without you," he did not stretch the truth.
1
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The loyalists and the administration thus formed a com-
munity of interest on the question of the Howes' guilt. And
since the refugees tied this issue to their fundamental as-
sumption that most Americans continued in their traditional
fidelity to the crown, it is not surprising that the exiles
undertook a concerted attempt to persuade the ministry to
accept that point as well. Nor, under the circumstances, is it
surprising that the ministry, after ignoring the refugees for
years, began to prove receptive to their arguments.
The immediate impetus for the loyalists' drive came from
the testimony of one of Sir William Howe's witnesses in the
parliamentary investigation. General Charles Grey declared
in early May 1779 that the rebel forces were so strong they
could not be beaten, that most Americans supported the goal162 The British-Americans
of independence, and that even the allegiance of the refugees
themselves was questionable. His statements, said one Rhode
Islander, seemed "to fix a sigma upon all the Americans,"
and the exiles accordingly determined "to wipe it off."
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The means they chose to answer Grey's allegations was to
organize themselves into a Loyalist Association and to present
a formal memorial to the king, "setting forth their original
Political Principles, their continuing Loyalty and attachment
to the cause of Government etc. etc." On May 21, 1779, a
number of Americans gathered at the Spring Garden Coffee
House under the leadership of Sir William Pepperrell. Those
present at this preliminary meeting scheduled a general con-
vocation of American exiles for May 26 at the Crown &
Anchor tavern in the Strand, "to consider of measures proper
to be taken for their Interest and reputation in the present
Conjuncture."
1
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When the refugees' second meeting convened as planned,
approximately ninety persons were in attendance. They
formally chose Pepperrell as their chairman and named
George Chalmers to serve as secretary. In addition, a commit-
tee of twelve was directed to decide upon "the proper
measures to be pursued . . . and to prepare every thing
relative thereto, and make Report at the next meeting."
1
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Galloway, John Patterson of New York, and Daniel Leonard,
who were appointed to the committee, then proceeded to
prepare a draft of an address to the king, which they pre-
sented in early July to an informal gathering attended by
Elisha Hutchinson, Chandler, and Boucher, among others.
"After 3 or 4 Hours debating and several amendments pro-
posed most of them rejected the Address was voted,"
Hutchinson recorded. On July 6, at a full meeting of the
Loyalist Association, the final version was approved and
signed.
1
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The purpose of the address was stated in its first para-
graphs: The refugees wanted to correct the erroneous im-
pression that British failures on the battlefield had been
caused by the disloyalty of the colonists. To the contrary, the
exiles could "assure your Majesty, that the greater Number
of your Subjects in the confederated Colonies, notwithstand-
ing every Art to seduce, every Device to intimidate, and a
Variety of Oppressions to compel them to abjure their Sover-
eign, entertain the firmest Attachment and Allegiance to
your Majesty's sacred Person and Government." As evidence
for this contention, the refugees cited the "counter Resolves"
against Congress adopted in various sections of the country,
the formation of loyal militia units to combat rebel troops,
the many colonists who had fled their homes or enlisted in
the British army, and the numerous petitions presented to
English generals asking for protection from the rebels. The
loyalists surrounded this basic argument with effusive pro-
testations of their "unfeigned Thanks" for the king's "un-
parallelled [sic] Exertions" on behalf of his loyal subjects,
and they concluded with a prayer that "the supreme Disposer
of Events" would "crown your Majesty's Endeavors with a
Success proportioned to the Righteousness of your Cause."
2
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In Elisha Hutchinson's opinion, this address contained
"such strong assurances of greater number of the Inhab[itan]ts
in America retaining the firmest attachment and allegiance
to the King as will I imagine prevent the majority of
Americans in England from signing." Hutchinson himself
refused to approve the petition for that very reason, but
George Rome, a Rhode Island merchant who also had his
doubts about its contents, was eventually persuaded to sign
it.
2
1 There is simply no way to determine how many other
refugees knew of the address but did not agree with its assess-
ment of the colonists' loyalties. By mid-1779 many of the164 The British-Americans
Americans in the British Isles were living tar from London
and were probably unaware of the Association and its goals.
One hundred and five exiles did sign the petition, most of
them merchants, farmers, and tradesmen, their distribution
by colony roughly reflecting the proportions of the exile
population then in Great Britain. Massachusetts led the list
with twenty-nine signers; then came Virginia with thirteen
and South Carolina and Pennsylvania, each with twelve.
Only New Hampshire was not represented, but New Jersey
had just one signer and Rhode Island only two. Among the
prominent names missing from the petition were those of
Thomas B. Chandler, Thomas Hutchinson, Peter Oliver, and
Martin Howard, who had nominally been a member of the
drafting committee.
2
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Elisha Hutchinson's comments, coupled with the fact that
some well-known signatures were noticeably absent from the
petition, indicate that there was some disagreement among the
refugees over the theory set forth in the address. But, like
Elisha, dissenters evidently kept their thoughts to themselves,
noting them privately in diaries and letters but not express-
ing them publicly. Perhaps some, like Rome, were prevailed
upon to give nominal assent to a position they did not truly
support. In any case, the fact remains that there were few
refugee voices raised openly against the argument presented
in the address. To all intents and purposes, the exiles were
unanimous in their insistence that the Americans' continuing
allegiance to the crown could not be questioned.
The refugees' confidence in this assertion was further
demonstrated by the subsequent activities of the Loyalist
Association. At the same time as the Association approved the
address, its members established a permanent standing com-
mittee to "manage all such public matters as shall appear for
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have taken Refuge from America in this country." The new
group was formed by adding Sir Egerton Leigh of South
Carolina and James Ingram of Virginia to such veterans of
the drafting committee as Galloway, Patterson, Chalmers, and
Leonard.
2
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In August the committee embarked upon two ambitious
projects. The first, which seemingly never came to fruition,
was to collect "Documents, Facts, and Informations" pertain-
ing to ''the Rise, Progress, and present State of the Rebellion
in America." In connection with this inquiry each committee
member was to answer a series of twenty-nine questions
about the Revolution in his particular province: these in-
cluded such queries as "At what Time and on what Pre-
tence, did a formal Opposition to Government commence,
and in what manner was it formed and conducted?" and
"What measures were taken, and Arts used by Congress to
reconcile the Minds of the People to Independency before
they dared openly to declare it?" If the committee members
ever supplied the material requested, it has apparently been
lost, but the very wording of the questions is sufficient to sug-
gest what the answers would have been.
2
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The second endeavor, by contrast, met with substantial
success. The committee decided to inform the refugees in
New York of the organization of the Loyalist Association and
to request their "Co-operation and Correspondence." The
committee's letter emphasized "the important Advantages of
a Coalition of the Loyalists on both Sides the Atlantic," and
it elicited an immediate response from the New Yorkers. One
of them revealed to Chalmers that they too had been
"roused" by Grey's testimony and that they had also sought
"some Method to oppose the Arts of their Enemies and of
course those of Great Britain and America." Following the
London pattern, the New York refugees held a general meet-166 The British-Americans
ing, appointed a board "to watch over their mutual Inter-
ests," and decided to address the king. That petition, like the
one earlier presented by the Loyalist Association, asserted
that most Americans retained their affection for Great
Britain and would eagerly join in the battle against the rebels
whenever "proper measures" were adopted to encourage
them.
2
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It was not only through such group efforts that the loyalists
pressed their analysis of the war on the ministry. In private
letters as well they told Germain and North that the Ameri-
cans "ardently wish to see a respectable Army of the King's
Forces sent into their Country, and say they would far rather
see the whole Country laid waste, though their property
would be destroyed with others, rather than live under such
Tyranny as they are compell'd to at present." The colonists,
the ministers were told, "suffer so much from the Cruelty of
their present Rulers, that there is scarce anything they would
not do to get rid of their oppression." Even though many
colonists had been forced to swear allegiance to the new state
governments, the British officials were assured, "their
Principles are the same as before."
2
6 With comparable state-
ments emanating from almost every loyalist of note, it is not
surprising that the administration finally began to listen to
the refugees' suggestions. For once the Americans were tell-
ing the British government what it wanted to hear: that
there was a panacea that would end all its battlefield diffi-
culties. That the losses in the colonies were not irreversible.
That the Americans had not inexplicably abandoned their
ties to the mother country. And, most of all, that the solution
to Britain's problems would not require any extra effort on
her part, but that the colonists could be depended upon to
carry a major share of the burden.
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much merit in the loyalists' arguments. A number of his-
torians have since pointed out that the major mistake of the
British ministers during the later years of the Revolution was
their assumption that most Americans opposed the rebellion
and could easily be mobilized to fight alongside the royal
army.
2
7 This misconception unquestionably received vital
support from the loyalists. Their interpretation of the con-
flict, vigorously promulgated by Galloway and others, con-
vinced the ministry that the war after Saratoga should be
pursued in the supposedly loyal South rather than in the
reportedly more disaffected northern colonies.
2
8 In the end,
the refugees' refusal to face the reality that the Revolution
had wide support helped to entice the British army to York-
town.
[3]
Early in 1779 came the ''Glorious News" that Savannah had
fallen to the king's forces, an event confirming the loyalists in
their belief that the strategy they were recommending to the
ministry was correct. During the following year their spirits
continued to rise as new victories were reported, and in May
1780 a refugee in New York declared confidently, "The
Rebellion declines daily, and is near its last Gasp." Just a
month later the announcement of the capture of Charleston
added to the loyalists' elation. "Can anything prevent the
southern provinces from returning immediately to their alle-
giance?" William Browne asked his half brother rhetorically.
"Their force being annihilated, their resistance must cease of
course."
2
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In the autumn of 1780 the exiles received new evidence
that the revolutionary effort was crumbling. Benedict
Arnold, one of the best-known American generals, defected
to the British, and the reason he cited for his desertion of the168 The British-Americans
rebel cause coincided exactly with the loyalists' view of affairs
in the colonies. Arnold declared that he had never favored
independence, desiring only "a redress of grievances," and he
reported the "Distress and Discontents" of the Americans in
lurid detail, concluding that "the Eyes of the People are in
general opened, they Feel their Error and look back with
Remorse to their once happy Condition, and most ardently
wish for a reconciliation on Terms safe and honorable to
both countries." The refugees jubilantly took Arnold's trea-
son as "proof that the fabric of congressional Tyranny is
mouldering and tottering to it's downfall," and Germain
noted approvingly that Arnold's testimony showed "the Con-
gress Resources to be nearly exhausted, and their Cause
universally sinking."
3
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Adding to the impact of the defection were countless
letters the refugees received from friends in New York, all of
which described the Americans as "heartily tired of the war,
and groan [ing] under the yoke of tyranny, and the heavy
taxes that are imposed on them." The loyalists still in the
colonies reported that "the Tyrannical Congress are Quarrel-
ing amongst themselves"; that "their Money is depreciated,
in every part of the Continent"; that the rebel army was in a
"miserable State"; and that the Americans "should sooner or
later suffer more from Wars within themselves, than they had
done from the British forces."
3
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Understandably, the exiles did not keep this authoritative
information to themselves; they systematically passed it on to
members of the administration or published it in order to
demonstrate that "there is an almost certain prospect of
annihilating the rebellion in America, in one year."
3
2 Not
that the point seemed to need much proving. The ministry
and the loyalists agreed that the Revolution was on its last
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The refugees' confidence in their interpretation was such
that they discounted any evidence contrary to it. In August
1780, for example, an American ship sailing under a flag of
truce from Boston brought several Massachusetts loyalists to
England, among them Robert Temple, who had been in-
terned in Cambridge since 1775. Robert Hallowell, the
former comptroller of the Boston customs house, thought
Temple talked about America "in a. very strange manner"
because he insisted that the rebels would be satisfied with
nothing less than independence. "Was you to hear Mr. T,"
Hallowell told his father-in-law Silvester Gardiner, "you
would suppose they never could be subdued." Temple and
the other passengers had to be putting the "Best face" on
American affairs, Hallowell concluded. "I do not think full
credit is to be given to what some of them have related — for
they [the rebels] are certainly in a most distresed situation —
and I do not suppose they got the men for their Army with
that facility they would make us beleive [5/c]."
3
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By early 1781 some of the more sanguine exiles were dis-
cussing possible peace missions, compensation by the govern-
ment for their sufferings, and returning to America.
3
4 But in
the minds of a few a lingering doubt remained. "I have
learned to expect little to prevent disappointments which we
have heretofore suffered," wrote Thomas Hutchinson, Jr.,
and Samuel Curwen concurred, telling a friend, "One swal-
low makes no summer." "I can only say, I am not hopeless,"
commented Boucher after reporting the aura of confidence
that surrounded most of the refugees. And Peter Oliver
observed that although the news from America was hopeful,
he had seen "such repeated Misconduct after great Advan-
tages" that he was not yet ready to celebrate a British vic-
tory.
3
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There was indeed, in the minds of some loyalists, ample170 The British-Americans
reason for pessimism. Sir Henry Clinton, whom they had
expected to "reverse the policy and conduct of his prede-
cessor/' had failed to do so. Like Howe he sat "sleeping in
New York" with his troops "while Ld Cornwallis calls in vain
for Succours to the Southward." One disgruntled refugee
poet put it this way, writing as if he were Clinton:
If growlers complain
I inactive remain
Will do nothing, nor let any others;
'Tis sure no new thing,
To serve thus our King;
Witness B e* and two famous brothers.
3
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The most active refugee critic of the conduct of the war
was still Joseph Galloway. By early 1781 he was charging that
Clinton was "utterly incompetent" and that he had done
everything "which ought not to have been done" while he
"shamefully neglected" everything "which ought to have
been done."
3
7 By contrast, Galloway at first unabashedly
admired Lord Cornwallis, whom he called "our second
Caesar," or perhaps "Alexander." "By his exertions," de-
clared Galloway, Cornwallis proved "with a handfull of men
what may be done in that Country." He concluded in July
1781, "Such a general as this ... is the one I have ever said
was necessary to the conquest of that or any other Country."
Yet just a month later Galloway accused Cornwallis of going
the "old wretched way" by failing to protect the loyal popu-
lation of the territory he had taken. Cornwallis' victories,
Galloway told Elisha Hutchinson, had "but little fruits at-
tending them. Like a Bird he passes through the Country but
conquers no part of it." Wrote Galloway in frustration,
"When I see a General enter a province — give the people
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assurances that he does not mean to desert them — cordially
invite the Loyalists to take up arms and to seize upon and
bring in the disaffected then and not till then will I presage
an end to the rebellion."
3
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With all his pessimism, though, Galloway was no better
prepared than the other loyalists for the report that Corn-
wallis had surrendered to the combined American and
French forces at Yorktown, Virginia. "The unhappy Ameri-
can news has quite stunned us all," observed Thomas
Hutchinson, Jr., and William Franklin, the last royal gover-
nor of New Jersey (who was the son of Benjamin) , took the
defeat as irrefutable evidence of the "Blunders and Mistakes"
committed during the war.
3
9 But the "great national Calam-
ity" was itself less important to the refugees than the specific
terms of surrender, for the articles of capitulation did not
protect the loyalists who had served with Cornwallis from
rebel retaliation. To Franklin's mind the terms put the
loyalists "in no better Light than as Runaway Slaves restored
to their former Masters," and the refugees in New York ex-
pressed "great uneasiness and apprehensions" when they
learned the details of the surrender agreement. Indeed, said
one, "if Great Britain thus permits her friends to be sacri-
ficed, she may bid adieu to America; for no government can
expect subjection without protection."
4
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In London Galloway was reported "busily employed in
counteracting this Misfortune," and the exiles continued to
hope — rather desperately, it must be admitted — for "new
measures, new men, and new reinforcements" that would
"retrieve every thing but the lives of our martyrs." Even after
what Galloway termed the "wretched votes" in the House of
Commons that halted offensive operations in America and
caused the downfall of the North administration, the refugees
clung to the notion that all was not yet lost. Grasping at
feeble straws, Chandler decided that the new ministry knew172 The British-Americans
"in their consciences" that the war should be continued
(despite the fact that members of it had for years termed the
war "unjust and impracticable"), and he took heart from the
fact that Lord Shelburne, now one of the secretaries of state
under Lord Rockingham, had always opposed indepen-
dence.
4
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It was with a renewed urgency that the refugees once again
flooded the government with plans to win the war, each
guaranteed to bring victory in return for little effort. Gal-
loway contributed another pamphlet reiterating his position;
Gardiner proposed an attack on Boston harbor; another New
Englander advocated a march from Quebec to Ticonderoga;
Benedict Arnold offered to organize a compact mobile
marine force to harass major American ports; Lord Dun-
more, the exiled governor of Virginia, thought the loyalists
should be allowed to conduct the war by whatever means
they chose; and a southerner asked for authorization to raise
ten thousand black troops from among the slave population
of the South.
4
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Moreover, the refugees continued their efforts to convince
the ministry that the war should not be abandoned, efforts
that were redoubled after they learned in August 1782 that
Britain was prepared to concede independence to the col-
onies. In London the exiles publicized accounts of the rebels'
"horrid cruelties" to loyalists and printed a series of letters
describing the state governments as being on the verge of
collapse. According to Thomas Hutchinson, Jr., the letters
"occasioned much talk and many opinions," but they seem-
ingly persuaded no one. The refugees in New York, for their
part, prepared a new address to the king, urging him not to
grant independence to America, and they quickly dispatched
it to England in the care of William Franklin.
4
3 But by the
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too late. On November 29, the provisional peace treaty was
signed in Paris, and its terms were far worse than the loyalists
had anticipated even in their most pessimistic moods.
[4]
The movement towards a peace settlement began in April
1782, when the ministry sent Richard Oswald, an elderly
merchant, to Paris to hold exploratory talks with his friend
Benjamin Franklin, the American representative in France.
Although serious negotiations were not undertaken until
after Oswald's official instructions were issued on July 31, it
was apparent from the very first that the fate of the loyalists
would constitute the major topic of discussion at the peace
table. There was disagreement over the boundaries of the
new nation, the extent of American fishing rights in the
Newfoundland banks, and the future political and economic
relationship between the two countries, but in the positions
of both sides on these questions there was ample room for
compromise. The issue of the loyalists was quite a different
matter.
4
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Oswald's instructions were explicit: he had to protect the
loyalists. In particular, he was directed to press for the release
of any persons still imprisoned in America because of their
loyalty, to request "a Restoration of all [property] Rights as
they stood before the Commencement of Hostilities," and to
propose "a general Amnesty of all offences committed or
supposed to be committed in the Course of them/'
4
5 In stark
contrast, the American negotiators had been specifically
ordered by Robert R. Livingston, the secretary of foreign
affairs, to resist any British efforts to win treaty stipulations
in favor of the loyalists. In a lengthy letter Livingston out-
lined for Franklin an impressive list of arguments that could
be used to exclude such provisions. "Every society may right-174 The British-Americans
fully banish from among them those who aim at its subver-
sion," Livingston declared, and so the loyalists' property was
thereby "justly forfeited/' Moreover, to allow the refugees to
return would not only cause "general dissatisfaction and
tumults" but also inject into American society a group of
"dangerous partizans" of Great Britain who would "neglect
no means to injure and subvert our constitution and govern-
ment." Finally, in any case, it would be "equally unjust and
impossible" to restore to the loyalists land that had already
been confiscated and sold to others.
4
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The lines were therefore clearly drawn, and when Oswald
first raised the question of the loyalists' fate with the Ameri-
cans, they uncompromisingly rebuffed his overtures. Indeed,
reported Oswald, Franklin refused even to discuss the matter,
on the grounds that the negotiators had no power to reach
agreement on the question, "as it was exclusively retained
under the Jurisdiction of the respective States upon whom
the several Claimants had any demands." In response to this
obstinacy, the ministry (now headed by Shelburne) retreated
from the strong stand taken in the original instructions. On
September 1, Secretary of State Thomas Townshend told
Oswald that the king "for the salutory purposes of precluding
all future delay" was willing to waive the requirement that
the loyalists be compensated by the treaty. Consequently, the
first draft treaty proposed by Franklin and his colleague John
Jay and forwarded to London by Oswald in October did not
even mention the refugees. Its four articles set the boundaries
of an independent United States, provided for the evacuation
of British-held ports and the immediate release of all
prisoners of war, allowed the Americans fishing rights in the
Newfoundland banks, and established a reciprocal commer-
cial agreement between the two nations.
4
7
Even though the terms of the draft were the direct result ofStrange and Unaccountable Conduct 175
the changes in Oswald's instructions, the ministers quickly
rejected the overly generous concessions that their negotiator
had made. Henry Strachey, Townshend's secretary, was dis-
patched to Paris to strengthen Britain's hand, and Shelburne
warned Oswald meaningfully that "many of the most weighty
advocates for Independence [in Parliament] are strenuous
for the Subject of Boundaries, and of a Provision for the
Refugees."
4
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After Strachey's arrival, the tone of the discussions changed
radically. Oswald had compliantly agreed to almost anything
the Americans proposed, but Strachey, by contrast, was de-
scribed by John Adams (who joined the American delegation
in mid-October) as "the most eager, earnest, pointed Spirit,"
a man who was "artfull and insinuating," who "pushes and
presses every Point as far as it can possibly go."
4
9 And so in
early November the serious bargaining on the loyalist clauses
began.
The first point carried by Strachey was that of debt repay-
ment. Franklin had been as adamant on this issue as he was
on the question of the loyalists, insisting that only the indi-
vidual states had the power to decide policy on debts. But
Adams did not concur: "The Question of paying Debts, and
that of compensating the Tories were Two," he told Frank-
lin, and assured Strachey that he had "no Notion of cheating
any Body." On November 4, after a long session, agreement
was reached on a clause (roughly approximating article 4 of
the final treaty) providing that "no lawfull Impediment"
could be placed in the way of the collection of debts con-
tracted on either side of the Atlantic before 1775. Adams'
motive for conceding this important point was far from altru-
istic. He correctly foresaw that the clause would divide the
British merchants from the loyalists by silencing creditors'
criticisms of the peace, thus preventing them "from making176 The British-Americans
common Cause with the Refugees/' He also astutely recog-
nized that for this reason the ministry would welcome the
proposal.
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At the same series of talks Strachey for the first time won a
specific provision for the loyalists. The Americans agreed to a
general amnesty applicable to any loyalist not attainted be-
fore the final British evacuation, and they also accepted a
proviso that loyalists and British subjects would have six
months after the evacuation to sell or remove their property
and to emigrate freely into British territory. This, Strachey
told Townshend, was ''all that could be obtained," but be-
fore he left Paris to carry the draft of the new articles to
London, he nevertheless addressed a formal appeal on the
subject of the loyalists to the American negotiators, warning
them ominously that their "Gratification of Resentment
against Individuals" was threatening "every favorite object of
America." Their refusal to indemnify the loyalists, he
emphasized, was "the great obstacle" to reaching agreement.
But Franklin, Adams, and Jay remained adamant even in the
face of this strong statement of the British position. They
replied once again that they had no authority to discuss the
question, that even if they did, the return of confiscated
property would be impracticable, and that they could not
even think of compensating the loyalists because of the dam-
age such men had inflicted on the United States.
5
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The negotiations therefore appeared to be deadlocked. It
was obvious that the concessions in the new draft would be
insufficient to satisfy the ministry, though some progress had
indeed been made, and it seemed equally as certain that the
Americans would not soften their position further. But on
November 6, after Strachey's departure, came the conversa-
tion that was eventually to lead to a breakthrough.
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loyalists once more. Of the three American negotiators, Jay
was the least vindictive on the subject; he believed that some
loyalists (including his close friend Peter Van Schaack) had
acted from principle, and consequently he advocated that
some men — all the loyalists "except the perifidious and
cruel" — should be pardoned by the United States.
5
2 And
that was what he told Osw
rald, revealing his personal opinion
to the British negotiator for the first time. Although some
loyalists could never be forgiven, Jay said, the "less obnox-
ious" would be treated by the states "with as much lenity as
their case would admit of." Since most of these were "of low
rank," they could easily resume their normal lives, and the
British government would not have to reimburse them. As to
the few loyalists who had been attainted, Great Britain could
compensate them with property in Canada, or even with
cash, and the cost "would be a small matter in comparison of
the Expence of going on with the War another Year."
5
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A week later Oswald, acting upon the conversation with
Jay, suggested that the loyalist clause of the treaty should be a
"Recommendation to the Congress in their favour in general,
leaving them to discriminate, according to circumstances." At
this point the Americans were notably unenthusiastic about
Oswald's idea, but it was eventually to become the basis for
the crucial fifth article of the treaty.
5
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In the middle of the month Strachey returned from Lon-
don with the ministry's draft of a stipulation for the loyalists,
the government having unsurprisingly rejected the previous
version. Like Oswald's proposal of a few days before, the
ministerial draft was obviously based upon Jay's hints that
the Americans would be amenable to differentiating among
different classes of loyalists. The ministry proposed, as the
ideal article, that any person whose property had been con-
fiscated would be able to recover that property by refunding178 The British-Americans
to its current owner the "Bona fide" price he had paid for it.
But if this version could not be obtained, Townshend told
Strachey, a number of alternatives were acceptable to the
ministry. Each successive modification further restricted the
types of persons to whom the clause would apply. The gov-
ernment was also willing to agree to a secret attainder article
that would list by name those refugees not included in the
terms of the treaty. Townshend was confident the Americans
would agree to at least one of the suggested clauses, for, he
declared, "it is impossible to suppose them so blind to their
real Interests, as wantonly to proscribe so large a number of
their fellow Citizens, whose repossession of their Property
and re-union to their Country, is as essential to the prosperity
of America, as to the honor of Great Britain/'
5
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With the ministry's draft as the basis for discussion, the
negotiations entered the final phase. After "a vast deal of
Conversation" and "endless" sessions on the loyalists, agree-
ment was finally reached on November 29. The debt and
amnesty articles were little altered from the previous draft,
but the loyalist clause differed from all the ministry's modifi-
cations, resembling instead Oswald's tentative proposal of
two weeks earlier. In its final form, the fifth article provided
that Congress would "earnestly recommend" to the states the
restoration of the property of "real British subjects" and of
persons who had not borne arms for the king and who were
then residing in areas under British control. All other per-
sons (that is, refugees and those who had fought for the
crown) were granted twelve months in which to attempt to
recover their property, and Congress was to "earnestly
recommend" that persons of this description be restored to
their property if they paid a purchaser his "bona fide" price.
Strachey, for one, thought this version "much more advan-
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because it avoided the "humiliating" secret article, and, he
declared, "if this is not as good a Peace as was expected, I am
confident it is the best that could have been made."
5
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The wording of the loyalist clause can only be described as
ambiguous. But, as the American negotiators later explained
to Livingston, "it is not to be wondered at, when it is con-
sidered how exceedingly averse Britain was to expressions
which explicitly wounded the tories, and how disinclined we
were to use any that should amount to absolute stipulations
in their favor." Indeed, the "middle line" taken in the fifth
article was truly ingenious.
5
7 The only definite provision for
the loyalists was the year's period of grace granted some of
them, yet Congress was committed by treaty to take affirma-
tive action on their behalf. By the same token, the article —
in line with Jay's suggestions — discriminated among differ-
ent types of loyalists, giving preferential treatment to British
nationals and to loyal native Americans who had not played
an active role in trying to thwart the Revolution. The most
reprehensible loyalists, in American eyes, had the least provi-
sion made for them: nothing more than a year in which to try
to regain their property, and even if successful they were
then required to reimburse its present owner.
Because the phrasing of the fifth article was so convoluted,
and because so much of its effective force depended upon the
discretion of the Americans, it is useful to ask how each of the
parties involved in the treaty-making process interpreted its
meaning. The American negotiators, for their part, thought
they had perhaps purchased the desired boundaries and fish-
ing rights by "a little too much 'reciprocity' to the tories."
They believed they had "exceeded their instructions" — as
indeed they had — by conceding even a congressional recom-
mendation on the loyalists' behalf. Yet once they had agreed
to the fifth article, they thought it should be enforced. They180 The British-Americans
expressed a wish that Congress would make the recommenda-
tion called for, that the states would act upon it, and that
"the legislatures may not involve all the tories in banishment
and ruin, but that such discrimination may be made as to
entitle the decisions to the approbation of disinterested men
and dispassionate posterity." For example, Jay thought that
complete forgiveness should "indeed extend to very few, but
even if it applied to the case of one only, that one ought, in
my opinion, to be saved."
5
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Congress, by contrast, had quite a different understanding
of the clause. Livingston found it "a very slender provision,"
one which seemed "rather to have been inserted to appease
the clamor of these poor wretches than to satisfy their wants."
He informed the negotiators that the clause "will operate
nothing in their favor in any State in the Union" and added
significantly, "but as you made no secret of this to the British
commissioners, they will have nothing to charge you with/'
The Americans, of course, had done nothing of the sort. In
fact, if Scrachey is to be believed, they had told him exactly
the opposite: "The American Commissioners continued to
assert . . . that the Recommendation of the Congress would
have all the Effect we proposed/' he informed Townshend
when explaining why he and Oswald had accepted the
specific language of the fifth article.
5
9 Despite this obvious
contradiction, though, Franklin, Adams, and Jay were not
necessarily guilty of deliberately misleading their British
counterparts. All three men had been absent from the
United States for several years, and they probably were not
aware of the depth of American hatred for the loyalists, nor
could they have foreseen the disregard for the treaty that was
to result from that hatred.
But if the American negotiators were not fully cognizant of
their countrymen's attitudes, the refugees certainly were.COURTESY OF LIBRARY OF CONGRESS PRINTS DIVISION
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^4 British cartoon criticizing the peace terms. Americans were commonly portrayed
as Indians in works of this kind.182 The British-Americans
Like Livingston, they knew immediately that the recom-
mendation to Congress was the same as ''casting them off
altogether." Wrote John Watts, an exiled New York mer-
chant and councilor, "It might reasonably have been ex-
pected the Treaty wou'd take care of those who had been
quiet and inoffensive, far from it, we who were proscribed
and our Estates confiscated remain just as we did, with only
this difference, to be mercifully recommended by Congress to
the several States, to be treated as seemeth good in their own
Eyes, a comfortable Situation, to be sure."
6
0 A discouraged
Galloway declared, ''America is given up — Rebellion has
triumphed and Britain is rapidly on the high Road to Ruin."
All his efforts "to set the Nation right" had failed; "the
Government know the whole and more and yet will do
nothing and the people are too dissipated to think of any
thing but their private Interest." What was the use of his
continuing to fight? "It might be the subject of a day's
conversation and no more."
6
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The British negotiators, on the other hand, were optimistic
in their interpretation of the fifth article. In fact, Strachey
told Oswald, "My idea was, and is, that the Resolution of
Congress to the different States concerning the Restitution of
Property will be equivalent to a Message from the King to
Parliament, and that it is not probable any refusal will be
given, except to a very few, who are particularly obnoxious."
This view was widely accepted in Britain in the months
following the signing of the preliminary treaty. As a North
Carolinian informed a friend, "A generous performance of
the Articles of the provisional Treaty is fully expected on
their parts."
6
2 There was no better indication of this ex-
pectation than the content of the parliamentary debates on
the subject of the peace treaty, for Shelburne, in defending
the terms negotiated under his direction, insisted that thereStrange and Unaccountable Conduct 183
was good reason to believe that Congress would fulfill the
terms of the fifth article. And, he argued, if the Americans
reneged on their word, "is England so lost to gratitude, and
all the feelings of humanity, as not to afford them an asy-
lum?" With less than twenty percent of the cost of one year's
campaign, the loyalists could be given "happiness and easi-
ness ... in as ample a manner as these blessings were ever
in their enjoyment/'
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Later in the debate Shelburne's words were echoed by
John Wilmot, who had just completed the revision of the
pension list. Although he disagreed politically with the loyal-
ists, Wilmot declared, he thought them "with some excep-
tions, persons of the greatest merit, and entitled to every
consideration from this country." Yet even so he did not find
it reasonable to expect Americans to "give up their estates
and possessions again to those with whom they had been
contending." Consequently, the government planned to
make "some solid provision" for refugees unable to obtain
compensation under the fifth article. But Wilmot emphasized
his belief that this group would comprise only a small pro-
portion of the larger loyalist community. Furthermore, any-
one "recompensed with sterling money, instead of a ruined
estate, or American paper currency," would have little cause
to complain. In conclusion Wilmot assured his fellow Mem-
bers of Parliament "that everything has been done in their
favour that could be reasonably expected, though not every
thing that could be wished; . . . that the treaty does provide
effectually and completely for by much the greatest part of
the American Loyalists, that the interests of the remainder
are attended to; that the number of those, who will derive no
benefit from the treaty, are few in comparison of the rest, and
that they will be provided for, as is most just, at a much more
moderate expence than is generally imagined/'
6
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Clearly, there were almost as many interpretations of the
fifth article as there were groups involved with the treaty.
The American rebels and the loyalists both agreed that the
clauses were meaningless; the American negotiators thought
them partially enforceable; and the British ministry expected
them to prove almost completely effective. In order to cut its
losses and escape from the war as quickly as possible, the
Shelburne administration elected to shoulder the responsibil-
ity for compensating what it thought would be the few
loyalists too obnoxious to receive consideration from the
Americans. But the treaty it accepted on those grounds not
only brought down the government but also involved Great
Britain in the affairs of the loyalists for years to come. For,
because of American hostility towards the loyalists, what the
ministry had originally envisioned as a brief inquiry into a
limited number of claims from refugees not compensated by
the United States turned into a comprehensive, detailed, and
exceptionally complex investigation into the cases of more
than three thousand loyalist exiles.7
A Debt of the Highest and Most
Inviolable Nature
It is ... a debt of the highest and most inviolable
nature, from which Parliament can never honour-
ably and justly discharge itself, but by making
adequate compensation; nor can the moral obliga-
tion to do it be by any means suspended, for a
moment, but by national inability and insolvency.
— JOSEPH GALLOWAY, 1788
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ONVINCED that the Americans would not enforce the
ambiguous terms of the peace treaty, the refugees de-
cided that the only way they could obtain compensation for
their American property was to persuade the British govern-
ment to make good their losses. The ministry had indeed
promised them restitution, but a key question was left unan-
swered during the parliamentary debates on the treaty. It was
not clear whether the administration would act quickly, or
whether it would wait for years before taking positive steps to
reimburse the exiles. A prolonged delay would obviously
cause hardships for the loyalists, who were eager to make
permanent plans for their future. And so, as a result of their,
desire for immediate compensation, the refugees for the first
time since 1779 organized themselves into a coherent pres-
sure group.186 The British-Americans
On January 28, 1783, the Massachusetts loyalists living in
London gathered at Sir William Pepperrell's house on
Wimpole Street to discuss the possibility of petitioning Par-
liament for rapid and complete restitution. Since some of
their number questioned the utility of a formal memorial,
the New Englanders instructed Pepperrell to ask for Lord
North's opinion on the subject before they reached a final
decision on the strategy they would pursue. North not only
heartily approved of the project (perhaps because he knew it
would embarrass Lord Shelburne's government) , but also
advised "all the colonies to unite together." The loyalists
quickly adopted the strategy he proposed, and on February 4
refugees from throughout the continent met in London to
consider "proper measures for obtaining redress in the article
of the provisional treaty." The exiles concluded that "dele-
gates should be selected to represent the several provinces
that felt themselves particularly aggrieved," and they di-
rected a committee composed of Pepperrell, William Frank-
lin, Galloway, William Bull, and Lord Dunmore "to adopt
such measures they might think proper." The next day the
Massachusetts refugees convened again to empower Pep-
perrell "to consult and act in all cases in conjunction with
the agents from the other provinces, giving his private word
not to take any important step without consulting his con-
stituents."
2
But other loyalists were not convinced that a unified orga-
nization would serve any useful purpose. Samuel Peters, for
example, was so opposed to the plan that he managed to
persuade his fellow Connecticut refugees not to participate in
the new group. Peters explained, "Upon the whole I think
our Strength is in setting still, since we must stir up EnemiesA Debt of the Highest and Most Inviolable Nature 187
against us, and by our striving we cannot make any Friends."
3
Yet despite this strain of hostility, and notwithstanding the
mutual mistrust reflected in the New Englanders' suspicion
that Galloway had "sinister designs," the board of loyalist
agents was soon a functioning body. All the provinces except
Connecticut eventually chose representatives to sit on the
board; its first members were, in addition to the men just
mentioned, Thomas Boone (coagent with Bull for South
Carolina) , John Wentworth of New Hampshire, Sir Robert
Eden of Maryland, Thomas Macknight of North Carolina,
and Sir James Wright, who was elected chairman.
4
As its first official act, the board dispatched Wright, Frank-
lin, Wentworth, and Eden to Lord Shelburne with the draft
of the proposed petition to Parliament. Shelburne's adminis-
tration was at that very moment under attack for having
agreed to a treaty that did not sufficiently protect the loyal-
ists, so he understandably refused to lend his support to the
refugees' memorial, which asserted exactly the same point.
5
The constituent exile groups thereupon voted to submit the
petition to Parliament over Shelburne's objections, and the
agents revised it to meet some of his arguments. The refugees
informed the House of Commons that "upon a serious con-
sideration of the Treaty with the United States" they could
"entertain no expectation of relief" in America — that they
had to rely solely upon the justice and magnanimity of Par-
liament to repay them for their "sufferings, losses, and dis-
tresses" in the service of the crown. The agents contended
that it would be an "unprecedented hardship" if the loyalists
were required to bear the entire financial burden of the peace.
Rather, the costs of this "national Benefit" should be
"equally distributed among and borne by the whole Society."
In other words, Parliament should tax other British subjects188 The British-Americans
in order to reimburse the refugees, so that the price of peace
could be spread evenly across the nation.
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The agents did not stop with the presentation of this
memorial to Parliament. Before the month was out they
published the first of many pamphlets, The Case and Claim
of the American Loyalists Impartially Stated and Considered,
in which they asserted that the refugees had "an incontestible
right" to restitution. Basing their contention both on the
specific circumstances of the war and on a peculiar interpre-
tation of the principle of eminent domain, the agents argued
that because Great Britain had surrendered the loyalists'
property in order to achieve the common good, the nation
was thereby obligated to compensate them for their posses-
sions. If adequate restitution was not forthcoming, Britain
would stand revealed before the world as an "unjust, dis-
honest, and oppressive" state. Therefore, the board concluded,
"the Nation is bound, as well by the fundamental laws of the
Society, as by the invariable and eternal principles of natural
justice, to make them a compensation." Being practical men,
the agents did not rest their case wholly upon these theoreti-
cal considerations. A collateral publication, Collections with
regard to the Case of the American Loyalists, recited at some
length the various official proclamations that had promised
protection to loyalists and also listed a number of precedents
for the reimbursement of persons injured in the service of
the king.
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The exiles' intensive campaign for compensation, which
was predicated upon the inadequacies of the treaty, may well
have contributed to the toppling of the Shelburne adminis-
tration late in the month. On February 21, Lord John
Cavendish, a Rockingham Whig who had refused a position
under Shelburne, introduced in the House of Commons a
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motions passed with the support of a coalition that included
both Lord North and his longtime opponent Charles James
Fox, and Cavendish then withdrew the fifth, which vaguely
promised compensation to the refugees. In spite of their
failure to win specific assurances of restitution from Parlia-
ment, the agents had at least helped to bring about the
downfall of the ministry that had betrayed their interests at
Paris.
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In the next few months, with the government in disarray
because of the changeover in administrations, several of the
state exile organizations initiated projects intended to make
Parliament more receptive to the refugees' demands for re-
imbursement. Acting at the suggestion of the board of agents,
some state groups attempted to estimate the "Aggregate
Loss" of their constituents, in order to discover the approxi-
mate amount of relief that should be requested from Great
Britain.
9 The Virginians and South Carolinians appointed
committees to examine in detail the financial statements of
refugees from their states. The goal of this inquiry, Dunmore
noted, was to reduce "the Claims as much as possible from a
hope that the smaller the demand was the more likelihood
there was that parl[iamen]t wo[ul]d make them compensa-
tion." The South Carolina committee had already begun
meeting by mid-February, and the Virginians were busily
investigating claims in June. Both groups deliberately under-
took the task of passing judgment on the cases they con-
sidered.
1
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The report of the seven-man South Carolina committee is
of special interest because it revealed for the first time the
types of problems that were later to plague the official claims
commission. Although they worked "with all possible dili-
gence," the committee members explained, their progress was
"considerably retarded by the different, as well as the deffec-190 The British-Americans
tive, manner in which several of the claims are stated/' The
South Carolinians commented that a large number of the
items on the loss schedules "were estimated above their real
value," and even though they had tried to make compensa-
tory deductions, they believed that "many of the Demands
will probably be further and very Considerably reduced upon
a more perfect investigation." In particular, the committee-
men recorded their failure to place accurate valuations on
claims involving extensive debts, regardless of whether those
debts were owed to or by the claimants.
1
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While its constituent organizations were engaged in their
studies of the refugees' losses, the board of agents devoted
itself to propaganda activities. On numerous occasions during
the spring London newspapers and magazines printed news
items designed to show "what the Loyalists have to trust to
from the mercy of the Americans." British readers were
informed of the town meeting in Worcester, Massachusetts,
that decided on May 19 that it would be "extremely danger-
ous" to allow refugees to return; of the April 9 Boston
meeting that reached the same conclusion; of the opinion of
some residents of Morristown, New Jersey, that "those de-
spicable wretches" should be hanged; and, above all, of the
likelihood that a congressional recommendation in accor-
dance with the fifth article of the treaty would have no effect
whatsoever on the recalcitrant states.
1
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In late June the board finally saw its efforts achieve success.
On the twentieth Cavendish, who had become chancellor of
the exchequer in the new North-Fox administration, pre-
sented a second formal petition from the loyalists to the
House of Commons. Four days later he asked permission to
submit a bill to extend the authority of John Wilmot and
Daniel P. Coke, who were then hearing pension cases, "to
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tolerable degree of precision, who were and who were not
persons distressed in consequence of the civil war, and per-
sons entitled to the protection and relief of parliament."
Cavendish explicitly stressed the preliminary nature of the
inquiry he proposed. By the time Wilmot and Coke reported
their findings, he argued, Parliament would be better in-
formed as to America's intentions with regard to the treaty,
and, through the cooperation of both countries, "effectual
relief would be administered to those who had been dis-
tressed in consequence of the late unfortunate civil war."
1
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The limited scope of Cavendish's plan dismayed the refu-
gees. In an attempt to convince the ministry that a more
comprehensive scheme was called for, the agents presented
Fox with a "General State of the Circumstances of the Prop-
erty belonging to the American Loyalists, which has been
confiscated by Laws of the American States." While the
compensation proposal was before Parliament, the board met
every day, and it hurriedly published a pamphlet drafted by
Galloway that criticized Cavendish's plan. Observations on
the Fifth Article of the Treaty with America contended that
Great Britain should under no circumstances postpone mak-
ing definite provisions for reimbursing the loyalists. Gal-
loway pointed out that some of the property of "real British
subjects" had already been sold by the states. As a result, such
persons would be unable to recover their possessions even if
the terms of the treaty were enforced. Moreover, he noted,
the Americans probably would not restore property to any
loyalists who had borne arms against them, regardless of the
fact that soldiers nominally had a year in which to try to
obtain compensation. He urged Parliament to authorize a
"judicial enquiry" into these classes of claims at least, even if
it was decided to delay consideration of the cases of other
types of refugees.
1
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Perhaps the agents' arguments had some effect, for the
compensation act passed by Parliament in July 1783 was far
more comprehensive than Cavendish's original proposal. The
law established a five-member commission with the authority
to investigate the loyalists' claims in detail, rather than sim-
ply to survey them in general terms. Furthermore, the com-
mission was empowered to consider the cases of refugees of all
descriptions, not just the cases of those particularly penalized
by the treaty. It was expected that the commissioners w
Tould
complete their task within two years, and March 25, 1784,
was established as the deadline for submitting claims. Wilmot
and Coke, already experts at considering loyalist pension
requests, were logical choices for the commission; also ap-
pointed were Robert Kingston and Thomas Dundas, two
army officers who had served in America, and John Marsh, an
experienced civil servant. Together the men were directed to
inquire into the ''Losses and Services of those who had
suffered in their Rights, Properties, and Professions, in conse-
quence of their Loyalty to his Majesty and Attachment to the
British Government." On August 30 the commissioners held
their first formal meeting, thus beginning an endeavor that
was to occupy them for more than six years.
1
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Before the commissioners started to examine individual
cases, they consulted "the most respectable and most intelli-
gent of the Committee or Agents of the American Loyalists"
and other refugees as well in an attempt to gain information
that "might tend to facilitate the investigation of each par-
ticular Claim." Wilmot later acknowledged that these pre-
liminary discussions were "of great service" because they gave
the commissioners "a very good general knowledge of the
subject."
1
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The agents' contributions to the inquiry fell into two
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and other exiles acting at their instigation, supplied the
commissioners with data on local property values, prices of
household goods and foodstuffs, currency depreciation rates,
and the confiscation policies of each of the states.
1
7 Second,
and more important, the refugees offered numerous sugges-
tions as to how the commissioners could best conduct their
task. Not only did the exiles' assessments of possible pitfalls
prove remarkably accurate, their proposals also became the
basis for the lines of inquiry the commissioners eventually
pursued.
In the statements they presented to the commission the
agents began by stressing the wording of what George
Chalmers called "the most significant clause in the whole
act": that which restricted compensation to those persons
injured "in consequence of loyalty." To the refugees' minds,
this phraseology had a dual implication. It meant that incon-
testable proof of loyalty would have to be supplied by anyone
who sought redress under the act. And, it meant that losses
not specifically resulting from a claimant's fidelity to the
crown should not be considered by the commission. Any
losses "incidental to the War," caused by "the common Acci-
dents or ravages thereof," would not fall within the scope of
the investigation. A South Carolinian's formula was simple:
loyalists should be reimbursed only for the property they
would have held intact after the war had they been rebels.
1
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The agents' rationale for suggesting the first of these limi-
tations is obvious: they wanted to prevent mendacious rebel
sympathizers from submitting successful claims. But the
second is more difficult to explain, because most of the refu-
gees had indeed suffered losses that were not directly related
to the fact of their loyalty. Soldiers of both sides had damaged
their lands, expropriated their animals and crops, seized their
ships, and lived in their houses, usually without payment.194 The British-Americans
Naturally the exiles wanted to obtain as much restitution as
possible from the British government, yet their representa-
tives consciously proposed a severe contraction in the scope of
the inquiry. The resolution of this apparent paradox lies in
the agents' entire approach to the subject of compensation.
As was demonstrated by the diligence of the state commit-
tees in closely examining the claims of their constituents, the
exile organizations wanted to reduce the total sum requested
from the British government. By thwarting fraud and re-
stricting claims to property lost directly as a consequence of
loyalty, the agents hoped to ensure that Parliament would
make full restitution of the remaining (and still sizable)
amount. It was to their own advantage, they believed, to help
the commissioners limit the size of claims, for the less that
was distributed to the undeserving, the more that would be
left for the truly worthy.
To this end, the agents warned the commissioners that
they should trust no one. "Every mans claim be his Rank or
Character what it will, ought to be enquired into as strictly as
the lowest," admonished one southerner. This was all the
more true because any man might value his property too
highly simply because of "the prepossession and partiality
with which mankind are apt to view their own acquire-
ments." In fact, James Simpson correctly predicted, "the
most intricate and difficult part" of the commissioners' task
would be the assessment of the exact worth of a piece of
property, not the determination of who had owned it.
1
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enable the commissioners to distinguish between accurate
and inflated valuations, the agents suggested a long series of
searching questions that could be asked of each supplicant for
relief. The inquiries ranged from general requests for infor-
mation about the claimant's background, birthplace, and so
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indebtedness, the solvency of his creditors, and the exact
status of the property under consideration (was it confis-
cated? was it sold? was it mortgaged? was it in the hands of
relatives?) .
2
0 The loyalists covered nearly every imaginable
contingency so thoroughly that the commission in later years
rarely strayed from the pattern of questioning they estab-
lished.
At the same time as the agents informed the commissioners
of possible frauds, they also did their best to aid those among
their honest constituents who would perhaps be unable to
produce "such proofs, as might be necessary in a Court of
law." Because of the circumstances of the war, said William
Franklin, it was unlikely that all the refugees would have
complete documentation to support their loss schedules. Urg-
ing the commissioners not to reject such cases out of hand,
the agents suggested that the testimony of witnesses or evi-
dence obtained directly from America could help to prove
the validity of an otherwise questionable claim. Eventually,
the commission recognized the wisdom of this advice and
dispatched a representative to the United States to gather
pertinent data.
2
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The agents' initial strategy, therefore, was to cooperate
fully with the claims commissioners in the hope of bringing
them to sympathize with the refugees' plight. During Sep-
tember 1783 the agents and the commissioners worked closely
with each other, and the culmination of the relationship
probably came with the publication of a pamphlet entitled
Directions to the American Loyalists, in order to enable them
to State their Cases. Although officially unattributed, the
tract seems to have been produced jointly by the board of
agents and the claims commission. It encouraged exiles to
read the compensation act, advised them not to submit false
claims, and provided sample forms for memorials, witness196 The British-Americans
lists, loss schedules, depositions, and powers of attorney. Al-
though the commissioners later required claims to conform
on the whole to the conditions laid down in the Directions, it
is apparent from the contents of the pamphlet that they did
not draft it entirely by themselves.
2
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This cordial collaboration between the agents and the
commission could not long continue, if only because ulti-
mately the interests of the two groups were contradictory.
The commissioners, after all, were the investigators, and the
agents represented the persons being investigated. If the
agents were to fulfill their proper function, they could not
comfortably occupy a middle ground between their constitu-
ents and the commissioners. This they discovered when the
commissioners asked them to assist actively in the conduct of
the inquiry, either by handling preliminary examinations of
the claims or by appointing qualified persons to "digest"
cases and arrange evidence for persons needing help. The
agents' abrupt rebuff of both requests indicated that they had
recognized that their aims were not necessarily compatible
with the goals of the commission, and that they could best
serve their constituents by criticizing the claims process from
the outside rather than by participating fully in it.
2
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In early September the commissioners placed advertise-
ments in the London newspapers, instructing loyalists to
submit their claims for property loss to the commission's
offices in Lincoln's Inn Fields. For some the announcement
brought confusion, because a number of the exiles did not
understand the difference between the new investigation and
the pension hearings conducted previously by Wilmot and
Coke.
2
4 And even the refugees who knew they could now
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wondered whether it would be worth the effort. Polly
Hutchinson, for one, expected little to result from the in-
quiry because of the British government's "parsimony." A
young Pennsylvanian agreed that "the distracted situation of
this Country" made the possibility of restitution "extremely
slender indeed/' and a New Yorker declared pessimistically,
"I do not believe we shall ever get one Sixth part of our real
losses."
2
5 But the loyalists' actions belied their words. Few
eligible refugees failed to submit claims to the commis-
sioners, and, although they continually denied any hope for
complete redress, they balanced their explicit statements to
that effect with an implicit assumption to the contrary.
An examination of a letter written in February 1784 by
Isaac Low, a refugee from Manhattan who had served in the
First Continental Congress, illuminates their pattern of
thought. Low told his brother Nicholas that he was present-
ing a claim only out of "Duty," being "without Hope, that
the desired Compensation to the Loyalists will terminate in
any Degree equal to their Expectations." Yet elsewhere in
the same letter Low asserted that his evidence was so com-
plete it would "stand the Test of the strictest Examination."
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Theoretically, he was willing to admit that most claimants
would probably be reimbursed for only a small proportion of
their actual losses. But he — like every other loyalist — clung
to the belief that his award would amount to full compensa-
tion if the documentation was sufficiently convincing.
As a result, Low and his fellow exiles expended much time
and effort in the preparation of their formal memorials to the
commissioners. They assiduously collected written evidence
of all sorts to support their claims, lined up series of witnesses
to appear on their behalf, and besieged the commissioners
with requests for early hearings. Since documents had to be
submitted in quintuplicate, the copying chores alone took198 The British-Americans
days, and many refugees, especially those who were poorly
educated, had to have assistance in drafting their petitions.
2
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The loyalists' memorials followed a standard format. They
usually began with a declaration of unswerving, eternal alle-
giance to Great Britain, which was followed by a detailed
recitation of the applicant's contributions to the war effort.
The purpose of this self-serving account was to demonstrate
that the claimant had "done all that could reasonably be ex-
pected from an unsupported individual, whatever might have
been his capacity and his vigour." Refugees took particular
care to explain any circumstances that could be interpreted to
their disadvantage: those who had not borne arms offered
excuses for this apparent dereliction of duty; others defended
their decision to remain in rebel-held territory; and those
who had fled to safety in England early in the war stressed
their attempts to avoid becoming a burden on government.
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More important than these subjective matters was the
substance of the claim itself, the exile's listing of the exact
amount of his losses. To make his account seem more reason-
able, each loyalist did his best to convince the commissioners
that he was requesting restitution for only a small percentage
of his actual loss and that he had no intention of claiming
"the uttermost farthing." Memorials habitually noted that
"inconsiderable losses" or "extraordinary expenses" were
generously being overlooked, and one New Jersey man even
modestly decided that he would not ask to be reimbursed for
"the future Value of his Estate."
2
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Despite the refugees' almost universal disclaimers, an ex-
amination of their memorials shows that they took advantage
of every conceivable opportunity to increase the amount of
their claims. In general, their efforts fell into two categories:
first, the inflation of property values, and second, the inclu-
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An exchange of letters between Robert Leake, a New York
refugee, and his brother John, who had remained in the
United States, may serve to illustrate the first point. Accord-
ing to Robert, his estimate of loss was "thought by all who
have seen it, to be the most reasonable one given in to the
Office." But John, who found "many Errors" in his brother's
account, took strong exception to that opinion. The property
valuations, he told Robert with "no small degree of pain,"
were "in several instances far too high." In response, Robert
admitted that the estimates were "in my opinion too high,
but," he explained, "I was advised and overruled by the first
Claimants in this Country." All he had done was to adopt
land values comparable to those listed by men whose prop-
erty had adjoined his; for obvious reasons he did not want his
schedules to conflict with ones submitted by William Smith
and Sir John Johnson. The only item that was really "ex-
travagant," he informed John, was the listing of "loss of
increase and profit, which I found charged by every other
person."
3
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It was this latter sort of claim that was more commonly
used to increase the size of loss accounts. Refugees regularly
asked reimbursement for travel and living expenses, losses
incurred when land was sold cheaply to avoid confiscation,
damages done to their estates by troops of both sides, losses
resulting from the depreciation of continental and provincial
currency, and uncollectable debts, even when the debtors
were admittedly insolvent.
3
1 Less often, but still not infre-
quently, the commissioners encountered claims for such
blatantly inadmissible items as the £250 annual income a
loyal law student expected from the practice he was never
able to establish in Charleston, the £24,000 a Rhode Island
merchant would have grossed had the war never occurred,
and, in one extraordinary case, "the loss of the proper use of200 The British-Americans
my Limbs," which, the applicant explained, is "of a much
more valuable nature than any other species of property
whatever."
3
2 In absolute terms, of course, he was correct,
but by no stretch of the imagination was the compensation
act intended to provide loyalists with that kind of relief.
The well-known fact that many exiles had by such means
"magnified iheir Claims beyond the Bounds of strict Pro-
priety" began to worry some of the more conscientious
among them. One concerned New Jersey loyalist wrote in
February 1784, "I fear from the enormous valuation that a
great number of People have made, that Govermt not being
able to pay the whole will be obliged to compound the
matter and pay so much in the Pound, by that means those
people who have had any concience and made a just estimate
(which by the by I believe to be very few) will only receive
in proportion to those that have charged three fold the value
of their property."
3
3
As this letter indicates, the refugees did not anticipate a
serious inquiry into every item listed on their schedules. To
them, the most important component of their claims was the
total amount of their loss. They naively believed that the
estimates would be accepted more or less as submitted, fol-
lowing a somewhat perfunctory investigation designed
mainly to expose out-and-out fraud. They assumed that the
more one claimed, the more he would receive; that deduc-
tions, if made at all, would fall evenly upon all claimants as a
standard percentage of whatever amount had been originally
requested. Even the loyalist agents, who had advised the
commissioners to look closely at each memorial, operated
under the same assumption. They too expected all reasonable
claims to be accepted without much difficulty.
3
4
Significantly, the claims commissioners had quite a differ-
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crucial to his mind, meant little to them. They were con-
cerned rather with verifying each individual entry on the
schedules both as to the fact of loss and as to the amount of
loss involved. Demanding precision in written and oral evi-
dence, they exhibited no qualms whatsoever about striking
unsupported items from exiles' accounts. From the outset
they defined the scope of their inquiry more narrowly than
the loyalists expected. Besides excluding "normal" wartime
damages (as the agents had suggested), they refused to con-
sider claims for losses incurred outside the limits of the
United States or for any property acquired during the war in
territory then under rebel control. And, by the time of their
first report to Parliament in August 1784, the commissioners
had also declared inadmissible any claims for rents and in-
comes accrued during the war, offices acquired since 1775,
tracts of uncultivated land, uncollectable debts, depreciation
of currency, income that had not been habitual before the
war, and estimated income from trade. Only four categories
of acceptable claims remained. The first, and the one that
encompassed most of the eligible memorials submitted, the
commissioners described as losses of property within the
United States "sustained by Persons of undoubted Loyalty"
who had lived outside the United States before or during the
war, when those losses could be ascribed to their "Loyalty
and adherence to the British Government." The other three
admissible classes were losses of life appointments or positions
held during the pleasure of the king, if those posts had been
acquired before the war; losses of professional income to
which the claimants had been accustomed before 1775; and
claims submitted by heirs of loyalists, if the heirs were also
loyal.
3
5
The commissioners had a good reason for excluding so
many classes of claims: on the whole, they either found it202 The British-Americans
impossible to evaluate such items accurately or did not con-
sider them to be losses resulting from loyalty. But they never
informed the board of agents of the restrictions thus estab-
lished, regarding their procedures instead as requiring strict
confidentiality. The policy was designed to prevent wide-
spread objection to the exclusion of the claims items, but it
succeeded only in creating misunderstandings and hard feel-
ings. Although Wilmot later tried to shift the blame for the
secrecy rule to the ministry, it was in fact the commissioners
who first insisted that "great Inconveniencies to the future
Conduct of the Inquiry may result from the making of the
Contents of their Report public." In the end, the criteria for
judging claims were revealed only to Members of Parliament
and to government officials.
3
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Wilmot, Coke, Kingston, Dundas, and Marsh began hear-
ing cases in October 1783, and the work proved to be so time-
consuming that by August 1784 they had completed work on
only 142 of the 2,063 claims that had been submitted before
the March 1784 deadline. Their instructions from Parliament
complicated their task, for they were required to place each
claimant into one of six categories according to his degree of
loyalty and service before they allotted him compensation. As
Wilmot later put it, they had to mediate somehow "between
the Nation on one side, and the Individual on the other,
whose whole patrimony, as well as character, depended on
their Verdict."
3
7 The task was far from easy. Only by subject-
ing claimants, witnesses, and documents to a searching scru-
tiny could the commissioners accomplish their goal.
As a consequence of the commission's dedication to un-
covering the truth, the formal hearings became an ordeal for
both claimants and their witnesses. Each person testified
separately, in secret, and the examinations were "very par-
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when they appeared before the commission, and more than
one claimed that he had been "so agitated I could not prop-
erly answer to those questions you were pleased to ask me."
The substantial number who thought it necessary to submit
clarifying statements after their hearings amply attests to the
difficulties they must have experienced.
3
8 All written mate-
rial had to be presented to the commission in advance of the
hearings, and if claimants could not produce several certifi-
cates from British army officers or leading American refugees
describing their loyalty and services, their cases received short
shrift. Even more important was the requirement that they
supply definitive proof of the losses for which they claimed.
This, as the agents had predicted, was a difficult assignment
indeed, especially because at the time that many of the
loyalists had fled their homes they had fully expected to
return. Some had neglected to take their title papers with
them, others had deliberately left their deeds behind in hopes
that their property could be salvaged by friends and relatives,
and many more had simply lost whatever documents they had
once possessed.
3
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Occasionally, accurate supportive testimony could com-
pensate for a lack of written evidence. Each loyalist called
two types of witnesses to bolster his case: prestigious refugees,
who could attest to his character and status, and former
neighbors, who could usually describe his property in greater
detail. According to Wilmot, most of the claimants testified
with "the utmost honour, veracity, and candour," and any
exiles who were less than honest were readily detected be-
cause "the opportunities were so many of comparing the
information of such persons with that of others who could be
depended upon, both for knowledge and integrity."
4
0
As this statement implies, the commissioners were inclined
to rely heavily upon the testimony of some persons whom204 The British-Americans
they trusted implicitly, and the refugees seem to have sensed
this fact. A few important men testified again and again,
sometimes in cases of which they had only the most periph-
eral knowledge. James Simpson, the most popular witness,
had forty-five appearances to his credit, but three or four
persons from every state (usually former civil officials) each
testified in more than twenty cases. The same rule applied to
neighbors who served as witnesses. Fewer than half of the
claimants ever testified for anyone else, even though each case
was usually supported by three to seven witnesses. The group
of twenty-six South Carolina claims examined between Oc-
tober and December, 1783, may serve as an example of this
phenomenon. Seventeen of the claimants, more than the
average, testified for one another; eleven of those appeared in
several cases, and one man supported the claims of eight of
his neighbors. There were ten instances of reciprocal testi-
mony, and four of the claimants appeared only for persons
who also testified for them.
4
1
Such statistics suggest a definite possibility of collusion.
Claimants often consulted their witnesses prior to drawing
up their loss schedules, occasionally even requesting the wit-
nesses' estimates of the value of their holdings. Other times
they tried to persuade witnesses to include certain facts in
their testimony or certificates, and still more frequently they
showed their memorials and deeds to witnesses in advance of
the hearings. But prior consultation could also backfire, as
happened, for example, when one exile testified that the man
for whom he appeared had told him that ''there were some
Articles he did not like and wished to expunge [from his
account], and [he intended] to fill up the place with some-
thing to the same amount so as still to correspond with the
Sum Total on the last page."
4
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Such blatant falsification was rare. Conscientious loyalists
like Samuel Shoemaker refused to appear for persons with
whom they were not well acquainted, and at times the poor
quality of the supporting testimony was itself ample evidence
that no collusion was involved. George Chalmers' scanty
knowledge of a fellow Marylander's property was totally
dependent upon what he had seen of it while "riding along
the high Road," and a neighbor of a South Carolina black-
smith was only able to say that he "used to see many Negroes
about the plant[atio]n which he took to be his — He lived in
a very decent manner and appeared to be a man of some
substance." Of the same type was testimony offered for a
North Carolina farmer: the witness "knew he had Land at
Crames Creek — but he can't speak to the value of it — Knew
of no other Lands he had except that on which he lived —
There were thereabouts 2 or 3 people who paid him rent."
4
3
But even this minimal support was not always easy to
obtain. Loyalists whose cases were heard after 1785 often
complained that their key witnesses had already left to re-
settle in Scotland, Ireland, or Nova Scotia. A few explained
that none of their neighbors had come to the British Isles in
the first place. Usually in such instances the commissioners
themselves tried to locate witnesses who knew something
about the claims in question, but on the whole they had no
more success than the petitioners did.
4
4 It was all very well
for the commission to require certificates, deeds, and wit-
nesses to support each case, but in practice the established
standards were seldom fully met. Most of the time the com-
missioners had to base their decisions on sketchy and frag-
mentary evidence, which did not make their task any simpler
or less demanding. It also ensured that there would be
unavoidable inequities in the awards they reported.2o6 The British-Americans
[3]
With the inquiry well under way, the agents in early 1784
began to consider further ways to aid their refugee constitu-
ents. At the recommendation of a committee that included
the indefatigable Chalmers, they decided to press for the
immediate payment of accepted claims. In trying to persuade
the commission to agree to this demand, the agents argued
both that the loyalists had a right to compensation that
should not be negated through delay and that practical
considerations favored rapid restitution. The board collected
data to demonstrate that the American states were not enforc-
ing the peace treaty, thus implying that Britain should not
postpone her plans to recompense the loyalists in the ex-
pectation that the United States would soon act on their
behalf. And the agents also hinted to William Pitt, the new
first minister, that there were certain advantages to be gained
by paying off the claims. "The sooner the intended compen-
sation shall be made," they told him meaningfully, "the
sooner government will get rid of the just complaints of these
unfortunate men and be relieved from the burden of their
present allowances."
4
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But Pitt stood firm in the face of these contentions, his
adamancy based upon a not unreasonable desire to know the
total extent of the demand upon his government before
committing himself to paying it in full. The agents, stymied,
decided to circumvent him by appealing directly to Parlia-
ment. In the spring of 1785 they published an official state-
ment of their position, The Summary Case of the American
Loyalists, which they distributed to the legislators in hopes of
winning their support. But the tactic backfired. Although at
this point the administration was well acquainted with the
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of Parliament had been exposed directly to the agents' asser-
tion that loyalist claims should be considered as "unfunded
debts of the state," that is, that they constituted contractual
obligations which Britain was legally required to pay. The
legislators were not pleased, to say the least. One Member
informed William Smith that the exiles "had only a Right to
benign Consideration," and Pitt told the agents that "noth-
ing . . . could be done till all the Losses were reported."
4
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Having no alternative but to accept failure in this en-
deavor, the agents then turned their undivided attention to
two frequent complaints about debts that had come from
their constituents. The first concerned debts owed by refu-
gees to American citizens. Under the provisions of most of
the state confiscation acts, the creditors of exiles were directed
to apply for payment to the appropriate state governments,
which were then to reimburse them out of funds received
from the sale of the loyalists' property. Even under ideal
conditions these applications were not always successful, and
in certain cases the proceeds from the sale of the property
were insufficient to cover the refugees' obligations. As a re-
sult, some American creditors began to file suit in British
courts to recover their money. The refugees viewed these
suits with resentment and dismay, for decisions favoring the
Americans would in effect force loyalists whose property had
been confiscated to pay the same debts twice.
4
7
John Tabor Kempe, a New Yorker involved in just such a
suit, tried in 1784 to obtain an English judicial decision free-
ing him from the obligation to pay his American creditors.
John Antill, the refugee executor of the estate of Alexander
Colden, an American subject, sued Kempe in the London
chancery court for the £450 he owed Colden. Instead of
contesting the suit, Kempe filed for an injunction in another
court. He argued that "it is contrary to Equity and good208 The British-Americans
Conscience that any demand of the said Debt should be made
upon your Orator by any Inhabitant of either of the said
States [New York or New Jersey] unless your Orators Prop-
erty should be restored to him of which there is no Probabil-
ity." Antill responded merely that it would cause him "great
Expense and trouble" to bring suit in New York and that his
chance of success there would be 'Very uncertain." Although
Kempe seemed to have equity and logic on his side, the
second court refused to stay the judgment of the first, and
Kempe was forced to pay the £450, plus court costs.
4
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In June 1785 the board of agents attempted to provide
legislative redress for men like Kempe by drafting a bill to
protect loyalists from suits brought in England by American
creditors. Even though some refugees considered the board's
proposal too weak, it and its successors in 1786 and 1787
encountered stiff opposition from the mercantile interests in
Parliament. So strong was the feeling against the bills that
none of them came to a vote.
4
9 Just as John Adams had
predicted in 1782, the English merchants had been success-
fully separated from the loyalists by the terms of the treaty.
Afraid that Congress would limit their rights to collect debts
in America if Parliament restricted the Americans' right to
sue in British courts, the merchants organized the resistance
to the agents' efforts to win some protection for their con-
stituents. In vain did Joseph Galloway contend that the
passage of the bill would not violate the terms of the peace
treaty. In theory he was correct, but the merchants knew only
too well that the Americans had already proved to be notori-
ously disrespectful of technicalities.
5
0
The agents had no more success in their efforts to deal with
the other debt problem that beset the refugees, which was the
question of whether the claims commission was going to
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American debtors. Although the commission never officially
informed the agents that it had excluded debts from its
purview, the agents deduced that fact from loyalists' reports
that they had not been examined on debt claims in their
formal hearings. The agents repeatedly petitioned the com-
mission on the subject, arguing that debts were "rights" lost
because of loyalty and that as such they fell within the terms
of the compensation act. The commissioners, though sympa-
thetic, thought rather that the loyalists' debts were legally
recoverable under the fourth article of the treaty, which
provided that "creditors on either side shall meet with no
lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in
sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted."
In response, the agents developed an ingenious argument
contending that the fourth article did not apply to refugees
because their debts had been transferred to the states by
confiscation several years before the treaty was signed, but
even this masterful effort was doomed to failure. The com-
mission refused to alter its original decision not to accept
claims for debt.
5
1
All the agents' work did not go for naught, though. In the
summer of 1785 the ministry finally made a significant con-
cession to their demands for immediate payment. In June,
Pitt proposed that £150,000 be distributed to those claimants
whose cases already had been reported. Loyalists who had
borne arms or rendered other services were to be paid 40
percent of their claims as liquidated by the commission, with
all other refugees allotted 30 percent of the sums due them.
After a spirited debate in which some Members of Parlia-
ment argued that "a fuller inquiry into the history and
present circumstances of the loyalists" should be undertaken
before the exiles were compensated, Pitt's plan was approved.
The commission prepared a list of claimants eligible for210 The British-Americans
shares of the £150,000, and the distribution began in early
September.
5
2
The loyalists welcomed the change of policy. The "hand-
some payment/' John Watts commented, "exceedingly . . .
rejoyces those who are partaking of it," and William Smith
observed, "The good Humour it has created, cannot but give
Pleasure even to those who don't share in the Benefaction/'
He approvingly remarked that the Treasury had managed
the payments "so judiciously ... as to free every Man's
Mind from uneasy Anticipations; for he that recieves [sic],
knows not of what Class he is, and so can't calculate upon the
Appreciation of the Estimate he delivered in."
5
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Alas, Smith had vastly underestimated the refugees' deduc-
tive and mathematical capabilities. Soon the commission was
inundated with complaints from dissatisfied claimants, who
now realized for the first time how much was being deducted
from their loss schedules. Many refugees, like Isaac Low,
declared themselves "confounded and perplexed" by their
"inadequate" allotments, most of them concluding with the
New Yorker James DeLancey "either that I have not received
my full proportion ... or that my Claim has been decided
upon mistaken principles." When assured that there had
been no error, such men usually reasoned that they had
"failed in point of proof." As a result they proceeded to
dump additional documents in the laps of the commissioners,
who were already overloaded with paperwork and who had
no intention of reopening any of the cases they had decided.
5
4
The first compensation act expired during the summer of
1785, and the law that replaced it reflected the experience of
the preceding two years. The commission had realized that it
was unreasonable to expect loyalists who had settled in
Canada to come to England for claims hearings, so the new
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Nova Scotia to examine cases there. It had also become
apparent that the deadline of March 25, 1784, had excluded a
large number of legitimate claims simply because many loyal-
ists had not arrived in England by that time. Accordingly, the
second act empowered the commission to receive claims until
May 1, 1786, from persons who had been "utterly incapable"
of submitting a memorial before the original deadline.
5
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The summer of 1785 also brought alterations in the per-
sonnel of the commission. After three years of dealing with
the refugees, Daniel P. Coke decided to resign. In his place
were appointed two new commissioners, Robert Mackenzie
and Jeremy Pemberton, and they, plus the experienced
Dundas, were dispatched to Canada, leaving Kingston,
Marsh, and Wilmot to continue dealing with cases in En-
gland. In addition, the act of 1785 authorized the commis-
sioners to send a representative to the United States to gather
data on claims, and in August a young man named John
Anstey was employed to perform that task. The commission
instructed him to collect information about claimants' titles
to property, the confiscation and sale of their possessions, the
possibility of their estates being restored to them, and the
debts they owed in America. Anstey left for the United States
early in 1786, remaining there for nearly two years. The data
he supplied caused the upward revision of many of the origi-
nal claims reports.
5
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After the passage of the new act, the dispatching of Anstey,
and the partial payment of some claims, the agents' objectives
changed. They continued to call for protection from Ameri-
can creditors' suits and for restitution for uncollectable debts,
but they abandoned their insistence on immediate reim-
bursement. Instead, they argued simply that refugees should
be informed of the exact amounts of their liquidated claims
and that they should be paid interest on the sums still out-212 The British-Americans
standing. The board also requested that professional men,
omitted from the distribution of funds in 1785 because of the
nature of their claims (for income rather than property) , be
included in the similar distribution planned for 1786. As
usual, though, their efforts were unsuccessful. Wilmot cate-
gorically rejected the agents' contentions on debts and profes-
sionals, and when Parliament considered granting the exiles
interest on their remaining claims, the ministry quickly
moved to squelch the idea. To allow interest on the sums
due, the chancellor of the exchequer declared, "would pledge
the House for the full payment of them at some future
period, which was a principle not hitherto recognized."
5
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Thwarted in their attempts to gain additional concessions,
the agents in late 1786 and 1787 largely ceased their com-
plaints about procedures, awaiting instead the conclusion of
the investigation. In March 1788, with the inquiry obviously
drawing to a close, the board once again petitioned the king
and Parliament. Although the memorials reiterated the usual
arguments for compensation, they especially emphasized the
"Wretchedness, and Woe" that characterized the lives of the
refugees in England. Deprived of their property, denied
redress, many of the loyalists had been "reduced from Afflu-
ence to Poverty — others, under the Pressure of Want, have
died with broken Hearts — and some have been driven by
their Distress into Insanity — and from Insanity to Suicide;
leaving their helpless Widows, and Orphans to prolong
their miserable Existence on the cold Charity of Strangers."
5
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Joseph Galloway contributed to the agents' final campaign
by writing still another pamphlet. In it he repeated his
contention that the loyalists' property had been "the price
and purchase of peace for the empire" and that restitution
was "due them by their birth-rights as British subjects." Be-
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refugees deserved to be additionally ''rewarded" for ''extraor-
dinary services." If the ministry did not accept this obliga-
tion, Galloway asserted, it would be "subverting the design of
the union, and manifestly violating its solemn engagements,
its duty, and the evident principles of reason, justice, and
law/'
5
9 Galloway's tract was joined in print by the agents'
own concurrent publication, Reasons why No Deductions
ought to be Made from the Amount of Sums due to the
American Loyalists. Asserting that the refugees' great losses
and the high standard of proof demanded by the commis-
sioners had combined to make the official awards fall "very
far short" of the actual amounts of loss, the agents argued
that the liquidated claims should be paid in full. In April
they supplemented the pamphlet with a formal memorial to
the House of Commons, and James DeLancey, the vice-presi-
dent of the board, wrote a lengthy letter to Pitt, explaining
why no distinction should be made among various classes of
refugees in the final settlement.
6
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But again the agents failed to achieve their objective, a
circumstance that became evident when Pitt commented
casually in a parliamentary debate in early May that the
refugees' claims "amounted to so large a sum, that it would
be utterly out of the power of this country to make them full
compensation for their losses." His plan of payment, pre-
sented to Parliament on June 6, 1788, accordingly struck a
compromise between partial and complete restitution. Pitt
proposed that liquidated claims of less than £10,000 be paid
in full, but that awards above that amount be reduced
according to a proportional scale: 10 percent would be de-
ducted from any excess over £10,000 but under £35,000; 15
percent from £35,000 to £50,000; and 20 percent from
awards above that sum. In other words, the larger the amount
reported by the commissioners, the greater the proportionate214 The British-Americans
reduction in the sum a loyalist would actually receive. Of
course, whatever compensation claimants had been allotted
in the distribution of funds in 1785, 1786, or 1787 would be
deducted from their final payment. Pitt described his plan as
"a liberal and a handsome compensation" that "left the
loyalists without a plea for complaining that they had been
hardly dealt by."
6
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Most Members of Parliament agreed with him. Many re-
corded their approval of the scheme, among them Edmund
Burke, who declared that he had never voted for a bill "with
more satisfaction," for he thought the compensation "both
liberal and prudent, neither too large on the one hand, nor
too small on the other." But there were two significant excep-
tions to the general chorus of approbation: Daniel P. Coke
and John Wilmot. Both men argued that every loyalist
should be paid the full amount of his liquidated claim. Coke
cited specific cases of refugees who would be adversely
affected by the deductions Pitt had proposed, and, although
Wilmot reluctantly agreed to bow to the will of the majority,
he "owned he had ever expected, that what the commis-
sioners reported, was to be the amount of the sums paid to
the loyalists."
6
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In spite of the obvious drawbacks of Pitt's plan, the loyal-
ists were so pleased at the settlement of their claims that
initially they did not criticize the details of the arrangement.
In a formal petition of thanks to the king, the agents on July
2 poured forth "the ardent effusions of their grateful hearts"
and asserted that their constituents would ever be ready to
"devote their lives and properties to your Majesty's service,
and the preservation of the British Constitution."
6
3 Al-
though the compensation scheme fell short of the loyalists'
expectations, Parliament had not drawn distinctions among
different descriptions of exiles. Moreover, since 1785 theFROM THE COLLECTION OF MR. AND MRS. PAUL MELLON
John Eardley-Wilmoty by Benjamin West (1812). The picture in
the background, painted by West in the 1780's, symbolically por-
trays the loyalists' gratitude to Great Britain for offering them
compensation and a refuge. At right are West and his wife; at the
head of the refugees stand William Franklin and Sir William
Pepperrell. (Wilmot took the additional surname Eardley in
1812.)216 The British-Americans
refugees had become accustomed to the idea that their awards
would be far less than they thought they deserved. They felt
only gratitude and relief that their fight for restitution had
finally culminated in a victory of sorts.
[4]
The claims commission's final report, issued in 1790, re-
vealed that 3,225 claims had been submitted in England and
Canada, with 2,291 loyalists receiving a compensation of
£3,033,091. The figures were impressive, but the 2,291 refu-
gees had originally estimated their losses at £8,216,126, and
their awards consequently represented an average return of
only 37 percent on their claims. Furthermore, 343 claims
were completely disallowed by the commissioners, and those
loyalists received no property compensation whatsoever.
6
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Therefore, although the total amount disbursed by the
British government seemed generous, some individual loyal-
ists did not necessarily fare very well.
Because of the endemic deficiencies of documentation and
testimony, the commissioners' awards rested largely upon
their estimate of the truthfulness of each claimant and his
witnesses. As a result, refugees whose integrity was ques-
tionable — especially those who had supported the rebel
cause in any way — found themselves being closely examined
by the commissioners.
6
5 Although the commission did not
automatically disallow the claims of men who had switched
sides, it did award them proportionately less restitution. A
convenient means of demonstrating this fact is to compare
the amount of compensation allotted to South Carolina refu-
gees whose loyalty was doubtful with the awards to Caro-
linians whose allegiance was undeniable. Of 44 problematical
loyalists whose cases were heard in England, only 17 (or 39
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claims. By contrast, of 98 known loyalists, 54 (or 55 percent)
were awarded more than 30 percent of their estimated loss,
with 19 (20 percent) of these receiving over one-half of the
amount they requested. Only 6 (13 percent) of the other
group of refugees were awarded as much.
6
6 Perhaps the
commissioners did not consciously discriminate against vacil-
lating exiles, but they were less inclined to believe the
specific details of the testimony of a man who had changed
his allegiance during the war. When the evidence was incom-
plete, as it was in many cases, they tended to decide against a
claimant whose fidelity was questionable.
Despite the large number of loss schedules that were con-
sciously or unconsciously inflated by the loyalists who sub-
mitted them, the commission rarely decided that a memorial
had been prepared w
7ith a deliberate intent to defraud the
government. Under the terms of the 1783 act, the commis-
sioners' determination that a claim was fraudulent automati-
cally excluded its author from receiving further compensa-
tion of any sort. The commissioners were genuinely reluctant
to impose this sanction on persons whom they regarded as
loyal, even if those persons had apparently submitted a false
estimate of loss. Of all the property claims considered in
England, the commissioners cited only the ten most flagrantly
spurious as fraudulent. Two were cited because the claimants
had charged for property they had sold during the war; one
because its author had knowingly substituted sterling valua-
tions for estimates originally drawn in terms of a depreciated
colonial currency; one because the merchant who submitted
it had been insolvent before the war; and the remaining six
because the claimants had declared large losses even though
they owned little or no property.
6
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The most incredible of the fraudulent claims was sub-
mitted by John F. D. Smyth of Maryland. Smyth represented218 The British-Americans
himself as a wealthy physician with an annual income of
£1900 and plantations worth £37,841, not to mention large
tracts of valuable Ohio lands. But witnesses called by the
commission testified that Smyth's practice had been small, his
one plantation rented, and his reputation "so notorious as a
liar that nobody would believe him." When confronted with
this evidence, Smyth adopted a pose of injured innocence,
explaining to the commissioners that he did not "presume"
to claim any exact sum from the government. Rather, the
only compensation he solicited was "what I conceived I had a
right to expect without having sustained any Loss at all."
Smyth was mistaken if he expected this disclaimer to protect
him from charges of fraud; the commissioners decided that he
had been guilty of "gross wilful perjury" and reported his
case immediately to the Lords of the Treasury.
6
8
When both the intent and the lies were less obvious, the
commission was inclined to be lenient. Several times it
merely disallowed claims, even when it decided that their
authors had "prevaricated grossly" at the hearings. Disallowal
carried with it no stigma of fraud, for that designation was
commonly applied to items inadmissible under the commis-
sion's rules. Anyone's claim might be disallowed in whole or
in part, and not even men like William Franklin were
immune from such a determination. Most of the 343 dis-
qualified claims simply fell outside the guidelines the com-
mission had established for admissible losses, but a few do
indeed appear to have been fraudulent.
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On the whole, it seems that the vast majority of claims
were relatively honest. The commission rarely uncovered
deliberate lies, most of their deductions resulting rather from
the fact that inadmissible items were usually included on loss
schedules. Unquestionably, some — perhaps even many —
loyalists inflated the value of their estates, but few tried toA Debt of the Highest and Most Inviolable Nature 219
claim for property they had not owned. And, because of the
commissioners' strict rules, it is highly unlikely that any
claimants were allocated more compensation than they de-
served. In fact, an analysis of the distribution of the awards
reveals that a majority of the exiles were allotted less than
half the amount they originally requested. Moreover, the
larger a refugee's claim, the smaller was his proportionate
return, which demonstrates that the commissioners them-
selves had reduced the relative size of the awards even before
Pitt officially proposed such deductions. No wonder both
Wilmot and Coke opposed Pitt's plan in Parliament.
7
0
A further conclusion that can be drawn from the pattern of
claims awards is that certain types of claimants were likely to
receive better compensation than others. Small landowners
(if their lands were cultivated) received a higher percentage
return on their claims than did artisans, tradesmen, and pro-
fessional men, the bulk of whose property consisted of furni-
ture, houses, books, tools, and the like. Since the same low
percentages held for both obscure laborers and well-known
clerics and lawyers, the difference in awards seems to have
derived from the kind of loss claimed. The reason was sim-
ple: it was far easier for the commissioners to evaluate landed
property than it was for them to estimate the worth of
personal possessions. Witnesses, deeds, and titles could help
to pinpoint the value of a farm, but the precise worth of
personal property was difficult to determine. And when the
commission was uncertain of its awards, it preferred to err on
the low side.
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The group of claimants that suffered the most in relative
terms was the merchants. Since much of their business was
conducted on credit, the commission's decision to exclude
claims for uncollectable debts hit them particularly hard. A
majority of refugee merchants received less than a 30 percent220 The British-Americans
return on their loss estimates, whereas a majority of all other
claimants received more than a 30 percent return. As George
Erving, a Bostonian and mandamus councilor who was
allotted only £500 on a claim of approximately £20,000,
accurately declared, "Those who have lost dirt are paid in
gold, and those who have lost gold are paid in dirt."
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Appropriately enough, therefore, it was the merchants who
most severely criticized the claims settlement. Contending
that the board of agents, "being composed principaly [sic]
by men of the learned Professions," had failed to protect
their interests properly, a sizable number of refugee mer-
chants organized their own pressure group in late 1788. Led
by such men as John Hamilton and Cumberland Wilson of
North Carolina, Robert Gilmour of Virginia, and John
Jamieson of Georgia, the American merchants' committee
repeatedly petitioned the ministry and Parliament for com-
pensation for confiscated debts. But despite their conviction
that they had been " (for reasons we cannot comprehend)
. . . singled out and doomed to hardships unknown to any
other class of his Majesties Subjects," it was not until 1802
that the merchants received even partial restitution for their
debt losses.
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Other claimants soon followed the merchants' lead. The
revelations of the preliminary fund distributions had not
fully prepared some exiles for the proportionately small
amounts they received, and they complained both long and
loudly. One New Jersey loyalist commented on his allotment,
"Justice if such a being existed would blush on hearing that
publick confidance could be so much violated," and, he
continued in utter bewilderment, "if the Commissioners of
American Claims saw fraud in the representation I made of
my losses, why not punish me as the Act of Parliament in that
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trary, no imposition, fallacy, or imposture appeared on my
side; why dismiss me by the payment of so pitiful a sum."
The exiles' dissatisfaction with their awards caused the board
of agents once again to seek disclosure of the commissioners'
"General Rules, and Principles," but without success. The
loyalists in fact did not learn the exact basis on which the
claims had been decided until Wilmot published his account
of the inquiry in 1815.
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The secrecy issue, though important, was an old one, and
the agents found a new concern in the months following the
acceptance of Pitt's plan: the method of payment adopted by
Parliament. Instead of being allocated one lump sum, claim-
ants were issued government debentures bearing only 314
percent interest. Furthermore, the principal was to be paid
off in sixteen equal installments spread over eight years, an
arrangement so complex as to make the debentures (in the
words of James DeLancey) ''utterly unfit for circulation, and
so unmarketable, that a heavy Discount can alone force the
Sale of them." Loyalists who wanted to realize cash in De-
cember 1788, the agents reported, were compelled to sell
their bonds at a 5 or 6 percent discount from face value, with
no allowance for future interest. Although the agents for
several years sought a more favorable scheme for retiring the
debentures, the most they could achieve was the prompt
payment of the installments, which at least brought the
discount rate down to 3 percent.
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In the end, it must be concluded that the loyalists were
not, in a strict sense, reimbursed for their losses in America.
They did receive partial compensation for those losses, a
compensation that bore at least a loose relationship to the
amount they had claimed, but their awards probably fell far
short of what they had actually sacrificed by remaining faith-
ful to the crown. Of course, seen from the standpoint of the222 The British-Americans
British government, the provisions made for them were in-
deed generous, perhaps even beyond what the loyalists had
any right to expect. It is also obvious that the pro forma
investigation and full restitution advocated by the board of
agents would never have been implemented under any cir-
cumstances. In 1788, the refugees owned less than they had in
1775, but on the other hand they had more than they had
possessed in 1783. Thanks to the compensation act and the
claims commission, they had now the means to begin a new
life. Finally, five years after the war's close, they were able to
put it behind them and to plan for the future.8
Finishing Their Days
Among Strangers
Once I thought to have spent my last breath
there [in America], but since providence has other-
wise ordain'd it, I am content, and must finish my
days amongst strangers.
— JOHN WATTS, 1785
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HE final settlement of loyalist claims, effected between
1788 and 1790, brought to an end the uncertainty that
had afflicted the refugees since 1775. At long last their lives
had begun to acquire a measure of permanence. The alterna-
tives open to them were clear: they could remain in England,
emigrate to British provinces in Canada or the West Indies,
or return to the United States to live under the independent
republican governments they had so strongly opposed. Each
of these courses of action had its advantages and its draw-
backs, and the exiles assessed the relative merits differently.
Some stayed in the mother country, little changing the mode
of existence they had adopted during the war years. A few
decided to brave the lingering wrath of their rebel fellow
countrymen in order to rebuild their lives in the United
States. But most chose instead to begin anew in the wilder-
ness of Nova Scotia or the uninhabited islands of the224 The British-Americans
Bahamas. For all, the financial support they received from
the British government was of crucial importance. Without
the reimbursement for losses of income or property, without
the continuation of subsistence allowances, most of the loyal-
ists would have been unable to make viable plans for their
future.
After Pitt's proposal for paying the liquidated claims had
been accepted, the ministry turned its attention to two types
of cases that had previously been neglected: demands against
the British army or navy, and losses of property in Florida as
a result of the cession of that territory to Spain. Hearings to
determine the extent and value of the Florida property were
conducted by independent commissioners in 1786 and 1787,
and the records reveal that most of the claimants were south-
erners who had settled in Florida after the evacuation of
Charleston, in the mistaken belief that the area would re-
main in British hands. Consequently, many of them had
endured two confiscations, first in the Carolinas or Georgia,
then in Florida. Since these cases were comparable to the
regular property claims, they were decided on approximately
the same grounds.
2
The army and navy cases, by contrast, involved a com-
pletely different kind of loss. They consisted of demands for
reimbursement for property seized or destroyed by British
forces during the war, and claimants with proof of the exact
value of their losses were entitled to full restitution. Al-
though preliminary examinations of these claims had been
conducted in New York in 1783 and in London two years
later, the three commissioners (Dundas, Pemberton, and
Mackenzie) assigned to hear them still took two years toFinishing Their Days Among Strangers 225
reach a final decision. In 1790 they recommended that more
than £66,000 be distributed among 210 refugees.
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During the six years that property claims were being
investigated, the commissioners had also continued to allot
pensions to refugee Americans. But, in the years following
Wilmot and Coke's revision of the allowance system, the
criteria for awarding stipends changed significantly. In the
first place, petitioners arriving in England after the final
evacuation of America usually had no intention of remaining
in the mother country longer than it took to press their
claims for property loss. To the commissioners it seemed as
though many had applied for temporary support simply as an
"Experiment" to see if they could thereby obtain more
money from the government than they would otherwise have
deserved. As a result the commission began to stress need as
the primary prerequisite for assistance. Loyalty and the
amount of loss still entered into the commissioners' decisions,
but increasingly they based the size of their awards upon
their estimate of an applicant's ability to support himself.
They commented that a New Jersey teen-ager was "a strong
hearty young man . . . able to get his own Bread," that a
Pennsylvania porter's "only misfortune (if it can be called
so) is the being obliged to labour for his Bread in England
instead of America," and they concluded that "in these Cases
we think the parties, especially if they are young, should
contribute to their own Livelihood, by their Industry in this
Country as well as they before did in America."
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The commissioners proved particularly reluctant to award
allowances to refugees whose status or prospects had actually
been improved by the war. After hearing the testimony of a
Philadelphia waiter, they observed, "It has been his Misfor-
tune that the Troubles put him for a time into the Situation
of a Gentleman and he is probably unwilling to return to his226 The British-Americans
former Occupation which certainly is as open to him here as
it was in that Country." And in the case of a North Caro-
linian they wrote, "If he is now without Property he is only
in the Situation that he was in before the War." They espe-
cially applied this line of reasoning to the few blacks who
submitted requests for pensions. Such men, the commis-
sioners noted repeatedly, came "with a very ill grace to ask
for the bounty of Government." Because of the war, they
were "in a much better Country," where they would "never
more be Slaves." What more could they want or deserve?
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A second alteration in allowance-granting procedures that
occurred after 1783 was a new emphasis on applicants' merit
and steadfast loyalty. Whereas Wilmot and Coke had been
relatively sympathetic to men who had, under pressure, re-
nounced their allegiance to the king, the commission as a
whole — and especially Dundas and Marsh, it appears — was
openly hostile to supplicants whose wartime role had been
ambiguous. The commissioners expressed contempt for the
men, mainly southerners, who had "played with their Alle-
giance" and "put it on or shaken it off as they thought it
would best answer the Purpose of saving their Property/'
Such vacillation, they declared, "does not deserve the Name
of Loyalty"; in fact, any persons who thus "played the double
part" were "the worst Enemies of Great Britain."
6 Particu-
larly culpable were the natives of the British Isles who,
however briefly, had flirted with the rebels. Of an Irish
gunsmith who had worked for the American troops until
1780, they wrote, "He ought to be ashamed of making this
application and deserves to be punished rather than re-
warded by this Country." They described a Scotsman who
had taken a Virginia loyalty oath as a "Traytor" and com-
mented on a former member of the Georgia provincial
assembly: "As an Englishman he is much more to blame thanFinishing Their Days Among Strangers
if he had been an American." Concluding that "Great
Britain must protect such people but she ought not to reward
them," they rarely recommended more than miniscule
stipends even for the most indigent loyalists of this de-
scription.
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The commissioners, then, went to great lengths to ensure
that refugees given allowances after 1783 truly deserved and
needed government assistance. But in spite of their careful
examination of applicants, the smaller size of the allotments
they awarded (most pensions now fell between £30 and £60
annually) , and a constant review of previously granted
stipends, the pension list expanded rapidly. At the end of
1784, 643 loyalists were receiving £52,695; a year later, even
after reductions resulting from the preliminary distribution
of property compensation, it was 840 refugees and £57,528.
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One of the reasons for the vast increase in the number of
pensioners was the fact that by 1785 the commissioners had
begun to use the allowance system as a means of assisting
propertyless refugees who were not eligible for relief under
the acts of 1783 and 1785. Since such persons had been indi-
gent in America, there was no way for the commissioners to
aid them within the framework of the official compensation
law. But, feeling an obligation to help support the deserving
loyal poor, the commissioners adopted a practice of awarding
them stipends of perhaps £10 or £20 a year. In consequence,
20 percent of the persons on the pension rolls in the spring of
1787 had not claimed a property loss.
9
At the time of the final settlement of the claims, allowances
were being paid to three widely differing groups of refugees.
First, there were loyalists who had lost property and who
would need little or no assistance once they had been issued
their debentures. Second, there were merchants and other
persons who had not incurred losses falling within the scope228 The British-Americans
of the compensation acts. Finally, there were professional
men who had suffered in terms of income, not property.
These pensioners were permanently provided for (to varying
degrees) by a dual allowance system established in early
1789.
One component of the system was simply the continuation
of the regular pension list, with allotments completely re-
vised in light of the property settlement. After loyalists who
had received a sizable compensation were dropped from the
rolls, two categories of pensioners remained. The first was
composed of widows and orphans, the elderly and the sick,
wounded veterans, and the like: those exiles whose indigency
enlisted the commissioners' sympathy. The second was the
merchants who could not be reimbursed under the relief acts
because of the commissioners' exclusion of uncollectable
debts from their investigation. All together, the revised tem-
porary support list included 588 names and represented an
annual outlay of £28,673.
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The other part of the dual system resulted from the section
of Pitt's compensation plan that dealt with professional in-
come. Under his formula, loyalists with a certifiable annual
loss of £400 or less were awarded a yearly stipend of one-half
their regular income. Any amount above £400 was adjusted
according to a sliding scale similar to that adopted for prop-
erty claims, and the allowances, of whatever size, were re-
garded as permanent and unalterable. They were not, how-
ever, awarded irrespective of other variables. If a pensioner
had an outside income equal to or greater than his allotted
sum, he received nothing. If he had some additional support,
he was granted an allowance sufficient to bring his total
income to the permissible level. In either case it was under-
stood that future changes in outside income would cause
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204 exiles on the list were awarded allotments totaling
year.
1
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These annuities provided some loyalists with the financial
security that all of them had been seeking for years. Accord-
ing to Thomas Hutchinson, Jr., many of the lawyers and
other professionals included on the rolls "were never so well
off before," and a Rhode Islander rejoiced that he had not
previously found employment, because "the certainty of a
decent support of which we cannot be deprived" was not to
be taken lightly under the circumstances.
1
2 The merchants,
relegated to the more precarious temporary support list,
looked upon the professionals with undisguised envy, and
through the medium of their organized committee they tried
to convince the ministry that only "arbitrary Grammatical
definitions" had prevented them from being classed with the
more fortunate lawyers and clergymen. In fact, they argued,
commerce had been "the most honourable calling" in
America prior to the war, and their income had been just as
''secure" as if it had been invested in land or obtained from a
law practice. The distinction between them and those who
had been awarded permanent annuities was "verbal but not
substantial"; they had been discriminated against only be-
cause the board of loyalist agents had "failed to represent, the
Merchants Situation."
1
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Predictably, the merchants' appeal fell on deaf ears. Pitt
and the commissioners, having worked so hard to limit the
number of persons who could claim a right to a government
allowance, had no intention of admitting the merchants to
that exclusive group. Furthermore, they had before them in
1789 a prime example of how one innocent, well-meaning
concession to the refugees could lead both to incredible
confusion and to enormous cost. This was the half-pay system
for provincial officers that had been set up immediately after230 The British-Americans
the war, even before the passage of the regular compensation
act.
Originally, commissioned officers in loyalist regiments had
been warned "neither to expect Rank in the Army, after
their Reduction, in consequence of such Commissions, or to
be entitled to half pay." But in January 1779 lagging recruit-
ment had led Germain to alter this policy. He had directed
that the officers of "such Provincial Regiments as shall be
compleated to the same number and proportion of Men and
officers as the present Establishment of the British Regiments
of Foot" would be allowed half pay and rank "in the same
manner as the officers of British reduced Regiments are
paid." By the end of the war, only three loyalist corps had
qualified for half pay under these standards, and interested
refugee officers (Benjamin Thompson foremost among
them) pressed the ministry to loosen the requirements. In
mid-June 1783 Lord North succumbed to their pleas, for-
mally extending the benefits of half pay to loyalists "who by
their Services and their Exertions have rendered themselves
deserving of those advantages and honorable marks of His
Majesty's Favor set forth in that Letter [Germain's] altho'
they may not have literally complied with the Engagements
which entitle them to it."
1
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Two weeks later North accordingly proposed to the House
of Commons that the officers of all twenty-one provincial
regiments on the British establishment be allowed half pay,
arguing as a justification that the spirit of Germain's policy
was more important than its specific wording. A number of
Members of Parliament, including the future first minister
William Pitt, questioned the wisdom of the idea, contending
instead that restitution of all sorts could best be left to the
planned claims commission. Pitt and others opposed the
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"profuse and wasteful system that had characterized the
whole of the American war," but, notwithstanding "a very
long and warm debate," the motion carried without a divi-
sion.
1
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Unlike the property compensation act approved the fol-
lowing month, the half-pay bill established no special
machinery to handle the loyalists' applications for benefits.
Instead, half-pay petitions submitted to the ministry were
simply routed to the offices of Sir George Yonge, the secretary
at war. Yonge allowed the memorials to accumulate for
months before taking any action, and it was not until August
1784 that he forwarded his first recommendations to the
Treasury. Yonge's report indicated that he had had little
difficulty in identifying the refugees eligible for half pay
under the conditions outlined by Germain and North. But,
he noted significantly, a number of other persons had also
applied for relief under the act. Since these loyalists had
"rendered very material Services during the War," he
thought them "deserving the consideration of Govern-
ment."
1
6 The Lords of the Treasury after some delay asked
two generals, William Fawcett and William Roy, for their
advice on the marginal petitions singled out by Yonge.
Fawcett and Roy immediately undertook the 'Very compli-
cated business" of reviewing the memorials, and their report
agreed with Yonge's in pointing out that many exiles who did
not qualify for half pay appeared to have "strong pretensions
to some provision from the Public." The generals, well
intentioned and seemingly unaware of the claims commis-
sioners' attempts to award compensation to refugees in an
orderly and controlled manner, recommended that worthy
loyalists be given "particular allowances, not however to be
under the denomination of Half-Pay, nor to give Rank."
1
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With this innocent and generous suggestion the work of232 The British-Americans
the commissioners was undone. Once it was admitted that
persons with no claim whatsoever to half pay could receive
military pensions, all efforts to limit the total outlay to refu-
gees were doomed to failure. The exiles quickly learned that
it was possible for men with only minimal military preten-
sions to qualify for allowances, and they soon came to regard
the half-pay system as nothing more than another kind of
compensation for their sufferings and losses in America. The
scheme originally proposed to reward a small number of
refugee officers for faithful service during the war was there-
fore transformed through ignorance and confusion into a
general pension system paralleling, and in many cases con-
tradicting, the one administered by the claims commissioners.
The loose interpretation of eligibility requirements for
military compensation was the source of the problem, but it
was further compounded by the lack of standard procedures
for reaching decisions on the refugees' applications. Ordi-
narily, petitions were passed upon separately by Yonge, the
Treasury, and Fawcett and Roy. Occasionally Howe, Clinton,
Cornwallis, and Carleton were consulted as well. By the time
memorials came before the Treasury for final decisions, they
usually had at least one favorable recommendation attached
to them. The Lords were always reluctant to disregard the
opinions of the experts on any subject, and so many loyalists
were allotted assistance on the strength of one general's vague
statement on their behalf. Moreover, unlike the claims com-
missioners, the military authorities did not keep good records
of their past proceedings. Exiles who had been denied allow-
ances could simply apply again, not mentioning their earlier
failure, and sometimes achieve success on the second try.
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As such cases imply, the generals paid little attention to
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would break it. For example, militia officers were usually
denied half pay because they had not served in regular regi-
ments, but a lieutenant colonel of the North Carolina militia
was awarded a pension after he argued that he had "run the
same Risks, and made the same Sacrifises" as officers in estab-
lished corps. Occasionally refugees who had been promised
commissions but had never actually served in the army were
given half pay, other times they were not; some loyalist
guerrilla leaders received allowances, others did not; and
although a few civilians were awarded both rank and half
pay, most were not. The only way to describe the system
accurately is to call it chaotic.
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The complete collapse of reasonable standards for award-
ing military compensation is apparent in the decisions in-
volving loyalists who could not claim even peripheral
connections with the war effort. A South Carolinian told
Clinton, "Good God sure none can have a better claim to
half pay, than a Man who lost a large property, took an Early,
Active, and decisive part in the War suffered every hardship
under Lord Dunmore in the Year 75 and part of 76 in
Virginia — taken prisoner there Chained Handcuffed, and
pinioned to two Negroes and in that Situation marched in the
dead of Winter from Hampton to Williamsburg without
shoe or Hatt being plundered of every thing and it snowing
all the Way." Although nothing in this recitation indicated
that he had rendered military services, much less that he
deserved half pay, he was awarded £60 a year. Even more
incredibly, Thomas Macknight, who had fled to England in
1776 and could only assert that he had "exerted his utmost
endeavours as a citizen, as a magistrate, and a member of the
Legislature" to support the British cause, was awarded £50
annually after he argued that, since most of his acquaintances234 The British-Americans
had military pensions, the fact that he did not receive one
"affixes a stigma on his character which he has not deserved/'
It is hardly surprising that by the end of 1785 the outlay for
military allowances was already double North's original esti-
mate.
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In February 1788 the Lords of the Treasury realized that
somehow they had to put a stop to the steady stream of half-
pay applications that continued to flood their offices. This
resolve was strengthened several months later when Fawcett
and Roy revealed that "as they happened not to serve in
America during the late War . . . they find it difficult if not
impossible to discriminate between those who are justly en-
titled or are real objects of Compassion, and those who are
not." Early the following year the generals made the further
damaging admission that they were "apprehensive" that they
had recommended pensions for unqualified persons, observ-
ing in passing that "they cannot help fearing that they are still
more liable to be mislead [sic] in future on account of the
Length of Time which has elapsed since the Close of the
War." The Lords thereupon decided that, as of January 3,
1789, they would accept no more half-pay applications. And
that rule they did not break.
2
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By the spring of 1789, therefore, final compensation for the
loyalists had been arranged. The first debentures were being
issued for property losses, permanent annuities had been
apportioned, an equitable system of charity was being con-
tinued, and military allowances assisted those who had been
fortunate enough to qualify for them. But, even before all of
these provisions had been made for their support, many of
the exiles had begun the slow process of making new lives for
themselves. In fact, some had started when the ink on the
peace treaty was scarcely dry.Finishing Their Days Among Strangers 235
The end of the war left the refugees (as Mrs. Henry Barnes
said) in "a very unsettled state, not knowing where, or how,
to dispose of themselves/' She assessed the alternatives accu-
rately: 'Tew of them wish, (even were they allowed that
libberty) to return to Boston, and (after injoying the sweets
of old England for Eight Years,) they shuder at the thoughts,
of repairing to the Wilds of Nova Scotia." It seemed to Mrs.
Jacob Duche, as it did to many other exiles, that the only
solution to their problem was to remain in England, "a good
Land, where we have not only every necessary and Comfort,
but likewise ... an agreeable and affectionate sett of
friends."
2
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The decision was easiest for the younger Americans, those
who had been brought to the British Isles as children by their
refugee parents. They had grown to maturity in the mother
country, and by the mid-1780's they w
rere marrying into
English families. Older exiles, many of whom had been
unwilling to commit themselves to a permanent residence in
Great Britain while the war continued, finally began to
consider reestablishing themselves in business. "Tired of
being Idle," they embarked upon new careers, and like Isaac
Low they found that "the Gloom which oppressed me begins
to dispel as the Prospect opens of earning a Subsistence."
2
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Doctors sought places in which to practice; refugee mer-
chants settled in Liverpool or Glasgow or perhaps Ireland;
the more well-to-do exiles purchased country homes with the
proceeds of their property compensation; the less wealthy
opened shops or taverns or tried to find regular employ-
ment.
2
4 The possible variations were endless: for example,
the Wells sisters of Charleston established "a residence for
those young gentlewomen of fortune who are without female236 The British-Americans
relations to introduce them into life," and two enterprising
young refugee artists, Thomas Duche and Mather Brown,
busily gathered commissions to paint portraits of their fellow
Americans to be sent to relatives in the United States.
2
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A few of the loyalists were fortunate enough to obtain
minor appointments from the British government, but only
George Chalmers, who became first clerk to the Committee
on Trade, acquired an influential post. Even a man with the
stature of Anthony Stokes could do no better than to be
named agent for the Bahama Islands. As a result, most of the
exiles would have agreed wholeheartedly with Benjamin
Thompson, who, after having "solicited in vain" for a job in
the British Isles, concluded that "England is not a place for a
Loyalist to make his way." Thompson, whom a Massachusetts
exile described as "one of the wonders really of the age,"
eventually became an aide-de-camp to the elector of Bavaria
and a count of the Holy Roman Empire.
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Not many loyalists went that far afield in their search for
employment, but they did find it easier to obtain positions
outside the confines of Great Britain. Most of these posts
were located, as might well be expected, in the remaining
British colonies. In the 1780's, several southern refugees were
rewarded with jobs in the customs or civil services of the
islands in the West Indies.
2
7 But in such established colonial
governments only a few jobs fell vacant each year, and for
that reason the most fertile ground for loyalist job hunters
was the Canadian provinces, where the large number of new
refugee settlers eventually created the need for an expansion
of the bureaucracy.
In the months following the signing of the peace treaty,
more than twenty-eight thousand loyalists left New York City
to settle in Canada, which Jonathan Sewall termed "the
american New Jerusalem." Many of the exiles who had beenFinishing Their Days Among Strangers 237
living in England also sailed for Canada, and the settlers, most
of whom were destitute on their arrival in their new homes,
were supplied with free land, provisions, and tools by the
Treasury.
2
8 Despite this assistance the future prospects of
ordinary loyalists in Canada were bleak, and the circum-
stances of unemployed professionals were still worse. In the
words of a young attorney, Nova Scotia was ''overstocked
with starved Lawyers" — and he could have added clerics,
doctors, and former civil officials as well. The only way a
professional man could ensure himself an adequate income in
Canada was to acquire a government post, which, as a New
Yorker observed, required "interest, Money, and friends."
Not only that: it also required available jobs and there were
few vacancies in the existing bureaucracies. Indeed, it was
reported, "For every Place . . . there were 40 Appliers."
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Few loyalists found immediate employment in Nova Scotia
or Quebec, despite the massive migration of refugees to those
provinces. William Smith was named chief justice of Quebec,
largely because Sir Guy Carleton, who was appointed gover-
nor general of Canada in 1785, insisted that he replace Peter
Livius, with whom Carleton had been feuding for years.
Sampson Salter Blowers received the much-sought-after post of
attorney general of Nova Scotia, but few other loyalists were
given positions in the hierarchy of that colony until after
John Wentworth took over as governor in 1792.
3
0 The chief
source of the Nova Scotia bottleneck was Governor John
Parr. He and the refugees disliked each other intensely: the
exiles thought him unsympathetic to their plight, and he
regarded them as "impossible to satisfy." A campaign the
loyalists organized to have Parr replaced with William Frank-
lin naturally antagonized the governor, and he frequently
complained to the colonial office that the refugees had given
him "many anxious disagreable and distressing hours."
3
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1785, when the then chief justice of Nova Scotia died, Parr
made it clear to the authorities in London that he wanted "a
good and proper Man," namely, "an Englishman," to fill the
position. Although such refugees as Stokes, Galloway,
Andrew Allen, Daniel Coxe, and James Hume were con-
sidered for the job, it eventually was awarded (to Parr's
satisfaction) to Jeremy Pemberton of the claims com-
mission.
3
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With Parr so antagonistic to their aspirations, the loyalists
could obtain only lesser posts within his jurisdiction. David
Mathews, the former mayor of New York City and a dis-
appointed applicant for Blowers' job, had to settle for an
appointment as attorney general of Cape Breton Island,
which was an administrative dependency of Nova Scotia. The
salary for the position was low, and Mathews soon discovered
to his dismay that he could not supplement it with outside
fees because the "distressed" residents of the island had
neither the need for legal services nor the money to pay for
them. In June 1790 he complained that he simply could not
support his large family on his limited income and declared
piteously that the only fresh meat they had eaten for three
months was "a little moose meat which at this season is ex-
treamly poor and bad."
3
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The only Nova Scotia job seekers who did not have to
contend with Governor Parr were the Anglican clerics who
hoped to be named bishop of the province. Although the
establishment of a bishopric in the area had been discussed
seriously as early as 1783, it was not until 1787 that final
arrangements for the post were made. In the interim just
about every exiled Anglican clergyman of stature continually
jockeyed for position, each man attempting simultaneously to
reinforce his own claims and to undercut those of his com-
petitors. Initially, Thomas Bradbury Chandler was the lead-Finishing Their Days Among Strangers 239
ing candidate for the miter, but because his health was poor
the other contenders saw nothing unethical in advancing
their own names as alternatives to his. Both Samuel Seabury
and Myles Cooper disclaimed any desire to compete with
Chandler but suggested that if his candidacy were withdrawn
theirs might be considered. Samuel Peters viciously attacked
still another hopeful, Charles Inglis, in a series of pamphlets,
and it was reported that Seabury had been persuaded to
concentrate on seeking appointment as bishop of Connecti-
cut so that he ''might not be in the way of others more arch
than himself" in the Nova Scotia race. Among the other
divines interested in the coveted position were Boucher,
Duche, Vardill, East Apthorp, Mather Byles, Jr., Thomas
Coombe, and William Walter.
3
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The process of attack and counterattack went on until the
spring of 1785, when Chandler, his health steadily worsening,
returned to New Jersey and relinquished his claims to the
post. Jonathan Boucher, the next in line, set conditions the
church would not meet, and, despite Peters' hopes of being
appointed, the choice eventually fell on Inglis.
3
5 It was not a
popular decision. Smith termed him a "Prigg Parson" who
would "ill support that Humility necessary to recommend
him either to Men in Civil Office or to the lower Clergy and
especially of other Persuasions," and Peters commented to an
American relative, "We appoint the worst men we have or
can find out in any Country to be Consuls, Bishops, Gover-
nors, Commissaries, Judges Collectors and Lawyers in our
Colonies and in your States."
3
6 Even when a loyalist won an
important position, it seemed, he was not the person the
refugees themselves would have selected for the job.
The Americans' continuing difficulties with Governor Parr
led them to seek a means of circumventing his authority.
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Nova Scotia, they concluded that partitioning the province
would achieve the ends they desired. Not only would they
thereby be freed from Parr's domination, they would also ac-
quire additional opportunities for employment, since any new
colony would presumably have to be administered by exiles.
Under heavy pressure from refugees in both Canada and Eng-
land, the ministry in June 1784 finally agreed to divide the
former territory of Nova Scotia into two sections, with the in-
land region designated as the separate province of New
Brunswick.
3
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With one stroke of the pen, therefore, a myriad of new jobs
was created. Although the man appointed governor of New
Brunswick, Thomas Carleton, was an Englishman (and the
younger brother of Sir Guy) , almost every other post in the
province was awarded to a refugee. But the jobs were not
handed out indiscriminately. One exile had predicted that a
"preference" would be given to "the principal Loyalists of
New York and other places who have borne the heat and
Burthen of the day, that is who have been in arms."
3
8 He
was correct, though not for the reason he supposed. Such men
received the appointments not because of their services but
rather as a result of their connections with the elder Carleton
and with Brook Watson, a London merchant and politician
who had served as commissary general in New York. Because
of the combined influence of Carleton, Watson, and Sir
William Pepperrell, with whom the ministry cleared poten-
tial appointees from Massachusetts, the New Brunswick hier-
archy was dominated by New Englanders, New Yorkers, and
men who had been in some way connected with the British
army in Manhattan.
For example, Jonathan Odell of New Jersey, Carleton's
former secretary, was named secretary to the province. Joshua
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"Sir Guy Carletons Friendship for me" and gave Pepperrell's
name as a reference, became an assistant judge. He was
joined on the bench by James Putnam of Massachusetts and
Colonel Isaac Allen of Pennsylvania, who had served under
Carleton. The post of chief justice went to George Duncan
Ludlow of New York, whose brother Gabriel was appointed
to the council. Ward Chipman of Massachusetts, who had the
support of Carleton in his quest for an appointment, found
that the post he wanted, attorney general of New Brunswick,
had been awarded to Sampson Blowers "thro' the interest of
Sir Wm. Pepperrell." When Blowers refused the job to
accept a comparable post in Nova Scotia, the New Brunswick
position was awarded to Jonathan Bliss, another favorite of
Pepperrell's, but Chipman's influence was sufficient to obtain
for him the appointment as solicitor general of the new
province. Although the post was not equal to his expecta-
tions, Chipman's connection with Carleton had served him
well.
3
9
Brook Watson, who was to become sheriff and then lord
mayor of the City of London, also came to the aid of Ameri-
cans who sought employment in Canada. His close relation-
ship with the exiles is evidenced not only by the frequent
mention of him in the diaries of William Smith and Samuel
Shoemaker, but also by the fact that he was the subject of one
of Copley's most famous paintings. After the war Watson's
recommendations won allowance increases for several refu-
gees, and he tried (unsuccessfully but not unenthusiasti-
cally) to obtain half pay for the American commissaries who
had worked with him in New York.
4
0 Two of his associates
were named to the New Brunswick council, and a third,
Christopher Sower, became king's printer for the province.
Watson saw to it that Sower's commission fees were remitted
and provided him with a printing press and other equip-242 The British-Americans
ment. Sower was so grateful that he named his only son after
his benefactor.
4
1
[3]
During the war the loyalists had talked constantly of going
home but few had actually ventured to return to rebel-held
territory. Since those who were bold enough to make the
attempt were most often arrested, mistreated, and deported,
4
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the refugees who considered settling in the United States
after the war had an unwelcome precedent before them.
Their sentiment on the subject was concisely expressed by a
New Yorker: "However much I wish to live among you
... I will not do it unless I can meet with the same cordiality
I have been accustomed to from my friends, and those I have
been used to live with." Other exiles agreed that they would
not return "in a Sculking manner, as if I had been guilty of
some crime," nor become "an humble Sollicitor . . . merely
to breathe my native air." As Polly Hutchinson wrote of her
husband Elisha's decision to remain in England, "Better to
be a beggar in a land where there is some appearance of
humanity than in affluence in a country where he cou'd have
no expectation but of continu[e]d persecution."
4
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As a consequence of their fears of being badly treated upon
arrival in the United States, most of the loyalists who thought
seriously of returning home in 1783 first consulted rebel
acquaintances about their probable reception. The replies
were consistently disheartening. "Be assured my dear Sir!"
John Gardiner told his father Silvester, "that no Refugee can
come here at present." One of Robert Auchmuty's corre-
spondents warned him not to come to Boston until "a differ-
ent temper prevails among the people at large, and in our
General Court in particular," and a Virginian cautioned an
exiled friend, "I'm afraid it will be long before the temper ofFinishing Their Days Among Strangers 243
the people here will be such as to acquiesce" in the provisions
of the peace treaty.
4
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The advice the refugees received was well founded, be-
cause although Americans expressed general satisfaction with
the treaty, the articles pertaining to loyalists and debts "ex-
cite[d] much ferment." Members of the Continental Con-
gress concluded that the recommendations in favor of the
loyalists must have been a "matter of form" only, for "if they
should be serious . . . we should be Involved in very Great
Difficulties Indeed." They assumed that "the Refugees, have
nothing to expect of Right": the exiles would have to depend
upon the "lenity and compassion" of the state legislatures.
And they made it clear that they thought "the Chance for the
Adherents to their gracious sovereign is but a blue one."
After all, the Congressmen asked, "Does Justice require that
we should shew them lenity?" The loyalists were "no small
cause of the burthens and Distresses that we shall feel for
many years to come. . . . Does Policy then dictate to us a
revision of our Laws, Retribution and a free admission of
them amongst us?"
4
5
The legislators had correctly assessed the mood of the
nation. Their constituents were "extremely opposed" to
allowing the "Tory Villains" to return "while filial Tears are
fresh upon our Cheeks and our murdered Brethren scarcely
cold in their Graves." At town meetings and special gather-
ings throughout the country the Americans declared them-
selves determined to prevent this awful eventuality,
believing, with a group of Baltimore residents, that "an
universal attachment to the present government of this state,
is essential to the harmony and tranquility of the good citi-
zens thereof; and .... that such an uniformity cannot pos-
sibly be obtained in this town, if those who have abandoned
the cause of America, are permitted to return to, and remain244 The British-Americans
among us as citizens."
4
6 These opinions were reflected at the
state level, where legislatures not only refused to repeal acts
of attainder and confiscation but also continued to enforce
them in defiance of the specific prohibitions in the treaty.
Even where state laws were repealed (as in Connecticut),
towns often acted independently to exclude loyalists from
their boundaries.
4
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The refugees who had impetuously embarked for America
upon learning the terms of the treaty bore the brunt of this
fury. Tales circulating in England in the fall of 1783 asserted
that returnees had been "whipt Imprisoned Fined — or
Hanged," and the stories were not overly exaggerated. A Vir-
ginian was greeted with "a New England Jacket (Tar and
feathers) and sent back, tho he had the Govr's permission in
his pocket"; a New Jerseyite was "apprehended by a party of
armed men who insulted and abused him very much and
obliged him to leave the province"; and it was reported
(perhaps not very reliably) that three loyalist soldiers were
"on their immediate arrival in No Carolina, murder'd with-
out the form of even a mock trial."
4
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More common than such vigilantism was quasi-legal action
against the refugees. Usually it took one of two forms: either
the returning loyalists were not permitted to enter the state
in the first place, or they were arrested as soon as they did.
Four South Carolinians who arrived in Charleston in the
spring "were not allowed to Land if they had Landed they
would have been confined and Banished again." A number of
New Englanders were refused readmittance to Massachusetts,
and southerners who had managed to disembark unnoticed
in the United States were warned to leave again immediately.
A Rhode Islander's experience was typical: relying on the
preliminary articles, he went home to try to recover his
property. But instead of succeeding he "was seized as soon asFinishing Their Days Among Strangers 245
he Landed and put into Prison, where he remained untill
they sent him off."
4
9
In the midst of the outpouring of hostility, there were
some moderates who argued that the treaty should be obeyed.
They did not adopt this conciliatory line out of sympathy for
the exiles, but rather because they believed that the "indis-
criminate punishment" of loyalists was not a wise policy for
the United States to pursue. Generally, the critics of "avowed
implacability" took two different tacks. Some thought that
"certain descriptions of the Refugees" should be allowed to
return, that "a line [should be] drawn between those who
are gone from us," so that persons who had not taken an
active role in the fighting could be permitted to resume their
lives in America.
5
0 Others emphasized the importance of
enforcing the treaty, "the faithful observance of which so
deeply interests the United States." The "national character"
was at stake, for the "intemperate" measures taken by the
states were "holding us up as a vindictive persecuting
People" to the countries of Europe, which were sympathetic
to the loyalists' plight. "Will foreign nations be willing to
undertake any thing with us or for us," asked Alexander
Hamilton, "when they find that the nature of our govern-
ments will allow no dependence to be placed on our engage-
ments?"
5
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Fortunately for the refugees who wished to return to their
homes, such sentiments represented the wave of the future. As
time passed, the intense passions of the immediate postwar
period subsided. In December 1784 a Connecticut resident
informed Samuel Peters, "The vindictive Spirit of the Coun-
try is almost totally altered in the space of one year past . . .
I can assure you that the fierce Spirit of Whiggism is Dead."
A few months later Benjamin Franklin asserted, "The Cir-
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mending, as the Minds of the People irritated by the Burning
of their Towns and Massacre of their Friends, begin to
cool."
5
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In accordance with the new mood, state legislatures began
to modify the harsh wartime statutes directed at loyalists.
Encouraged by the Continental Congress's formal recom-
mendation in favor of the refugees (as stipulated by the fifth
article), states like Massachusetts and New York relaxed their
universal prohibitions against the return of exiles. Although
Massachusetts asserted that it had the right to expel "all
aliens who . . . hold principles incompatible with the safety
and sovereignty of the state," and New York declared that
"persons holding principles inimical to the constitution
should not be admitted into office or places of public trust/'
both states in the spring of 1784 agreed that certain types of
loyalists could live within their jurisdiction. In general, they
continued to exclude only persons who had taken an active
part in attempting to suppress the rebellion or who had been
identified by name in the earlier confiscation acts. In Massa-
chusetts, less obnoxious refugees were allowed to return if
they obtained permission from the governor and council; in
New York, loyalists were disfranchised and barred from office
but were not otherwise penalized. Other states took com-
parable actions, and even in New Jersey and South Carolina,
where hostility towards loyalists persisted for a longer period
than elsewhere, antagonism had to a large extent dissipated
by the later years of the decade.
5
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Although refugees who returned in 1784 and thereafter
consequently met with less persecution than did their prede-
cessors, one class of loyalists still uniformly aroused the
Americans' ire. These were the men who came to the United
States not to become citizens of the republic but instead to
try to collect debts or to sell their remaining property. TheirFinishing Their Days Among Strangers 247
efforts invariably failed. One Virginia merchant claimed that
the courts "laughed" at his attempts to force his debtors to
discharge their obligations, and a frustrated New England
loyalist commented from Boston in 1785 that "there seems
almost a fixd determination amongst all Ranks of People
here to withhold from the Loyalists whatever they have taken
from them." Carolinians as well complained that they found
it "impossible" to obtain satisfaction under the fourth and
fifth articles of the treaty, and a returned resident of Camden
told his brother, "Although they at present treat me very
well, yet was I to go into the Country, and enter any action to
recover any Debts, there are many many, if they could do it
privately, would put an End to my Existance."
5
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The one group of refugees who retained their British
nationality and who were not molested were those who came
to the United States as British consuls after 1786. Phineas
Bond, John Hamilton, and George Miller were able to func-
tion relatively well under the protection of diplomatic im-
munity, even though a New Yorker observed of Bond, "But
for his appointment from Great Britain he would have
mounted the Ladder had he ever been found in that State
[Pennsylvania]."
5
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Loyalists who recanted and repented of their errors were
treated rather well once the initial hostility had faded. In
fact, it appears that a loyalist's willingness to admit he had
been mistaken in his allegiance was more important than the
passage of time in winning him eventual acceptance by his
former neighbors. Even before Massachusetts officially altered
its laws, John Amory was allowed to take up residence in
Boston after he had assured the General Court that "there is
no form of Government upon earth, that he so much desires
to live under" as a republic. In the spring of 1784, the repeal
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to follow Amory's lead, and what happened then must have
been typical of other areas as well. Isaac Smith was one of the
first returnees to arrive in Boston, and his discovery that "the
temper of the people is much soften'd" started a chain re-
action among his acquaintances in London. Smith assured
the Boston merchant John Atkinson that "you need not . . .
be under any apprehension of danger, in consequence of
returning here immediately," and he cited the experience of
Amory and others to prove his point.
5
6 Smith's good friend
Samuel Curwen, relying on assurances that he was seen "not
as an enemy but as a timid friend," sailed for America a few
months later. Joseph Taylor, an associate of all three men,
ventured forth to Boston in October and met with "a most
Cordial Reception" that led him to add his voice to those
urging Atkinson to return. Thus heartened, Atkinson em-
barked with his family for Massachusetts, arriving at the end
of November 1785 to find his friends "overjoy'd to see us."
5
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In other states the pattern was the same. Peter Van Schaack
went back to New York; Thomas Bradbury Chandler was
treated "with remarkable kindness and respect" when he
reappeared in New Jersey; and Samuel Shoemaker and Jacob
Duche returned to Philadelphia in 1789 and 1790, respec-
tively. On the other hand, although Galloway asked Pennsyl-
vania for permission to return, the legislature would not
allow him to enter the state. And many others (like members
of the Hutchinson family) never even submitted such re-
quests, knowing their efforts to be futile from the very
beginning. Moreover, most of the returnees would have
agreed with a Virginian who commented to a relative that he
was glad to be back in his native land, "but it is so much
chang'd that I hardly know it and I am sorry to say very little
for the better or more properly for the worse."
5
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Some of the exiles had indeed managed to go home again.Finishing Their Days Among Strangers 249
But most had not: the vast majority of the loyalists remained
outside of the independent United States, whether as a result
of choice or necessity. Wherever these men settled, they
continued to cherish the hope that England and America
would one day be reunited. They refused to accept the
verdict of the Revolution as final, nursing instead the belief
that the force of tradition and the exigencies of world politics
would eventually bring the two countries together in a last-
ing coalition.Epilogue
A British-American Empire
The time draws nigh when Britain and America
will be again united and the greatest Empire that
ever was on Earth will be formed, which will in
due time be removed to the West, where the
English Laws, Language Manners and Customs
will prevail and at no distant day prove the most
formidable in the World.
— JOHN CRUDEN, 1785
1
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INCE the earliest days of the Revolution, the loyalists
had believed that independence would prove ruinous to
the United States, and the events of the 1780's did little to
make them change their minds. They found in the interstate
quarrels, in Shays' Rebellion, in the problems of the Con-
federation government, all the evidence they needed to
confirm the truth of their predictions. They saw no reason to
alter their original opinion that America would have been
far better off within the empire. Their inability to recognize
the Americans' commitment to independence combined with
an exaggerated emphasis on the vicissitudes of the United
States to produce in them the firm belief not only that a
complete reconciliation was desirable but also that it would
eventually be achieved. The exiles' futile hopes for reunifica-
tion may therefore be taken as a final, forlorn symbol of their
failure to comprehend fully the concatenation of forces that
had ejected them from their homes.Epilogue: A British-American Empire 251
The loyalists had long been convinced that, as Curwen put
it, "the colonies will never find any good purpose answered
by independence." After all, their belief that America gained
more than it lost by inclusion in the British Empire was one
of the reasons why they had remained faithful to the crown.
They foresaw only "ruin and Destruction" for a free United
States, because they expected that the "clashing interests,
prejudices and principles" suppressed under royal rule would
''burst out with destructive violence" once independence was
achieved. The rebels would soon "cutt each others Throats,"
and "America would be a scene of bloody discord and desola-
tion for ages — the most miserable distracted country on
earth."
2 The refugees were particularly concerned about the
influence of the "lower, illiterate classes" in the new Ameri-
can governments. It seemed to a New England physician,
for example, that the "general principle of the lower Orders"
was "a desire of being free from all Restraints of Govern-
ment, and this principle still continues to operate under the
Independency." Although Jonathan Sewall expressed the
hope that such fears were "Chimerical and imaginary," he
asked pessimistically, "Will ye independent Americans
tamely submit to be dragooned into Submission and Compli-
ance, by their fellow Citizens and Countrymen?"
3
The exiles' gloomy expectations colored their every pro-
nouncement on the United States in the 1780's. Each time
they learned of a new disaster — whether it was clashes over
boundaries, internal disputes, or widespread inflation — they
renewed their predictions that the republican experiment
was doomed.
4 Yet their comments were characterized by a
curious ambivalence: although on the one hand they were
inclined to gloat over the Americans' difficulties, on the other252 The British-Americans
their lingering affection for the United States prevented
them from being altogether pleased by her problems. No-
where was this contradictory attitude more clearly displayed
than in the correspondence of George Erving. In March 1786
he told his brother that America was "the destin'd Country —
where Liberty and Science promise to bless and enlighten
mankind." But just four months later he criticized the "bad
Stamina ... in the Governing power" of the United States,
declaring that "the Laws wear a very sperious [sic] aspect of
liberty and security." Throughout the rest of the decade he
continued his inconsistent observations on America, rejoicing
when matters went well for his former compatriots while
simultaneously retaining his skepticism about the wisdom of
independence. In 1790 he explained, "I feel truly interested
in every thing that regards the prosperity and welfare of my
Country; nor is my attachment to it the least weaken'd by my
seperation [sic], or the unmerited doom I am sentenced to by
my Countrymen."
5
In the refugees' writings on the United States there was no
small element of an attitude that was best expressed by
Thomas Coffin. "They chose to be independent, let them
suffer the Inconvenience of it." Or, to put it another way, the
Americans deserved whatever troubles they were experiencing.
Partly for this reason, influential exiles like George Chalmers
and William Smith vigorously opposed allowing the Ameri-
cans to trade with the British West Indies. Like Elias Ball,
they were determined that the United States should not
"throw off Britan [sic] and still Retain the Privaledge of
subjects." Furthermore, the refugees wanted their fellow
loyalists in Canada to acquire a monopoly of the lucrative
West Indian commerce previously enjoyed by New England.
The exiles' opinions were accurately summed up in Ball's
simile: "I compare America to a boy of Eight or ten years ofEpilogue: A British-American Empire 253
age who has quarrild and thrown of[f] his parents. If you
was to see such a boy abus'd and buffeted by other people you
would say that Chap deserves it I think its applycable to the
Case in view."
6
By August 1785 Smith and a number of other refugees had
concluded, ''Every thing hastens to another Revolution in
America." A New Brunswick resident declared, "The foed-
eral union of the United States[,] totally destitute of energy,
is verging to dissolution," because in America "commerce
languishes, credit is annihilated, morals destroyed, and all
faith between man and man seems wholly to have disap-
peared." Shays' Rebellion then confirmed the loyalists in their
opinion. One exile sarcastically told a friend in New York, "I
find you begin to enjoy a little the Blessings of Indepen-
dance — Strange that the ungrateful Multitude should turn
upon the illustrious Patriots, who led them to seek such
Happiness!"
7 Not even the adoption of the Constitution,
which the loyalists at least thought superior to the Articles of
Confederation, sufficed to make them alter their assessment of
America's future. The new government might "do well
enough for a time," admitted a New Englander, but, he
added, "I do not think much of its Continuance." Ball de-
scribed the new scheme as "the bubble of the Day that will
soon vanish into nothing," and although Jonathan Boucher
conceded that the Americans displayed a "partiality" for the
Constitution, he noted that they "set out on principles in-
compatible with stability; and of course it is natural to
suppose that their people, following the example of their
founders, will always be prone to revolt and rebellion."
8
As a consequence of their persistent pessimism about
America's chances for survival as an independent republic,
the refugees continued to nurture the hope that a reunifica-
tion of Britain and America could be effected. When254 The British-Americans
Boucher published a book of sermons in 1797, he noted that
his "sincere aim" was to bring about "a perfect reconcilia-
tion" between the two countries. As a proof of his intentions,
he dedicated the book to George Washington and went on to
assert that the interests of Britain and America were "demon-
strably the same." For the hundredth time he contended that
"it was never the serious wish either of the one or the other
to separate." Indeed, "the settled persuasion of their judg-
ments, and the most cordial wish of their hearts, [was] to
unite again." The Americans and Britons would combine to
create "one great and happy people" divided between "two
distant, distinct, and completely independent states" that
would be linked by political and economic ties, as well as by
those of culture.
9
Boucher was not the only loyalist who dreamed of a re-
newed connection between America and Great Britain. The
southerner John Cruden predicted in 1784 that "both Coun-
tries will yet embrace each other . . . The tender Ties of
Blood, the same Religion, Laws, and Manners . . . will
come in to aid the Union, cement the Friendship, and make
us one People again." Smith continued to believe that the
United States could be "reclaimed" if Britain took the
proper steps, and in 1785 he wrote seriously of the possibility
that Congress might be planning to negotiate a reunification.
Samuel Peters, convinced that New England could be sepa-
rated from the rest of the states, suggested to the lieutenant
governor of Connecticut that the northerners abandon their
southern allies, who were merely "a Composition of Rene-
gadoes, Africans, Convicts and the Refuse of all Nations," in
order to rejoin the empire. And, in a supreme show of
confidence in 1787, a Bostonian volunteered to serve as an
"impartial and unequivocal" channel of communications be-Epilogue: A British-American Empire 255
tween the ministry and the Americans in the event of an
attempt to reach agreement on "any sort of Union."
1
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Just as during the war the refugees had found evidence for
their beliefs in reports from America, so too now what they
heard from the United States encouraged them to think that
the empire could yet be salvaged. When John Rapelje of
New York arrived in England in June 1784, he told Smith
that the Americans "hate those who have led them to the
Separation from Great Britain and long for a Restoration."
Rapelje insisted that the most disaffected were former Whigs,
who were "free and impetuous ag[ains]t their Leaders be-
yond Description." Upon his return to New Jersey, Thomas
Bradbury Chandler talked with "some persons who made
themselves conspicuous in the late rebellion," and he re-
ported that "all of them feel, that the exchange of British
protection for independency has been ruinous to the Coun-
try." In Chandler's opinion, "a very large majority are dis-
posed to adopt the language of the repenting Prodigal in
the Parable, towards the Parent Country."
1
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The pattern of self-deception that had been characteristic
of loyalist thinking since 1774 thus persisted into the first
decades following independence. The exiles had long before
convinced themselves that the Revolution lacked majority
support, and the fact that it had succeeded did not necessarily
indicate to them that they had been mistaken. On the
contrary, it seemed as though the Americans' victory had been
"one of those extraordinary and unexpected events . . .
which bid defiance to all human foresight and calculation."
The refugees still thought it possible that the results of the
Revolution could be reversed, and they persisted in their
efforts to produce reconciliation plans that would resolve the
differences that divided Britain and the United States. But if
the proposals they had drawn up during the war were hope-256 The British-Americans
lessly outdated at their very inception, then the postwar plans
were still more ineffectual and uncomprehending.
1
2 Moti-
vated by a deep concern and affection for both nations, the
refugees simply could not understand that their former com-
patriots did not share their sentiments.
In 1815 John Eardley-Wilmot excused the loyalists for
their erroneous interpretation of the Revolution by observ-
ing that they were "too much interested, and too much
inflamed, perhaps, by their sufferings or resentments, to form
a cool and impartial judgment."
1
3 True enough: but
Eardley-Wilmot's comment failed to explain sufficiently
either the sources of the refugees' bias or the reasons for its
peculiar configuration. Hatred of the rebels, though obvi-
ously endemic among the exiles, does not provide an ade-
quate explanation of the rigid and unrealistic manner in
which they perceived the events of the revolutionary era.
The loyalists counted among their number many of the
political and social leaders of prewar America, men who had
not gained their positions through stupidity or lack of intel-
lectual attributes. Some of them had even been the chief
participants in the colonies' most notable success stories. Yet
all were dumbfounded and confused by what happened to
their homeland in the 1770's, and the explanation for their
confusion appears to lie in the nature of the Revolution itself
rather than in their own perceptual shortcomings.
As is well known, the rebels used the language of conserva-
tism, arguing that the British government was the innovator,
that all they wanted (at least initially) was the reversal of
certain oppressive acts that had altered the normal imperial
relationship. But, although the revolutionaries' ends were
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rhetoric, the Americans were engaged in a most radical
endeavor. They were remaking and reshaping their politics,
their society, their culture. The full implication of their
ideology was not immediately apparent; indeed, much of
their innovation was achieved unconsciously. But innovation
it undeniably was. And the testimony of the loyalists is the
key to understanding the radical character of that innovation.
As long as the debate with Great Britain remained within
traditional lines, future loyalists were in the forefront of
the American cause. Daniel Dulany, Robert Alexander,
Jacob Duche: all made significant contributions to the
colonists' struggle for greater autonomy within the empire.
Joseph Galloway, William Smith, and others equally learned
tried to work out compromises that would give the Ameri-
cans a greater voice in their own governance. Some men who
chose in the end to adhere to the crown even took up arms
with their compatriots in the hectic days following Lexington
and Concord. But, when the dispute jumped outside of the
accepted boundaries, when the issue became that of indepen-
dence, the loyalists refused to go any further.
For independence was indeed a radical solution to the
problems that had arisen inside the imperial structure. In
effect, the revolutionaries were telling their fellow Americans
that the only way they could attain the rights of Englishmen
was to abandon their connection with England. To the loyal-
ists, this seemed both contradictory and incomprehensible.
Change within the empire? Yes, answered Robert Alexander,
who freely admitted to the claims commission that he be-
lieved that "the inhabitants of America were not liable to
Taxation by the British Parliament." But independence?
Never! His goal had been to promote "every Constitutional
Connection between the two Countries."
1
4
The loyalists' inability to understand the dynamics of the258 The British-Americans
Revolution acquires new significance when seen in this con-
text. The issue of independence was what first irreversibly
divided them from their rebellious fellow countrymen, but it
was not the sole question raised by the revolt. In order to
defend their right to seek a separation from Great Britain,
the Americans adopted new notions about the nature of
politics and society, and these ideas the refugees found espe-
cially perplexing. What gave legitimacy to government,
argued the revolutionaries, was the consent of the governed,
not the force of tradition or the canonical pronouncements of
interpreters of the British constitution. Theoretically at least,
all men were created equal: and if that statement had little
immediate impact upon actual practice, it was eventually to
more than compensate for its modest beginnings. Both themes,
it is true, had deep roots in the shared Anglo-American
heritage, but never before had they been expressed with such
vigor and persuasive power. Never before had they so com-
pletely seized the imagination of a large proportion of the
American population. And never before had they deliber-
ately, consciously been acted upon by political leaders.
This was not conservatism. If it had been, the loyalists
could have comprehended it, analyzed it, and in the end per-
haps dissented from it. Rather, the revolutionary ideology
was truly revolutionary — though the rebels did not view it as
such — and that was why the loyalists had a difficult time in
coming to terms with its realities. Thoroughly conversant
with imperial ways of thinking, they could not make the break
with the past that the Revolution required: not in order to
join the rebels, not even in order to understand their motives
and actions. What was happening in America after 1774 was
, so new, so alien to them that they were bewildered, confused,
even unhinged by the experience. The only way they could
retain some semblance of certainty in their lives was to deny,Epilogue: A British-American Empire 259
in effect, the very existence of a true revolution. Thus the in-
sistence that the conflict had been fomented by a small dis-
gruntled minority. Thus the clinging to hopes for victory or
reconciliation. Thus their refusal to accept the finality of their
exile. And thus Thomas Hutchinson's pathetic 1778 charac-
terization of the last few years of his life as "a dream or other
delusion."
1
5
With his talent for graphic analogy, Peter Oliver once
described the Revolution as a volcano. If his metaphor can be
extended, then the lava flow from the crater was the revolu-
tionary movement itself, consuming everything in its inexo-
rable path. And the loyalists were the debris scattered across
the countryside by successive eruptions. Men of all descrip-
tions — rich and poor, celebrated and unknown — they were
what was left when the lava moved on; they were the rocks
thrown hither and yon by the force of the explosions. And,
almost as uncomprehending as their inanimate counterparts,
they held fast to the America, to the empire, they had known
and loved. In London, in Bristol, in Halifax, their thoughts
were the same. They lamented the loss of a Utopian empire
that had never existed and longed for its rejuvenation. They
did what they could to re-create their former lives, but it
proved impossible to reverse the flow of time. Their chief
virtue was a steadfast loyalty to a governmental system they
revered, their chief shortcoming an inability to recognize a
need for change. In the end, it might accurately have been
said of each of them, as it was of one: "He loved God,
honoured his King, esteemed his friends, and hated re-
bellion."
1
6Essay on Sources
This bibliographical essay does not pretend to be a compre-
hensive survey of the materials available for the study of loyalism.
Rather, its purpose is to provide the interested reader with a brief
guide to the existing literature of the field, the major printed
primary works, and the most important collections of documents
pertinent to the refugees. More detailed references may be found
in the notes (pages 275-317).
Secondary Sources
The logical starting point for a study of the literature of
loyalism is Wallace Brown, "The View at Two Hundred Years:
The Loyalists of the American Revolution," American Antiquar-
ian Society Proceedings, LXXX (April 1970), 25-47. ^
n
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article Brown discusses trends in loyalist scholarship since the
nineteenth century, making it unnecessary for me to supply ad-
ditional comments upon some of the major works in the field.
Suffice it to say that, despite their age, such studies as Claude H.
Van Tyne, Loyalists in the American Revolution (New York,
1902); Moses C. Tyler, "The Party of the Loyalists in the Ameri-
can Revolution," American Historical Review, I (1895), 24-45;
Egerton Ryerson, The Loyalists of America and Their Times (2
vols., Toronto, 1880); and Lorenzo Sabine, Biographical Sketches
of Loyalists of the American Revolution (2 vols., Boston, 1864),
still deserve the careful attention of researchers.
Brown's own work has done much to correct the erroneous
impression (received from these earlier scholars) that the loyal-
ists were almost to a man wealthy colonial aristocrats. Brown's
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idence, 1965) proves beyond a doubt that most of the loyalists
were ordinary Americans, but, as Eugene Fingerhut has shown in
"Uses and Abuses of the American Loyalists' Claims: A Critique
of Quantitative Analyses,"William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser.,
XXV (1968), 245-58, Brown's statistical conclusions are based
upon a number of incorrect assumptions and must therefore be
regarded as questionable. Brown's more recent book, The Good
Americans (New York, 1969), a much broader survey, is the most
comprehensive single-volume treatment of the loyalists available
at this time.
In contrast to Brown, whose major concern has been the social
and economic background of the loyalists, William H. Nelson
has concentrated upon the development of their ideology. The
publication of his The American Tory (New York, 1961) marked
the beginning of the current wave of loyalist studies. Nelson's
work is useful for many reasons, not the least of which is his
suggestive analysis of possible motivations for loyalism, but it is
flawed by his overemphasis upon Thomas Hutchinson and
Joseph Galloway and by his failure to consult any but the most
obvious published sources. Another recent book dealing with
ideology is William A. Benton, Whig-Loyalism (Rutherford,
N.J., 1969), which discusses the middle ground between "Whigs"
and "Tories." Although it contains information not found else-
where, Benton's study is narrowly focused on nine individuals
and so is not as useful as it might perhaps have been.
Of works dealing more specifically with the refugees and the
war, North Callahan's Flight from the Republic (Indianapolis,
1967) is little more than an undigested narration of facts and
incidents. Far more useful are Paul H. Smith's excellent Loyal-
ists and Redcoats (Chapel Hill, 1964), which examines loyalist
participation in the British war effort, and his "The American
Loyalists: Notes on Their Organization and Numerical Strength/'
William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., XXV (1968), 259-77. ^
n
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book that treats the exile experience at some length is Lewis
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War of Independence (Boston, 1933), but he concentrates solely
on the lives of a few leading refugees, especially those involved in
the British espionage service.
Much of loyalist scholarship has been concerned with the
loyalists from particular areas, and some of this plethora of state
studies contain information pertinent to the exiles. Among the
most useful publications are Richard D. Brown, "The Confisca-
tion and Disposition of Loyalists' Estates in Suffolk County, Mas-
sachusetts," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., XXI (1964),
534-50; Robert S. Lambert, "The Confiscation of Loyalist Prop-
erty in Georgia, 1782-1786," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd
ser., XX (1963), 80-94; James H. Stark, The Loyalists of Massa-
chusetts (Boston, 1907); E. Alfred Jones, The Loyalists of New
Jersey (Collections of the New Jersey Historical Society, X [1927]);
and two articles by Oscar Zeichner: "The Rehabilitation of the
Loyalists in Connecticut," New England Quarterly, XI (1938),
308-30; and "The Loyalist Problem in New York after the Rev-
olution," New York History, XXI (1940), 284-302. The most
prolific practitioner of this sort of local analysis was Wilbur H.
Siebert, who wrote innumerable articles about various aspects
of loyalism. His relevant works include "The Dispersion of the
American Tories," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, I
(1914), 185-97; "The Refugee Loyalists of Connecticut/' Trans-
actions of the Royal Society of Canada, 3rd ser., X (1916), 75-92;
The Loyalists of Pennsylvania (Columbus, O., 1920); and Loyal-
ist Refugees of New Hampshire (Columbus, O., 1916).
Information about the more famous refugees may, of course,
be found in biographies. Unfortunately, however, many of the
book-length studies of individual loyalists date from the nine-
teenth century and are of the "life and times" variety. These
works contain long quotations from the correspondence or jour-
nals of their subjects but cast little analytical light upon their
lives. Into this category fall such works as Henry C. Van Schaack,
The Life of Peter Van Schaack (New York, 1842), and E. Edwards
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Samuel Seabury, D.D. (Boston, 1881). Biographies of more recent
vintage are accordingly of greater value to modern scholars;
numbered among the best of these are Grace Cockcroft, The
Public Life of George Chalmers (New York, 1939); Oliver
Kuntzleman, Joseph Galloway, Loyalist ([Philadelphia], 1941) ;
and L. S. F. Upton, The Loyal Whig: Chief Justice William
Smith of New York and Quebec (Toronto, 1969). Also useful in
this regard are biographical articles, the more important of which
include Catherine Fennelly, "William Franklin of New Jersey,"
William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., VI (1949), 361-82;
Catherine S. Crary, "The American Dream: John Tabor Kempe's
Rise from Poverty to Riches," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd
ser., XIV (1957), 176-95; the essays on Anthony Stokes and
Sir James Wright in Horace Montgomery, ed., Georgians in Pro-
file (Athens, 1958) ; Michael D. Clark, "Jonathan Boucher: The
Mirror of Reaction," Huntington Library Quarterly, XXXIII
(Nov. 1969), 19-32; and the articles in Lawrence H. Leder, ed.,
The Colonial Legacy, vol. I: Loyalist Historians (New York,
*97O-
Printed Primary Sources
Published primary materials relevant to the refugees are both
copious and significant. Many of their own writings have been
printed in the years since the Revolution, and in addition the
papers of many of the British officials who dealt with them have
been at least partially published. Clarence E. Carter, ed., The
Correspondence of General Thomas Gage, 1763-1775 (2 vols.,
New Haven, 1931-1933), supplies important information con-
cerning affairs in Massachusetts in 1774-1775. John Eardley-Wil-
mot, Historical View of the Commission for Enquiring into the
Losses, Services, and Claims, of the American Loyalists (London,
1^
15)»
 and Daniel P. Coke, The Royal Commission on the Losses
and Services of American Loyalists, ed. Hugh E. Egerton (Oxford,
19
15) > which prints Coke's notes on cases heard in London in
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the claims commission. The British Historical Manuscripts Com-
mission's publications are also useful, though incomplete: The
Manuscripts of the Earl of Dartmouth (2 vols., London, 1881,
1895), Report on Manuscripts of Mrs. Stopford-Sackville [Lord
George Germain] (2 vols., London, 1904), and Report on Manu-
scripts in Various Collections, VI [William Knox] (Dublin,
1909), make readily available some of the papers of the most
important British politicians who came into regular contact with
the refugees. Further, there is the incomparable and invaluable
Benjamin F. Stevens, ed., Facsimiles of Manuscripts in European
Archives Relating to America, 1773-1783 (25 vols., London,
1889-1895), which reproduces a number of Galloway's letters
and includes many other documents pertinent to the study of the
loyalists and the war as a whole.
The exiles were not reluctant to express their views about the
Revolution in print, so the historian has ample sources to draw
upon for a study of their thought. Galloway alone wrote more
than ten pamphlets during the war, the most important of which
are A Candid Examination of the Mutual Claims of Great-
Britain and the Colonies . . . (New York, 1775; repr. London,
1780), Historical and Political Reflections on the Rise and Prog-
ress of the American Rebellion (London, 1780), and Political
Reflections on the late Colonial Governments (London, 1783).
Other significant contemporary publications include Jonathan
Boucher, A View of the Causes and Consequences of the Ameri-
can Revolution (London, 1797) ; George Chalmers, Political
Annals of the Present United Colonies (London, 1780; repr. New
York, 1968) ; Myles Cooper, National Humiliation and Repent-
ance recommended, and the Causes of the present Rebellion in
America assigned (Oxford, 1777); [Thomas Hutchinson], Stric-
tures upon the Declaration of the Congress at Philadelphia
(London, 1776) ; and Alexander Hewatt, An Historical Account
of the Rise and Progress of the Colonies of South Carolina and
Georgia (2 vols., London, 1779; repr. Spartanburg, 1962). In ad-
dition, some loyalist writings were published only after the deaths
of their authors; among these are Chalmers' An Introduction toEssay on Sources 265
the History of the Revolt of the American Colonies (2 vols.,
Boston, 1845; repr. New York, 1971) ; Thomas Jones, History of
New York during the Revolutionary War, ed. Edward F. De-
Lancey (2 vols., New York, 1879) ; and Peter Oliver, Origin &
Progress of the American Rebellion, ed. Douglass Adair and
John A. Schutz (San Marino, Calif., 1961).
Of equal interest and importance are the published journals
and memoirs of the loyalist exiles. These works contain much in-
formation concerning the refugees' daily lives — information that
can be found nowhere else. The most significant collection of
this nature is Peter O. Hutchinson, ed., The Diary and Letters
of Thomas Hutchinson (2 vols., Boston, 1884). Although the
first volume is a nearly complete edition of Hutchinson's diary
for 1774-1775, the second abridges the entries for succeeding years,
and Hutchinson's correspondence is scattered through both vol-
umes with little attention to chronology. George A. Ward, ed.,
Journal and Letters of the late Samuel Curwen, 3rd ed. (New
York, 1845) > *
s better organized but still an abridgment of the
original; it will soon be replaced by a new edition prepared by
Andrew Oliver. Curwen's comments are always interesting and
quotable, but he was by no means representative of his fellows.
The ready availability of his diary has therefore caused an un-
fortunate distortion in the work of men like William Nelson who
have relied heavily upon it.
Another diary of some importance is that of Edward Oxnard,
extracts from which were published in the New England Histori-
cal and Genealogical Register, XXVI (1872), 8-10, 115-21, 254-
59. The printed version is so inaccurate, though, that it is neces-
sary to consult the original in the Maine Historical Society in
Portland in order not only to verify the exact wording of entries
but also to determine the correct dates. L. S. F. Upton's edition
of The Diary and Selected Papers of Chief Justice William Smith
1784-1793 (2 vols., Toronto, 1963) avoids the above-mentioned
problems and provides a vivid picture of life in London during
1784-1785. More sketchy and fragmentary but still useful are
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1777, ed. Martha C. Codman (Boston, 1923) ; Louisa Wells Aik-
man, The Journal of a Voyage from Charleston, S.C. to London
(New York, 1906) ; The Diary and Letters of Benjamin Pickman
(17 40-1819) of Salem, Massachusetts (Newport, 1928) ; Samuel
Quincy, "Diary Oct. 9, 1776 —March 30, 1777/' Proceedings of
the Massachusetts Historical Society, XIX (1881-1882), 211-23;
and "Journal of Rev. Joshua Wingate Weeks, Loyalist Rector of
St. Michael's Church, Marblehead, 1778-1779," Essex Institute
Historical Collections, LII (1916), 1-16, 161-76, 197-208, 345-56.
Less reliable than the foregoing, because they were written
years after the Revolution, are Jonathan Boucher, Reminiscences
of an American Loyalist, 1738-1789, ed. Jonathan Bouchier (Bos-
ton, 1925) ; The Journal of Alexander Chesney, a South Carolina
Loyalist, ed. E. Alfred Jones (Columbus, O., 1921); and Eliza-
beth Johnston, Recollections of a Georgia Loyalist (New York,
1901). Also of interest are a few valuable collections of loyalist
letters: W. O. Raymond, ed., Winslow Papers 1776-1826 (St.
John, N.B., 1901); Anne Hulton, Letters of a Loyalist Lady
(Cambridge, 1927); and Nina M. Tiffany, ed., Letters of James
Murray, Loyalist (Boston, 1901). The pamphlets published by
individual loyalists as part of their campaigns to win compensa-
tion from the British government were clearly self-serving, but
they too contain useful material. Typical of the genre are An
Account of the Sufferings and Persecution of John Champneys
(London, 1778); The Case of James Christie, jun. Late of the
Province of Maryland, Merchant (n.p., n.d.); John McAlpine,
Genuine Narratives, and Concise Memoirs . . . (n.p., 1788);
Narrative of the Exertions and Sufferings of Lieut. James Moody,
ed. Charles Bushnell (New York, 1865) ; and A Narrative of the
Official Conduct of Anthony Stokes . . . [London, 1784].
Manuscripts
The manuscript sources on the loyalist refugees are of two
major types: government records and personal papers. British
archival collections provide information about individual loyal-Essay on Sources 267
ists and about their collective attempts to influence the admin-
istration, and the exiles' letters and diaries give insight into the
day-to-day existence of particular families. Both kinds of ma-
terials should be used in conjunction if a coherent picture of the
loyalist experience is to be obtained.
The single most important repository of manuscripts for the
study of the loyalists is the Public Record Office in London, and
the most useful of its many series are Audit Office 12 and 13, in
which are deposited the documents utilized by the claims com-
mission. Audit Office 12 is composed for the most part of the
official record books of the commission, which contain copies
of the loyalists' memorials and notes on their hearings before the
board. The series also includes documentary material collected
by John Anstey on his trip to the United States in 1786-1788 and
the records of the refugees' pension hearings. Audit Office 13
duplicates this series to a certain extent, in that it contains many
of the original documents copied in the volumes of 12, but it
also includes much additional material not found elsewhere. In
13 are deposited the loyalists' claims memorials, certificates, and
deeds; correspondence relating to their claims; and many of the
pension petitions they submitted to the government during the
war years.
Several other series in the Public Record Office contain signifi-
cant manuscripts pertinent to the loyalists. Many volumes of
Colonial Office 5 include correspondence with and about the
refugees; of particular importance are the collections of mis-
cellaneous petitions to Lord George Germain, vols. 115-117 and
156-158. Similar memorials from the period after 1783 are con-
tained in the first volumes of the Foreign Office 4 series. Other
Colonial Office papers relevant to the loyalists may be found in
the series devoted to the Canadian provinces: 42 (Quebec), 188
(New Brunswick), and 217 (Nova Scotia). Also of special inter-
est are the record books of interoffice correspondence, in the
Home Office 36 and Colonial Office 5 groups; the two volumes of
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FO 97/157 and FO 95/511; and the multivolumed private papers
of William Pitt.
The various Treasury series provide another major source of
information about the loyalists. T 1, miscellaneous in-letters to
the Treasury, contains many communications from and relevant
to the refugees, particularly half-pay petitions from the period
1783-1789. The minute books of the Lords of the Treasury
(T 29) record the decisions of the Lords on pensions and other
types of compensation for the exiles, and deposited in Treasury
50 are the loyalist pension rolls from 1782 to 1839. The series
Treasury 79 includes both the reports of the claims commissioners
and documentation pertaining to loyalists' claims under the Jay
Treaty and the disposition of their property in the first half of
the nineteenth century.
The other significant repository in London for the study of the
loyalists is the British Museum. The most important collection
here is the Hutchinson family papers, Egerton Manuscripts 2659-
2674. In these volumes are the diaries of Thomas Hutchinson, his
son Elisha, Chief Justice Peter Oliver, and his son Dr. Peter
Oliver. The collection also contains the family correspondence
and several letterbooks. Likewise deposited in the British Mu-
seum are the papers of Lord Hardwicke, who corresponded
extensively with both Thomas Hutchinson and Joseph Galloway,
and the papers of Charles Jenkinson (Lord Liverpool), who was
secretary at war in the North administration. Both collections in-
clude letters from refugees, as do the papers of General Frederick
Haldimand. Also of interest in the British Museum are the more
than two hundred volumes of transcripts of documents relating
to the Revolution prepared under the direction of Benjamin F.
Stevens.
Other libraries in England have material of similar importance.
The very valuable letters of Jonathan Boucher may be consulted
at the East Sussex Record Office in Lewes, where they have
been deposited by their owner, Mr. Jonathan Locker-Lampson.
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Rev. Jonathan Boucher, 1759-1777/' Maryland Historical Mag-
azine, VII [1912], 1-26 et seq.) In the William Salt Library,
Stafford, are the personal papers of Lord Dartmouth, which con-
tain many communications from loyalists. The small collection
of the papers of Henry Rugeley of South Carolina in the Bed-
fordshire County Record Office is of some interest, and the letter-
book of the Reverend Henry Caner of Massachusetts in the Uni-
versity of Bristol Library provides a vivid account of the siege and
evacuation of Boston. Two useful larger collections are the Parker
family papers, in the Liverpool Record Office, and the papers of
Charles Steuart, in the National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh.
There are also many important repositories of relevant manu-
scripts in the United States. In particular, the William L. Clements
Library, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, possesses the personal papers
of a number of the British officials who came into contact with
the loyalists. Of greatest significance are the papers of Lord
George Germain and Lord Shelburne. Included in both collec-
tions are many letters and petitions from Americans and docu-
ments revealing the British government's policy towards the
refugees. Also of great value are the papers of William Knox, Sir
Henry Clinton, and General Thomas Gage. The Clements Li-
brary, moreover, owns four small but useful collections of loyal-
ists' private papers: the Dering, Perkins, John Calef, and Atkin-
son MSS.
The Massachusetts Historical Society in Boston houses the
largest quantity of refugees' personal papers to be found under
one roof. Its holdings are too extensive to describe in detail, but
the most important collections are the following: Coffin MSS
(Thomas and Francis Coffin), Gardiner-Whipple-Allen MSS
(Silvester Gardiner), David Greenough MSS (George Erving),
Jeffries MSS (John Jeffries), Samuel Quincy MSS, J. M. Robbins
MSS (Henry Barnes), S. P. Savage MSS II (Arthur Savage),
Robie-Sewall MSS (Jonathan Sewall), Smith-Carter MSS (Isaac
Smith), and Winslow MSS (Sir William Pepperrell). In addition,
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of Hutchinson family papers, and it owns a microfilm of the
Hutchinson papers in the British Museum. The MHS also pos-
sesses a film of the letterbook of William Browne (part of which
has been published in Essex Institute Historical Collections,
XCVI [i960], 1-46).
Of only slightly lesser significance are the collections of the
New-York Historical Society. The Robert Watts and Leake
papers both contain many letters from the loyalist members of
those families, and they should be used in conjunction with the
papers of Samuel Peters (now on microfilm only), John Peters,
James DeLancey, and the Colden family. In addition to the His-
torical Society, there are four other libraries in New York City
that possess manuscripts relevant to the study of the refugees. In
the New York Public Library are several small collections of
loyalists' letters (the Chandler, Balch, and Bayard-Campbell-
Pearsall papers), and twenty volumes of documents collected by
George Chalmers. Also in the Public Library are the Bancroft
Transcripts of parts of the Audit Office 12 series from the Public
Record Office. The Library of the Museum of the City of New
York houses two limited but informative collections of manu-
scripts, the Harry Munro and Thomas Jones papers, in addition
to an interesting miscellaneous group of letters. In the Columbia
University Library are the papers of Peter Van Schaack, and in
the library of the General Theological Seminary are deposited the
cursory diary of Thomas B. Chandler and the somewhat more
valuable papers of Samuel Seabury.
The Historical Society of Pennsylvania also owns numerous col-
lections of loyalists' personal letters. Of particular importance is
the diary of Samuel Shoemaker, which provides a detailed ac-
count of life in London in 1784 and 1785. The letters of Joseph
Galloway and his daughter Elizabeth may be found in the Dreer
and Thompson collections, those of Phineas Bond in the Cad-
walader Collection, and those of Mr. and Mrs. Jacob Duch£ in
the Redwood Papers. Also of interest are the John Warder letter-
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Coombe MSS, and the journal of Samuel R. Fisher (microfilm).
Another Philadelphia library, that of the American Philosophi-
cal Society, has a small collection of material pertinent to the
loyalists in addition to the Franklin Papers, which contain some of
William Franklin's correspondence.
Although the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress
does not have a large number of original manuscripts relevant
to the loyalists, its holdings are of major importance. The Nicho-
las Low Papers contain many letters from that American's loyal
relatives, and the recently acquired personal letters of Joseph and
Elizabeth Galloway are particularly useful in illuminating as-
pects of the refugees' daily lives in London. The letters of Mrs.
Henry Barnes describe the details of life in the Massachusetts
colony at Bristol. Further, the brief diary of Thomas Moffat
(1775-1777), the Andrew Bell MSS, the Peter Van Schaack MSS,
and the John Singleton Copley MSS include material of interest.
In addition, the LCMD owns forty-two volumes labeled "Pro-
ceedings of the Loyalist Commissioners," which are for the most
part notes pertaining to claims cases heard in Canada.
It should be pointed out that the Library of Congress Manu-
script Division is also the repository for a large number of tran-
scripts and reproductions of documents from the Public Record
Office in London. Most of the important volumes of Colonial
Office 5 have been transcribed or filmed for the division, which
also has microfilms of all of Audit Office 12 and 13, as well as
parts of T 29. In addition, the LCMD has extensive transcripts
from the papers of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel
in Foreign Parts and photostats of some of the Hutchinson papers
from the British Museum.
Other American libraries have limited but significant holdings
on the loyalists. In the Harvard University Library are the Jared
Sparks MSS, the most relevant component of which is the George
Chalmers collection. Here may be found information concerning
both the Loyalist Association of 1779 and the board of loyalist
agents. Also deposited in the Harvard University Library are the
journal of George Inman, which is owned by the Cambridge His-272 Essay on Sources
torical Society, and a microfilm of the letterbook of William Vas-
sall. At the Yale University Library is the Knollenberg Collection,
a group of exceptionally useful letters written during the war by
Anglican clergymen in London to a friend in New York. The
Virginia Historical Society in Richmond possesses a number of
interesting letters of the Harrison Grays, father and son (pub-
lished in the Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, VIII
[1901], 225-36), and the Maryland Historical Society in Baltimore
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45, 254-255; as issue in peace nego-
tiations, 173-179; on Revolution,
analyzed, 256-259; see also claims,
loyalist; loyalist agents, board of;
Loyalist Association; loyalist exiles;
pensions, loyalist; by state; names
of individuals328 Index
loyalty: as factor in pension decisions,
116, 225-227; of most Americans,
loyalists on, 152-154, 157, 158—164;
as factor in claims decisions, 193,
202, 203, 216-217
loyalty acts, state, 25-26, 34-35
Ludlow, Gabriel, 241
Ludlow, George Duncan, 241
McCulloh, Henry E., 305 n.4
Mackenzie, Robert, 211, 224
Macknight, Thomas, 28, 187, 233-234
Maier, Pauline, 4
Maine, 105
mandamus councilors (Mass.), 14-15,
54
Margate, Eng., 94
Marie Antoinette, 92
Marsh, John, 192, 202, 211, 227
Martin, Josiah, 71
Maryland loyalists: number in Eng-
land, 37; urge conquest of their
province, 157; agents of, 187, 305
n.4; see also names of individuals
Massachusetts: and Intolerable Acts,
12-16; and "New Ireland," 107; be-
ginnings of Revolution in, loyalists
on, 142—145, 150; and return of loy-
alists, 242,246—248
Massachusetts Government Act, 13-
H, 151
Massachusetts loyalists: subjected to
abuse, 13-15, 25; in Boston, 29-30;
evacuated to Halifax, 30-31; mi-
grate to England, 31, 37—38, 169;
request financial assistance, 54; resi-
dences of, in London, 63, 66, 67;
meet in St. James's Park, 66—67;
 an(^
New England coffeehouse, 67-68;
relationship with Pennsylvanians,
70; social patterns of, in London,
72-73» 76^78; and New England
Club, 76-77; and Brompton Row
Club, 77; and Lane Son and Fraser,
77-78; leave London, 97; in Shrews-
bury, 98; in Birmingham, 98-99; in
Wales, 99-100; in Bristol, 100—102;
and "New Ireland," 105-107; and
Loyalist Association, 164; and loyal-
ist agents, 186-187; employed in
New Brunswick, 240—241; return to
Mass., 244, 247—248; see also names
of individuals
Mather, Mr. and Mrs. Samuel Jr., 100
Mathews, David, 238
Mayhew, Jonathan, 3
merchants, American loyalist, 49; in
London, 63, 66, 73; and pensions,
115, 227—228; and claims, 219—220;
committee of, 220, 229; settle in
Britain, 235
merchants, British: and Continental
Association, 43—44; and loyalists,
77-78, 175-176, 208
Miller, George, 247
ministry, North, 22, 43; and Thomas
Hutchinson, 45-49; and loyalist
pensions, 52-55; and employment
of loyalists, 105-110; and loyalists'
plans to win war, 157; and loyalists'
view of Revolution, 161, 166—167,
168; falls, 171; see also Dartmouth,
Lord; Germain, Lord George;
North, Lord Frederick
ministry, North-Fox, 190—191; see
also North, Lord Frederick; Fox,
Charles James
ministry, Pitt, 240; see also Pitt, Wil-
liam
ministry, Rockingham, 112, 171-172;
see also Rockingham, Lord; Shel-
burne, Lord
ministry, Shelburne: and peace nego-
tiations, 174-175, 177-178; expecta-
tions of, regarding compensation
for loyalists, 182-184; attacked, 187;Index 329
falls, 188-189; see also Shelburne,
Lord; Townshend, Thomas
mobs, 26, 28; in Massachusetts, 14-15,
25, 150; and Stamp Act, 148
Moffat, Thomas, 46
Moore's Creek Bridge, N.C. (battle),
34
Morristown, N.J., 190
Munro, Harry, 126-127
Murray, John, 99
need: as factor in pension decisions,
116-117, 225-227
Negroes, 172, 226
New Brunswick: creation of, 239-240;
loyalists employed in, 240-242
New England: role of, in Revolution,
loyalists on, 142—145, 148, 150—152
New England Club (London), 76-77;
see also Brompton Row Club
New England coffeehouse (London),
67,77
Newfoundland, 104, 174, 179
Newgate prison (London), 81
New Hampshire loyalists: number in
England, 37; and Loyalist Associa-
tion, 164; and loyalist agents, 187,
305 n.2, 305 n.4; see also names of
individuals
"New Ireland," 105-107, 110
New Jersey: and return of loyalists,
246
New Jersey loyalists: number in Eng-
land, 37; and Loyalist Association,
164; agents of, 186, 305 n.4; see also
names of individuals
New York (city), 118-119, 224; loyal-
ists in, 32-34, 70, 165-166, 168, 171,
172; evacuation of, 33, 68, 236
New York (state), 102, 142, 246
New York coffeehouse (London), 67-
68
New York loyalists: number in Eng-
land, 37; emigration patterns of, 38;
residences of, in London, 66; and
New York coffeehouse, 67-68; in
Chester 98; in Wales, 100; employed
in New Brunswick, 240—241; agents
of, 305 n.4; and debts, 309 n.49; see
also names of individuals
New York Triumvirate, 141—142
North, Lord Frederick, 44, 46-47, 52,
112; on "New Ireland," 105; concil-
iation plan of, loyalists on, 155-156;
and loyalist agents, 186; coalition
with C. J. Fox, 189; and half pay,
230; see also ministry, North; min-
istry, North-Fox
North Carolina, 34-35
North Carolina loyalists: number in
England, 37; and Carolina coffee-
house, 67—68; agents of, 187, 305 n.4;
publications of, 305 n.7; committee
of, 306 n.9; see also names of indi-
viduals
Nova Scotia: loyalists in, 30-31, 104-
105, 205, 237—239; claims hearings
in, 210—211; loyalists on, 235, 237;
bishopric of, 238-239; partition of,
239—240
Nutting, John, 105—106
Observations on the Fifth Article of
the Treaty with America (Gallo-
way), 191
Odell, Jonathan, 240
Ogden, David, 305 n.4
Ogilvie, Charles, 305 n.4
Oliver, Daniel, 99, 100
Oliver, Louisa, 99
Oliver, Peter, 30, 31, 94, 131, 259; in
Birmingham, 98-99; and "New Ire-
land," 106-107; and pension revi-
sion, 120; on Revolution, 134, 138,
140, 142, 143, 147, 149-150'
 l69»
 an
d
Loyalist Association, 16433<> Index
Oliver, Peter Jr., 60, 98-99
Oliver, Thomas, 54, 73; mobbed, 15-
16; and Halifax, 30—31
Oswald, Richard, 173-178, 180, 182
Oxnard, Edward: on London attrac-
tions, 66-67,
 8o>
 82>
 83> 86, 90-91;
associations of, in London, 73, 76,
77; and clubs, 76; on Bath, 94; men-
tal attitude of, 95, 156
Paris, France, 92, 94, 173
Parker, James, 305 n.4
Parliament, 12, 151; and loyalist pen-
sions, 55, 119; investigates conduct
of war, 158, 161—162; and peace
treaty, 175, 182-183; loyalist peti-
tions to, 187-188, 212, 220; censures
Shelburne ministry, 188-189; and
compensation act (1783), 190-192;
and loyalist claims, 202, 206-209,
212-216, 219, 221; and half pay for
loyalist officers, 230—231; see also
House of Commons
Parr, John, 237-238
Patterson, John, 162, 165
Paxton, Charles, 73, 78
peace negotiations, 173-179; see also
Treaty of Paris
Pemberton, Jeremy, 211, 224, 238
Pennsylvania, 38, 248
Pennsylvania coffeehouse (London),
67-68
Pennsylvania loyalists, 70, 72; number
in England, 37; and Pennsylvania
coffeehouse, 67—68; in Bristol, 102;
and Loyalist Association, 164;
agents of, 186; in Birmingham, 290
n.9; see also names of individuals
Penobscot Bay, 105-107, 110
pensions, loyalist: beginning of, 52-53;
formalized, 54; described, 54-60;
exiles on, 55—56, 58, 59—60, 120—121;
and Benjamin Thompson, 58-59;
some stopped or reduced, 110-112,
293 n.38; revision of, 114-121; re-
quests for, heard by Wilmot and
Coke, 190, 196; allotted by claims
commission, 225-227; final settle-
ment of, 227-229; Brook Watson
and, 241; original list of, 284 n.34
Pepperrell, Sir William, 72-73; and
"New Ireland," 107; mental atti-
tude of, 124, 125, 128; and Loyalist
Association, 162; and loyalist agents,
186, 305 n.4; influence of, on New
Brunswick appointments, 240-241
Peters, Samuel, 61, 63, 127, 131, 245;
and loyalist agents, 186-187; and
Nova Scotia bishopric, 239; hopes
for reunification of U.S. and Brit-
ain, 254; applies for aid, 283 n.29
Philadelphia, Pa., 40, 96, 159
Pickman, Benjamin, 99, 126, 128
Pimlico (London), 63
Pitt, William: and loyalist agents,
206-207; and claims, 209-210, 213-
214, 219, 221; and pensions, 228;
and half pay, 230-231; see also min-
istry, Pitt
pleasure gardens (London), 90-91
Plenderleath, Mr. and Mrs. John, 100
Powell, James E., 313 n.27
professional men, loyalist: and em-
ployment in England, 49-50, 52;
pensions of, 115, 228-229; compen-
sation for, 201, 212, 310 n.57; settle
in England, 235-236; in Canada, 237
property, loyalists': as factor in pen-
sion decisions, 116-117; as issue in
peace negotiations, 173—174, 176,
177—179, 182; some not compensated
for, 193-194, 201; sale of, in Ameri-
can states, 207; fraudulent claims
for loss of, 217-218; patterns of
compensation for, 219-220; in Flor-
ida, 224Index 33*
Putnam, James, 100, 241
Quebec, 210-211, 237
Quincy, Samuel: in London, 62, 66—67,
71; and New England Club, 76; ob-
tains post in Antigua, 103
radicals, American, 4, 5, 7, 24-25; be-
liefs of, 43-45; see also revolution-
aries, American
Randolph, John, 72, 120, 126, 287 n.14
Ranelagh Gardens (London), 90-91
Rapelje, John, 255
Reasons why no Deductions ought to
be Made from the Amounts of Sums
due to the American Loyalists, 213
republicanism: loyalists on, 141, 142-
*45> W W-W
Revolution, American: causes of, loy-
alists on, 124—125, 132—146; loyalist
histories of, 130—131; beginnings of,
loyalists on, 146-152; Loyalist Asso-
ciation and,165
revolutionaries, American: and loyal-
ists, 25—28, 34—35; loyalists on, 140—
143, 148-152, 168-169, 172; ana-
lyzed, 256-258
Revolutionary War: effects of, on loy-
alists; 24-41; 110-111; loyalists on,
96-97> i55-i6o» 167-173
Rhode Island loyalists: number in
England, 37; and Loyalist Associa-
tion, 164; agents of, 305 n.4; see also
names of individuals
Richardson, Ebenezer, 283 n.29
Robertson, James, 313 n.27
Rockingham, Lord, 112, 114; see also
ministry, Rockingham
Rome, George, 163, 305 n.4
Rowe, Milward, 53-54, 60
Roy, William, 231, 232, 234
Royall, Isaac, 101
Rumford, Count. See Thompson,
Benjamin
Sadler's Wells (London), 82
St. James's Park (London), 66-67, 8°
St. Paul's Cathedral, 80
Salem, Mass.: loyalists from, in Eng-
land, 73, 98
Saltonstall, Richard, 100
Saratoga, N.Y. (battle): impact of, on
loyalists, 40, 95, 96—97, 102-103, 111;
122, 130-131, 155; impact of, on
British strategy, 154, 167
Sargent, John, 99
Savage, Arthur, 71
Savage, John, 71
Savannah, Ga.: falls to British, 34,
167; as loyalist haven, 35—36, 108;
evacuation of, 36
Scotland, 205, 235
Scott, John Morin, 142
Seabury, Samuel, 17; on Continental
Congress, 20-21; on Revolution,
141, 151; and Nova Scotia bishopric,
239
Sewall, Jonathan, 73, 125, 236; on be-
sieged Boston, 29; and clubs, 76; on
causes of Revolution, 124; on inde-
pendence, 251
Shays' Rebellion, 253
Shelburne, Lord, 114, 172; on fifth
article of treaty, 182-183; and loyal-
ist agents, 186-187; see also min-
istry, Shelburne
Shoemaker, Samuel, 102, 205; London
associations of, 70-71, 241; returns
to Pennsylvania, 248
Shrewsbury, Eng., 98
Siddons, Mrs., 86
Sidmouth, Eng., 51
Simpson, James, 138, 157; and attempt
to restore civil government in S.C.,
108-110; and claims, 194, 204; and332 Index
Simpson, James (continued)
loyalist agents, 305 n.4
Smith, Isaac, 51, 127, 248
Smith, William, 7, 70, 100, 142, 252,
257; on London attractions, 80-81,
83, 90, 91-92; and restoration of
civil government in America, 109;
and salary, 113-114, 121; and
claims, 199, 207, 210; named chief
justice of Quebec, 237; on Charles
Inglis, 239; and Brook Watson, 241;
on U.S., 253, 254; information col-
lected by, 302 n.32
Smyth, John F. D., 217-218
Society for the Propagation of the
Gospel in Foreign Parts: mission-
aries of, 17, 25, 104-105; continues
salary of missionaries, 50; see also
clergymen, Anglican
Soho (London), 63, 66
South Carolina, 34-36; attempts to
restore civil government in, 109—
110; and return of loyalists, 246
South Carolina loyalists, 72; number
in England, 37; emigration patterns
of, 38; and Carolina coffeehouse,
67-68; in Bristol, 102; return to
S.C., 109, 112, 244, 247; and Loyalist
Association, 164; agents of, 186—187,
305 n.4; committee of, 189-190, 310
n.66; and claims, 204, 216-217; see
also names of individuals
Sower, Christopher, 241-242
Spencer, Betsy, 91
Spring Garden coffeehouse (London),
162
Stamp Act, 3-4; loyalists on, 135, 148-
149
Startin, Mr. and Mrs. Charles, 99, 102
state governments: loyalists on, 172;
and return of loyalists, 243—244, 246
Stedman, Charles, 311 n.3
Steuart, Charles, 118
Stokes, Anthony: returns to Georgia,
108, 128, 131; on causes of Revolu-
tion, 134, 136; and employment,
236, 238
Strachey, Henry, 175-179, 180
Summary Case of the American Loyal-
ists, The, 206-207
Swan, Thomas, 120
tarring and feathering: use of, exag-
gerated, 28
Tatnall, Josiah, 313 n.27
Taylor, Joseph, 73, 76, 248
Temple, Robert, 169
theater (London), 83, 86, 90
Thompson, Benjamin: career of, 58,
236; influence of, on pensions, 58-
59; influence of, on employment,
103, 107; and Joseph Galloway, 161;
and half pay, 230
Tower of London, 80
Townshend, Thomas, 174—175, 176,
178
Townshend Acts, 4, 53; Loyalists on,
Treasury, Lords of: and loyalist pen-
sions, 52-55, 56, 59-60, 103, 110,
111-113; order southerners to re-
turn to America, 110, 112; and pen-
sion revision, 113-121; and customs
officers, 118-119; and fraudulent
claims, 218; and half-pay system,
231-232, 234; and loyalist settle-
ments in Canada, 237
Treaty of Paris, 92; preliminary
drafts of, 174, 176, 177-178; fourth
article of, 175, 208, 209, 243, 247;
fifth article of, 177, 178-184, 190,
191, 243, 246; loyalists on, 182, 187—
188; enforcement of, 206, 244-245;
see also peace negotiations
Tyburn (London), 81—82Index 333
United States, 174, 179; loyalist
claims investigated in, 195, 211; re-
turn of loyalists to, 242-249; loyal-
ists on, 253-255
Upham, Joshua, 240-241
Van Schaack, Peter, 128, 177, 248
Vardill, John, 45, 239, 277 n.4
Vauxhall Gardens (London), 90
Virginia: and return of loyalists, 242-
243
Virginia loyalists, 72; number in Eng-
land, 37; in Glasgow, 98; ordered to
return to America, 112; and Loyal-
ist Association, 164; agents of, 186,
305 n.4; committee of, 189; see also
names of individuals
Wales, 99-100
Walter, William, 239
Washington, George, 24, 30, 254
Watson, Brook, 240-242
Watts, John, 182, 210, 223
Weeks, Joshua W., 104-105, 125
Wells, Helena, 235-236
Wells, Louisa, 42
Wentworth, Benning, 305 n.4
Wentworth, John, 58, 106, 187, 237
Wentworth, John Jr., 305 n.4
Wentworth, Paul, 305 n4
West, Benjamin, 70, 81
West Indies, 35, 36, 252; loyalists in,
236, 281 n.45, 309 n.55, 313 n.27; see
also Antigua; Bahama Islands; Ber-
muda
Westminster (London), 63, 67
Westminster Abbey, 80
Whig Club (Manhattan), 142
Wilmot, George, 283 n.29
Wilmot, John Eardley: and loyalist
pensions, 114-121, 196, 225-226; on
loyalists, 183, 256; on treaty, 183;
and claims commission, 190-192,
202, 203, 211, 214, 219; on loyalist
agents, 192, 212
Wilson, Cumberland, 220
Winslow, Hannah, 59, 66, 125
Wiswall, John, 25, 29
witnesses: in claims hearings, 195,
202-205
Woodruff, Robert, 309 n.56
Worcester, Mass., 190
Wright, Sir James, 108, 157; and loy-
alist agents, 187, 308 n.45
Yale College, 17
Yonge, Sir George, 231-232
York town, Va. (battle): impact of, on
loyalists, 36, 40-41, 107, 112, 171-
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